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The major advances in the identification of the human genome that took place from 
the early 1990s onwards triggered a significant increase in the number of patent 
applications concerning newly discovered human gene sequences that nevertheless 
failed to disclose the function of the isolated material, and thus did not meet the 
patent law requirement of industrial application. In order to address this issue the 
1998 Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions (Biotech 
Directive)
1
 required patent applicants to disclose the industrial applicability of 
inventions covering human gene sequences and related proteins at the time of the 
patent application. Furthermore, the Biotech Directive established functionality-
related protection for all types of genetic inventions, thus restricting the scope of 
protection granted to human genetic inventions to their ability to perform the 
industrial application disclosed by the applicant. 
This thesis analyses the implications of the Biotech Directive’s approach towards the 
industrial application of human genes and fragments thereof in respect of three 
issues: the assessment of the industrial applicability of inventions concerning 
sequences or partial sequences of human genes; the distinction between discoveries 
and patentable inventions when the claimed subject matter is human genetic material; 
and the determination of the scope of protection awarded to patents over genetic 
information. 
The thesis argues that the requirement of industrial application can act as an efficient 
checkpoint for preventing the grant of patents over human genetic discoveries of no 
practical benefit to society, but also for impeding the issuance of overly broad 
patents in this field. At the same time, a strict interpretation of this requirement does 
not imply that patent authorities will systematically overlook the interests of private 
                                                 
1
 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal 




firms, but it is intended to set a realistic standard that serves to avoid the rise of 
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Nature is the source of all true knowledge. She has her own logic, her own laws, 
she has no effect without cause nor invention without necessity 
Leonardo da Vinci 
1.1. Background 
The term biotechnology was first coined by the Hungarian engineer Károly Ereky in 
1919 to refer to the process of producing substances from raw materials with the aid 
of living organisms.
2
 Today, biotechnology is broadly defined as any technological 
application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to 
make or modify products or processes for specific use.
3
  
The vast potential of biotechnology to improve human and animal health, increase 
agricultural production and protect the environment has been acknowledged in 
multiple intergovernmental meetings including the 1992 United Nations (UN) Earth 
Summit.
4
 In fact, over the last few years, the level of innovation in biotech sciences 
has often been used as an indicator of a country’s competitiveness and economic 
performance. Furthermore, governments worldwide usually consider biotechnology 
to be a key asset for securing a more competitive and sustainable future. In this 
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regard, promoting innovation in biotechnology currently forms an integral part of the 
European Union’s (EU) strategy towards a knowledge-based economy. 
The origins of biotechnological techniques date back to the ancient times. By 2300 
BC Egyptians had already started to use microorganisms in the brewing processes for 
making products such as beer, wine and cheese.
5
 However, modern biotechnology, 
which has had a major impact on the development of today’s biotech industry, is 
mainly based on the scientific advances that have taken place since the nineteenth 
century. 
The science of zymotechnology, which appeared in late nineteenth century and 
included all types of industrial fermentation, rather than just brewing, played a 
crucial role in bridging the gap between old biotechnology and modern genetic 
engineering.
6
 At the same time, Gregor Mendel’s experiments on plant and animal 
breeding made it possible to define the rules of heredity,
7
 which represented a 
tremendous step towards understanding the genetics of organisms. Mendel’s theories 
in combination with the chromosome theory of inheritance by Thomas Morgan 
constituted the core of classical genetics. The discipline of molecular biology 
developed in the subsequent decades. 
In the twentieth century, growing bonds between biology and engineering led to the 
development of biotechnology as a science. The 1953 discovery of the 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) structure and the development of a recombinant DNA 
technique in 1973 constitute the two key events that set the groundwork for new and 
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revolutionary advances in biotech sciences. Based on Mendel’s laws, geneticists 
began to speculate about the chemical structure and functioning of the gene, and the 
relationship between genes and proteins, at the start of the twentieth century.
8
  
The discovery that DNA is the genetic material of organisms started with Griffith’s 
experiments in 1928, who showed that nonvirulent bacteria strains could be 
genetically transformed with a substance derived from a heat-killed pathogenic 
strain.
9
 Based on further experimental evidence, Crick and Watson proposed the 
double-helical structure of DNA, in which two complementary polynucleotide chains 
(made out of the primary nucleobases adenine, thymine, guanine and cytosine) are 
twisted around each other, held together by hydrogen bonds between pairs of bases, 
to form a regular double helix.
10
 In April 1953, the international scientific journal 
‘Nature’ published a communication from the two researchers at the Cavendish 
Laboratory at the University of Cambridge in England, explaining the double helix 
molecular structure of DNA.
11
 This publication, which was further supported by a 
second article,
12
 proposed the new model of DNA together with some of its genetic 
implications.  
By the autumn of 1953, the ‘central dogma’ was that chromosomal DNA functions 
were the template for ribonucleic acid (RNA) molecules, which subsequently moved 
to the cytoplasm of eukaryotic cells, where they determine the arrangement of amino 
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 Information hence flows from DNA to RNA and then to 
protein. In previous decades, investigators had never seen and rarely studied 
elements such as DNA and proteins.
14
 Thus, the scientific foundation established by 
Crick and Watson allowed a better understanding of previous discoveries, provoking 
a great transformation of life sciences. 
Two decades later, Cohen and Boyer invented a methodology for cutting and splicing 
DNA segments from different sources, making it possible to transfer genes from one 
source to the DNA of a different specie. This technology, known as recombinant 
DNA, set the basis of genetic engineering by allowing the insertion of a fragment of 
DNA from one cell, for example a human cell, into the genetic sequence of another 
host cell, for example a bacterium; and then its activation so that the host begins to 
produce the protein encoded by the inserted DNA sequence. Recombinant DNA has 
helped investigators to study cancer cells, programmed cell death, antibody 
production, hormone action, and other fundamental biological processes.
15
 The 
practical implications of this method include the production of human insulin, which 
reached the market in 1982 and gradually replaced the insulin extracted from porcine 
or bovine pancreas,
16
 human growth hormones, drugs to treat anemia, cardiovascular 
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Soon after recombinant DNA technology was first developed, the distinction 
between traditional and modern biotechnology was adopted. ‘Traditional 
biotechnology’ refers to the use of living matter in fermentation, like beer brewing or 
bread making, and plant and animal hybridization. In contrast, ‘modern 
biotechnology’ is used to refer to more advanced techniques like manipulation of an 




Since the 1990s, biotech research has been principally focused on the act of 
identifying which stretches of DNA in an organism correspond to which genes, and 
recombinant products and processes. Moreover, molecular research started to be 
increasingly focused on commercial applications, which blurred the boundaries 
between academic (public) and industrial (private) activities.
19
 Most recent advances 
in genetic engineering include protein engineering, nanobiotechnology,
20
 DNA 
shuffling, and gene therapy.  
With the rapid advancement of genetic engineering techniques, patent protection has 
become a fundamental asset for companies in this industry. Patent rights are 
government-granted limited monopolies attached to inventions that comply with the 
requirements of novelty, inventiveness (non-obviousness) and industrial application 
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(utility), and are not excluded from patentability.
21
 Patents are negative legal rights 
with potential economic value, which give owners temporary rights to prevent others 
from using, making or selling a particular invention. Amongst others, patents can be 
used for preventing duplication, blocking competitors, securing royalty fees or 
negotiating licensing contracts.
22
 For example, a patent right could be infringed if 
someone sells or otherwise commercialises the invention without the holder’s 
consent, which gives the owner the possibility to enforce his rights in court and 
obtain a compensation for the invention’s benefits that have been unlawfully 
obtained by the infringer, and other costs incurred. 
In order to secure continuous research, companies need to somehow guarantee that 
investors will be able to capture the value of their creations and recover the invested 
amounts. In this regard, investors usually see patents on the inventions resulting from 
the financed research as the best indicator that a company is competitive and that the 
project is achieving its objectives. Thus, today having a valuable patent portfolio is 
very important for maintaining a competitive market position, especially for 
biotechnology firms, which require vast amounts of money to carry out research. 
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During the 1990s and 2000s the gap between policy and life sciences developments 
became a primary concern in the EU, which led policy makers to focus on adopting 
different measures to foster research and innovation in this field. In this regard, 
patent protection was seen as a crucial element for attracting investors and promoting 
the successful development of a competitive biotechnology industry in Europe. 
The European Patent Convention (EPC) does not contain any express provision 
excluding genetic inventions from patentability, while Article 27(1) of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement)
23
 requires that patents are to be available for all fields of technology. 
However, even though patent laws do not prohibit the patentability of inventions 
concerning (human) genetic material, the intrinsic characteristics of these types of 
inventions pose challenges to the application of general patent law rules. For 
instance, since the launch of the Human Genome Project (HGP) in the 1990s, there 
has been a significant increase in the number of patent applications concerning 
human genes and partial sequences, many of which do not easily meet traditional 
patentability standards. In particular, it has been common to find patent applications 
over newly discovered, isolated human DNA sequences (and related proteins) for 
which an industrial application has not yet been identified.  
Discussions about the patentability of human genetic inventions were usually 
focused on questions regarding the novelty, inventiveness or ethical implications of 
these types of patent applications. However, with the advent of more and more patent 
claims concerning isolated human genes and gene sequences without a known 
practical utility in industry, the patent law requirement of industrial application has 
proved to be a difficult standard to fulfill for these kinds of inventions. In 
consequence, the criterion of industrial application has become a key issue in the 
debate over the patentability of human genes.  
This was especially controversial since the requirement of industrial application is 
essential to ensure that patents are granted to those inventions that make a 
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contribution to the art that has a real applicability in industry. In the case of gene 
patents, this requirement serves to guarantee that society is not deprived from using 
inventions concerning human genetic material, such as diagnostic tests, if the 
patentee has not been able to indicate what the invention’s practical utility in industry 
is. 
The 1998 Biotech Directive has attempted to address this question by introducing a 
number of provisions that give the requirement of industrial application a 
determinant role in the patenting of human DNA sequences. The aim was to ensure 
that patents over genes and gene sequences of human origin contain a real practical 
value for society that justifies the grant of monopoly rights to such inventions. 
Moreover, the Biotech Directive did not only raise the industrial applicability 
standard per se, but further analysis of its text reveals a close link between this 
requirement and other important provisions in gene patenting such as the exclusion 
from patentability of discoveries and the determination of the scope of protection. As 
a result, the criterion of industrial application itself and in its different dimensions, 
that is, in connection with other patent law elements, has now a central position in 
the patenting of genetic material.  
1.2. Terminology 
1.2.1. Biotechnology: 
This thesis uses the term ‘biotechnology’ to refer to the techniques that developed 
after the discovery of the DNA structure in the 1950s. In particular, it refers to the 
advances in genetic engineering that form part of what is known as modern 
biotechnology as opposed to traditional biotechnological techniques like 
fermentation.  
1.2.2. Genetic Invention, Gene Patent, Genetic Patent, DNA Invention, DNA 
Patent 
This thesis employs the terms ‘genetic invention’, ‘gene patent’, ‘genetic patent’, 




in the field of genetic engineering.  In most cases, the genetic inventions or genetic 
patents referred to in this thesis relate to gene sequences, like DNA or amino acid 
sequences, of human origin. However, in some instances, the thesis refers to genetic 
inventions or patents in general, no matter the origin of the genetic material, or to 
animal or plant genetic inventions or patents. In all cases, the text of the thesis will 
specify the origin of the genetic material concerned. 
1.3. Hypothesis And Research Questions 
This thesis is based on the hypothesis that, without imposing an unrealistic 
insurmountable hurdle to the patentability of human genetic material, the European 
patent law requirement of industrial application for human DNA inventions can act 
as an effective mechanism for preventing the grant of patents over genetic 
discoveries that would not bring a practical benefit to society, but would rather pose 
undue barriers to the progress of further research. 
This hypothesis is tested by introducing two questions: 
- What is the rationale behind and purpose of the requirement of industrial 
application in general and with regard to human gene patents? 
- What are the implications of the Biotech Directive’s more stringent approach 
towards the industrial application of human genetic material in the patentability of 
human gene sequences, the interpretation of the exclusion of discoveries and the 
determination of the scope of patent protection for inventions in this field? 
1.4. Methodology 
In order to obtain the relevant evidence to test this hypothesis, the research questions 
above are broken down into three steps: 
- Identifying the connection between the justification and historical development of 




behind the Biotech Directive’s introduction of a strict approach towards this 
requirement for inventions over human gene sequences.  
- Analysing the practical implementations of the Biotech Directive’s approach to the 
industrial application of human DNA and how it affects the assessment of the 
practical utility of human gene sequences and related proteins, the interpretation of 
the exclusion of discoveries within the context of human DNA inventions, and the 
determinantion of the scope of protection for these types of inventions. 
- Assessing the feasibility of using the industrial application standard to avoid the 
proliferation of patent clusters in important research areas and a potential 
‘anticommons’ situation. 
To answer these questions the thesis relies on primary sources such as legal texts and 
case law. It does so because these are the sources that produce the most reliable 
information to test the hypothesis. The legal documents and decisions analysed 
provide factual, first hand information for understanding the rationale and evaluating 
the practical implementation of the European approach towards the industrial 
application of human gene patents. The main legal texts used are the Strasbourg 
Convention,
24
 the EPC and EPC Implementing Regulations, the Biotech Directive, as 
well as the preparatory works of these laws. As regards the case law, the thesis relies 
on a selection of decisions from the European Patent Office (EPO), European 
national courts, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and United 
States (US) courts.  
Based on these sources, the thesis analyses the origin and historical significance of 
the requirement of industrial application in European patent law and the justification 
for adopting strict utility standards with regard to human genes. Furthermore, the 
decisions studied in this thesis illustrate the main characteristics of the current 
approach towards the interpretation of the requirement of industrial application 
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within the context of human gene patents, the role of this requirement in the 
distinction between human genetic discoveries and inventions, and the determination 
of the patent scope of genetic inventions. Thus, based on the study of the selected 
decisions, the thesis offers a comprehensive analysis of the practical role of industrial 
applicability in patenting human genes in Europe; that is, how the Biotech 
Directive’s approach towards the requirement of industrial application has impacted 
on the Implementing Regulations to the EPC and the decisions of the EPO and 
European courts. 
The thesis also relies on secondary sources for the explanation of the legal texts and 
decisions mentioned above, and for examining how the European strict approach to 
the industrial application of human genetic inventions and subsequent decisions have 
been received by the different stakeholders in the European patent system. In this 
regard, the secondary sources used in this thesis are the relevant legal and scientific 
literature, official reports from EU and national institutions, reports from other 
international and national institutions and organizations, reports and comments from 
international and national professional associations, information on websites and 
analyses of the author. The thesis also relies on these sources for discussing the 
potential role of the requirement of industrial application as a means to prevent the 
effects of extensive patenting in human gene technologies. 
Although the thesis delves into the historical evolution of the European patent law 
requirement of industrial application, merely relying on an historical research 
approach would not provide relevant and sufficient evidence for analysing the 
practical implications of the strict approach towards this requirement for human gene 
patents. Therefore, this thesis employs an historical research approach only in those 
parts of the thesis that explore the origin and justification of the patent law standard 
of industrial application, the rationale and negotiating process for the adoption of 
patent laws like the Strasbourg Convention, the EPC and the Biotech Directive, as 





On the other hand, a case study research approach or carrying out fieldwork have not 
been considered since the primary objective of the thesis is not to analyse the 
particular characteristics of a specific case, neither to discuss how the public 
understand or view the European stance towards the industrial applicability of human 
genes. In contrast, after explaining the significance of and rationale behind the 
European industrial application approach to human DNA inventions, this thesis seeks 
to explore its effective implementation and impact on the interpretation of other 
controversial patent law requirements in gene patenting such as the exclusion of 
mere discoveries and the delimitation of patent scope. Overall, the thesis aims to 
offer an exhaustive analysis of the significance and practical implications of the 
European industrial application criteria for human gene inventions as a policy option 
that is to be implemented by all EU Member States. 
1.5. Contribution 
Applying patent law rules adequately is crucial for meeting the objectives of fair 
reward that the patent system pursues. In the case of human gene inventions, the 
requirement of industrial application is particularly important since it ensures that 
exclusive rights over human body parts such as sequences or partial sequences of 
human genes are granted only to those creations that bring a real technical 
contribution to society. Given the importance of human gene inventions, especially 
in healthcare, it is crucial that society is only prevented from freely using inventions 
that meet such criterion.  
This thesis aims to demonstrate that current European patent law, through giving the 
requirement of industrial application a key role in the patenting of human genes and 
gene sequences, offers a balanced policy option for addressing important concerns 
regarding the patentability of human genes that can be effectively implemented 
across European countries. In particular, the European strict approach towards the 
industrial applicability of human genetic inventions is able to ensure that patents over 
these types of inventions make a technical contribution to the art that can actually be 




industrial applicability; and that the scope of patent protection awarded to such 
inventions corresponds and is limited to the invention’s ability to carry out its 
function, which in the case of human gene patents is the industrial application 
specified by the patentee. Furthermore, the new scenario has the potential to act as an 
effective checkpoint in the patenting of genetic inventions that would impose undue 
obstacles to further research, for instance by avoiding the patenting of abstract 
discoveries or overly broad claims that would contribute to the growth of patent 
clusters in important research fields such as genetic testing. 
The requirement of industrial application has historically been an easy standard to 
fulfill and thus has rarely been the focus of patent law discussions. However, in the 
case of inventions over human genes it has been shown that this requirement no 
longer imposes a low barrier to patentability. Nonetheless the research on 
biotechnology patenting has tended to be focused on whether human genes should be 
patented, the ethics of patenting genes or on whether isolated genes comply with the 
requirements of novelty and inventiveness; rather than the role of industrial 
applicability in gene patenting.  
In this regard, the thesis offers a comprehensive analysis of the role of industrial 
application in human gene patenting that will help to explain the different 
implications of the current approach towards the interpretation of this criterion in the 
patenting of inventions in this field. Furthermore, the findings of this thesis are 
relevant for understanding European patent law and policy regarding the industrial 
applicability of human genetic material, but also non-human genetic material since, 
for instance, the EPO interpretation of the Biotech Directive’s function disclosure 
requirement for human DNA sequences has become part of the general guidelines for 
interpreting the requirement of industrial applicability. Moreover, since the US has 
also taken a similar approach towards the utility of genetic and non-genetic 
inventions,
25
 this thesis assists with understanding US patent policy on the 
requirement of utility and its implications for patent applicants. 
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This thesis is based on the fact that human genetic information is patentable under 
certain conditions and focuses on how the European patent law requirement of 
industrial application is applied to inventions covering human DNA sequences. It 
sets aside questions over the patentability of human genetic material and other 
genetic products and processes like transgenic animals and plants, human stem cells 
or human embryos. These issues are very specific and raise different ethical and legal 
concerns. 
Neither is the thesis intended to offer an exhaustive comparison between the US 
patent law requirement of utility and the European requirement of industrial 
application within the context of gene patenting. However, since the US has 
historically taken a significantly rigorous approach towards utility, which was most 
recently consolidated in the US Utility Examination Guidelines in 2001, this thesis 
also makes reference to US policy and case law on the requirement of utility in order 
to further enhance our understanding of European policy, regulation and case law on 
the industrial applicability of human genetic inventions. An example would be when 
the preliminary works to the Biotech Directive’s requirement to disclose the 
industrial application of DNA sequences take into consideration the situation in the 
US, or when an EPO or national court’s decision make reference to US case law.  
1.7. Outline Of Chapters 
This thesis is comprised of six chapters and the introduction and conclusion.  
This chapter provides a general introduction to the thesis. The chapter reviews the 
historical development of the biotechnology industry and the difficulties in applying 
conventional European patent law rules to inventions in this field. In particular, the 
chapter presents the concerns regarding the lack of industrial application of patent 
claims over isolated human DNA sequences and the importance of this requirement 




outlines the hypothesis and contribution of the thesis, as well as the methodology that 
will be used to test the hypothesis. 
Chapter 2 reviews the issues surrounding the role of patents in innovation in life 
sciences industries, especially in gene technologies. The chapter first presents the 
rationale behind the establishment of patent systems and explores how these 
arguments relate to objectives of promoting creativity and technical innovation. 
Based on economic and other relevant data, the chapter then demonstrates the 
importance of patent protection for promoting innovation in the field of human 
genetics. Finally, the chapter discusses the historical background and process for the 
adoption of the Biotech Directive as well as related EU policies for the promotion of 
research and innovation in biotechnology. 
Chapter 3 relates to the European patent law requirement of industrial application. It 
studies the historical development and rationale behind this criterion, to then, by 
relying on the EPO legal texts and case law, analyse the interpretation and practical 
implementation of the EPC provisions regarding the requirement of industrial 
application as applicable to all fields of technology.  Finally, the chapter gives an 
account of the differences between the arguments for and against the adoption of a 
strict approach towards the assessment of an invention’s practical utility.  
Chapter 4 continues the discussion by focusing on the issues surrounding the 
assessment of the industrial application of inventions concerning human DNA. The 
chapter first explains from a scientific perspective how inventions based on human 
genetic information are developed, to then discuss the concerns regarding the high 
number of patent claims over isolated gene fragments and their corresponding 
proteins of unknown applicability in industry. Following this, the chapter explores 
the background, objectives and practical implementation of Article 5(3) of the 
Biotech Directive, which deals with the industrial applicability of human genetic 
inventions by requiring applicants to disclose the specific function of the human 
genetic material claimed in the patent application. In this regard, the chapter includes 
a discussion of the case of Eli Lilly v. Human Genome Sciences before both the 




practical terms. This case was prioritised because it provides an accurate synthesis of 
the EPO case law on the industrial application of human DNA and also shows how 
the EPO and national courts can arrive at a common approach towards interpreting 
the requirement set out in Article 5(3) of the Biotech Directive.  
Chapter 5 expands the analysis into the effect that the Biotech Directive’s 
requirement of disclosing the industrial application of the claimed human gene 
sequences has on the European distinction between mere discoveries and patentable 
inventions within the context of human genetic substances. This chapter shows the 
important role of the criterion of practical applicability in the assessment of the 
inherent requirement for an invention in European patent law in general, and within 
the context of isolated human genes in particular. In this regard, the chapter analyses 
the significance of Article 5(3) of the Biotech Directive as a new element in the 
distinction between discoveries and inventions in the case of human gene sequences. 
It discusses the justification, interpretation and implications of such approach.  
Chapter 6 then focuses on the role of the requirement of industrial application in the 
determination of the scope of protection granted to genetic inventions in Europe. 
After highlighting the importance of well-defined patent scopes and outlining the 
main economic theories on the optimal size of patent protection, the chapter 
illustrates the EPO approach towards the definition of the patent scope of genetic 
inventions to then show how Article 9 of the Biotech Directive further restricts the 
scope of protection granted to human gene patents to the invention’s capability of 
performing the industrial application claimed by the patentee. In this regard, the 
chapter reviews the historical background, objectives and interpretation of this 
provision as abolishing absolute product protection for human gene patents. Finally, 
the chapter examines the decision of the CJEU in Monsanto v. Cefetra interpreting 
Article 9 of the Biotech Directive and its implications for gene patents. 
After having explored the impact of the Biotech Directive’s approach towards the 
industrial application of human genetic inventions in different contexts in the 
previous chapters of the thesis - that is, the assessment of the industrial application of 




inventions, and the determination of the scope of protection - Chapter 7 discusses the 
role that this criterion could play in reducing the negative effects associated with 
extensive patenting in the field of genetics. To this end, this chapter analyses the 
serious consequences that excessive patenting and fragmentation of rights may have 
on the progress of innovation in gene technologies and why existing access 
mechanisms fall short in addressing this issue. Following this, the chapter then 
explains how, besides other ex post promising solutions, the Biotech Directive’s 
strict approach towards the implementation of the industrial application requirement 

















2. GENETIC INVENTIONS AND PATENT LAW IN 
EUROPE 
2.1. Introduction 
The role of patents in promoting innovation is to some extent questionable. However, 
in the case of biotechnology the specific characteristics of companies in this industry 
make patents a crucial means for incentivizing research and innovation in this field. 
Nonetheless, the intrinsic features of biotechnological inventions pose significant 
challenges to the application of long standing patent law rules. In Europe, growing 
interests in promoting innovation in biotechnology and genetics led to the adoption 
of different rules and policies to facilitate the patentability of biotechnological 
inventions, including those concerning human genetic information. In particular, the 
1998 Biotech Directive set the basis for a new era of patent law and practice 
regarding the patentability of living matter.  
This chapter first examines the economic rationale and justifications for the creation 
of patent systems and the role of patent protection for promoting innovation in 
genetics. The chapter then explores the background and process for the adoption of 
the 1998 Biotech Directive as well as existing EU policies for the promotion of 
research and innovation in biotechnology. 
2.2. Patents And Human Genetics 
2.2.1. The Economics Of The Patent System 
The concept of ‘invention’ is similar but different from ‘innovation’. Invention 




application and the marketing of inventions and thus follows the patent.
26
 Innovation 
can be defined as a change in ideas, practices or objects involving some degree of 
novelty and success in application. In contrast, ‘innovation system’ refers to the 
utilization of innovations through a network of various actors within an institutional 
framework.
27
 Patent rights are believed to have a significant impact on both the level 
of innovation and the functioning of innovation systems. 
The emergence of patents is part of the evolution of market economies and 
capitalism. In Antiquity and the Middle Ages, although inventors were rewarded by 
further contracts or promotions, there was no formal protection of inventions and 
organized secrecy prevailed.
28
 The idea that some kind of monopoly over inventions 
could be used to promote innovation appeared in the Greek city of Sybaris in 500 
BC, where the king would grant one-year exclusive rights to chefs who invented a 
new recipe.
29
  Then in the late Middle Ages, different kinds of privileges rewarding 
inventions were granted in northern Italy in order to attract foreign craftsmen with 
new abilities.
30
  An example is the Brunelleschi’s patent for a system that would 
transport marble up the Arno River. The patent was granted by the city of Florence in 
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1426 and formalized in the Venice Statute in 1474,
31
 which contained all the 
essential elements of modern patent law, namely, the patentability requirements, the 
requirement of registration, basic rules of infringement, right to license, limited 
duration, and remedies of damages and delivery up.
32
  In particular, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the requirement of industrial application, or for 
an invention to be useful, was an essential part of this very early form of patent law 
and continued to be a key element in the subsequent evolution and justification of 
patent systems. Although much more refined, this criterion along with the other 
provisions was included in the Venice Statute, which constitutes the basis of modern 
patent systems. 
Soon after the Venice Statute was adopted, patents started to be granted in England, 
France and Germany. The 1624 Statute of Monopolies was the basis for the further 
development of patent laws in England. Then by the early nineteenth century, patent 
laws had been passed in France, Germany and then many countries in continental 
Europe.
33
 This was related to the spread of the industrial revolution and market 
economies and to the emergence of the modern state and the rule of law.
34
 In fact, the 
development of patent laws during the Modern Era in Europe occurred 
simultaneously with the progressive introduction of new manufacturing processes in 
European industries. In this regard, as will be discussed later in this thesis, a primary 
aim of patent laws was to promote industrial development, which gave the 
requirement for an invention to be useful in industry a key role in achieving such 
objective.   
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At the end of the ninetheenth century, most advanced countries had a robust system 
of patent law, so governments started to focus on harmonization.
35
 In this context, 
the 1883 Paris Convention set the basis for future steps towards harmonizing 
intellectual property laws.
36
 In respect of patents, European harmonization efforts 
culminated with the adoption of the Strasbourg Convention in 1963 and the 
subsequent EPC in 1973. 
Today, innovation is a crucial element in the determination of a country’s level of 
development and competitiveness. The idea that the true wealth of nations mostly 
lies in their innovative activity began to prevail after World War II, and has been 
reinforced by the increasing global competition in technological innovation.
37
 
Furthermore, there is the argument that innovation is essential for overcoming 
today’s conditions of growing scarcity of resources.
38
 Thus, establishing mechanisms 
for promoting investment on innovative research has been a priority for governments 
in most conutries.  
Throughout history, economists have repeatedly acknowledged the role of patents in 
promoting creativity and technical innovation. In 1937 Adam Smith recognized the 
importance of patents to safeguard innovation arguing that the grant of a temporary 
trade monopoly to a company venturing into a new market, such as the grant of a 
patent to an inventor, is a way for the state to compensate innovators for ‘hazarding a 
dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public is afterwards to reap the 
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 Under this view, the patent system would basically be a means to promote 
technical, economic and, ultimately, social progress.  
The thesis that the grant of monopolies promotes innovation is commonly associated 
with Joseph Schumpeter’s analysis on how monopoly conditions may enable and 
accelerate innovation and growth more effectively than competition in a dynamic 
capitalist system.
40
 According to Schumpeter, this can be achieved through a process 
of creative destruction,
41
 in which the incessant creation of new innovations by new 
firms replace old firms that provide obsolete goods and services to the market.  
In essence, patents are an incentive to invest in creating knowledge the practical 
application of which results in disclosure. Their principal aim is to encourage 
innovation and investment in innovation, but also dissemination of knowledge 
throughout the economy.
42
 The economic rationale for patent rights is that without 
such protection, the level of innovation would fall below that socially desirable 
because imitation might occur so quickly that an inventor may not be able to 
appropriate sufficient return of his invention, which would discourage him to 
continue investing in innovative research.
43
 Therefore, in order to stimulate inventive 
activity and the flow of useful inventions, society provides incentives such as patent 
rights.  
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Machlup and Penrose distinguish four fundamental arguments to justify the creation 
of patent rights, each of which has been challenged to some extent in the patent 
literature. Still today, there is not a universally accepted theoretical justification for 
the grant of patent rights and commentators continue to justify the grant of patents on 
essentially the same arguments that existed for the creation of the first patent 
systems. 
First, there is the natural property right theory, according to which society is morally 
obligated to recognize and protect a man’s property right over his ideas (resulting 
from his own work).
44
 This natural law vision predominates in Europe, as opposed to 
the American utilitarian view of intellectual property rights as rights granted by 
governments discretionally.
45
 The natural property right argument usually relies on 
John Locke’s labour theory to acquire ideological legitimacy as a justification for the 
grant of patents.
46
 Locke explains how, adding or mixing one’s labour with resources 
found in the common gives rise to individual property rights.
47
 Locke’s theory is 
about property and human prospering through individual appropriation no matter 
whether the goods are intangible and nonrivalrous.
48
 
However, while Locke’s theory of property is conditional upon convention and 
agreement of the members of society, thus conventional and not natural, this theory 
is interpreted as a justification of property as natural.
49
 Furthermore, this approach 
also raises questions regarding the factors that should be considered, for instance 
effort or result; the fairness and proportionality of awarding patents and thus 
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restricting access to patented technology, for example by granting perpetual rights; or 
the role of previous works and collaborators.
50
 In fact, the American utilitarian view 
of intellectual property rights was developed in part to counteract some of this 
arguments.
51
 The instrumental conception of patents differs from the view of patents 
as ‘natural rights’ over a form of property to which the inventor has a right by virtue 
of his inventive efforts.
52
 Nonetheless, the natural right theory is still part of the 
patent law discourse to explain the rationale for patent rights. 
Second, the reward theory or incentive to invent theory requires society, as an act of 
fairness, to reward a man through the grant of monopoly rights for providing society 
with useful inventions.
53
 This follows the utilitarian view of intellectual property 
rights described above. According to this argument, inventors do a service to society 
and thus it would be unfair to allow free riding of their inventions.
54
  Besides, if 
successful inventions were quickly imitated by free riders, competition would 
decrease prices to a point where the inventor is unable to appropriate enough of the 
social value of the invention and recover the original investment made.
55
 
Third, the incentive to innovate theory sustains that neither invention nor exploitation 
of invention will be obtained to an optimal level unless inventors and capitalists have 
                                                 
50
 Ibid 189-192. 
51
 Merges (n 45) 95. 
52
 Michael R Taylor and Jerry Cayford, ‘The U.S. Patent System and Developing Country Access to 
Biotechnology: Does the Balance Need Adjusting?’ [2002] Resources for the Future 2; Dan L Burk 
and Mark A Lemley, ‘Policy Levers in Patent Law’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review, 1575; F Scott 
Kieff, ‘On the Economics of Patent Law and Policy’ in Toshiko Takenaka (ed), Patent Law and 
Theory (Edward Elgar 2008) 3. 
53
 Machlup and Penrose (n 44). 
54
 Sterckx (n 37) 188. 
55




assurances that successful ventures will yield profits which make their efforts and 
risk their money worthwhile.
56
 
Fourth, the incentive to disclose theory holds that in return for the grant of exclusive 
patent rights inventors are required to disclose their inventions, which ensures that 
new creations are generally known and become part of the technology of society.
57
 
This theory assumes that in the absence of patent protection inventors would keep 
their inventions secret preventing the public from gaining the full benefit of new 
knowledge and leading to wasteful duplicative research in order to prevent imitation 
from competitors.
58
 However, secrecy is not always a practical strategy for 
protection, and often, secret technologies can eventually be uncovered through 
reverse engineering.
59
 Besides, where long term secrecy is feasible, patent protection 
for a mere seventeen years might not be an attractive alternative.
60
 Moreover, any 
technology that can be exploited in secrecy by its inventor can probably also be 
exploited in secrecy by an infringer, making a patent on such an invention difficult to 
enforce.
61
 Nonetheless, public disclosure of patent information is usually perceived 
as the most immediate benefit from the patent system. In the presence of patents 
knowledge is diffused either by free transfer from public domain sources or by 
private licenses or assignments.
62
 Public disclosure of patent information allows 
competitors to gain easy access to the technical knowledge pertaining to a patent 
application and exploit its value. Furthermore, since patent information can be used 
as an indicator of the state of the art, patent disclosure helps to avoid the coexistence 
of overlapping research projects. Moreover, well-defined patents allow competitors 
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to undertake more transparent business negotiations with the patent owner,
63
 which 
ultimately facilitates technology transfer. 
More recently Mazzoneli and Nelson have proposed four broad theories about the 
purposes of patents. ‘Invention motivation theory’, according to which the 
anticipation of patents motivates inventors to create useful inventions; ‘induce 
commercialization theory’, according to which patents help to obtain the necessary 
investments to develop and commercialize inventions; ‘information disclosure 
theory’ according to which patents are awards to individuals who disclose their 
inventions in return; and finally ‘exploration control theory’, which supports the idea 
that patents enable the orderly exploration of a broad prospect.
64
 On this basis, the 
objectives of the patent system could be summarized as follows. Providing incentives 
for innovative behavior, inducing investment to develop and commercialize 
technologies, encouraging the disclosure of information, and facilitating the transfer 
of technology.
65
 These theories are not mutually exclusive and they are likely to 
overlap with each other depending on the characteristics of the particular industry 
and case. 
However, even though patents can play an important role in promoting research and 
development of new products, assuming that patent protection will always improve 
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the incentives to innovate might be misleading in many cases. Empirical evidence 
has shown a wide diversity in the effectiveness of patents as a means of 
appropriation (either to prevent duplication or to secure royalty income) accross 
industries and also as a function of firm size.
66
 An extensive analysis of the role of 
patents in innovation goes beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is important 
to note that with a few notable exceptions such as pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology, economists have been unable to show a clear causal link between 
patent rights and increased innovation.
67
 In other industries, time-leading, 
reputational advantage, moving quickly down the learning curve, sales or service 
efforts have been in many cases regarded as more effective means for appropriating 
the returns of innovation than patent exclusive monopoly rights.  
2.2.2. Patent Rights And Genetic Research 
As noted above, the effectiveness of patents in encouraging innovation differs 
according to the characteristics and needs of each industry. Thus, in order to 
understand the role of patents in the progress of innovation in gene technologies, this 
section of the chapter examines the particular relationship between patents and 
innovation in genetics.  
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Today, it is widely accepted that patents play an important role in promoting research 
and innovation in biotechnology and genetic sciences. In biotech industries, 
companies possess characteristics that give patents a very important role as an 
incentive to innovate. Biotech firms are knowledge intensive enterprises the activities 
of which include basic and applied research, as well as systematic development of 
products and processes. In general, patents are most likely to support the growth of 
knowledge-intensive industries in fields characterized by low ratios of imitation 
costs, like in areas with large-scale research projects that result in highly codified 
knowledge. This is typically the case of science-based industries, like life sciences, 
which attempt to use existing knowledge but also advance scientific research and 
capture value of the knowledge it creates.
68
 For example, in the case of gene-based 
innovations, the cost of isolating and characterizing a gene, and putting it into a 
commercially viable format, can be very expensive; but once the discovery is 
complete, the genetic information can be easily duplicated.
69
 In this regard, patents 
help to prevent imitators from easily appropriating a competitor’s invention. 
On the other hand, innovation in biotechnology, especially in the field of genetics, 
moves at a very high pace and new products are constantly reaching the market, thus 
firms require access to large amounts of capital to finance their projects and be at the 
same level as their competitors. In fact, the state of competitiveness of this industry 
is strongly equated with the level of capital raised.
70
 Moreover, the activities 
involved in this business require specific qualifications and capabilities. Thus, in 
order to be successful, companies need to assemble a highly educated workforce with 
valuable research experience or high-level university training, which also entails 
significant costs to firms. 
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Most European biotech companies are small, research-led enterprises with a project-
based form of organization that obtain funds through pre-seed investment, or 
investment in highly promising ideas at a very early stage, which adds value to the 
project and helps to attract investors.
71
 Firms then receive further funding from 
investors and industrial collaborators based on the evaluation of the project’s 
achievements.
72
 In order to recoup the invested amounts, companies protect their 
inventions with patents, so that they can license or sell the patented products with 
high margins, and also ensure that competitors cannot copy them.
73
 Thus, potential 
investors see patent applications as a guarantee that their investments will be paid 
back,
74
 which helps to overcome the general investment risk that goes along with 
technological uncertainty.  
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On the other hand, patents have also provided universities and public research 
institutions, which play a key role in the evolution of biotech and genetic sciences, 
further incentives to perform their research and to frame it in a way that would 
facilitate downstream applications.
75
 Furthermore, as many companies are not 
capable of going downstream, doing clinical tests or manufacturing drugs, having a 
competitive patent portfolio that they can license or sell allows them to continue in 
the market. Hence, the impact of patents in promoting research is not confined to the 
benefit of strong, diversified biotech companies, but it extends to public institutions 
and smaller businesses in this industry. 
Since the 1970s, the contribution of advanced technologies to the economic 
performance of most developed countries has grown significantly. Currently, the 
competitiveness of a nation heavily depends on its level of innovation in certain 
fields like information technologies and life sciences.
76
 Given the importance of 
patents in the progress of biotechnology in general and genetic research in particular, 
in order to stimulate innovation and economic growth, countries started to encourage 
the use of patent rights in such promising industrial areas. Promoting the 
patentability of inventions in this field was seen as a key policy measure for the 
further expansion of the industry.  
The main difference between biological inventions, such as inventions concerning 
genetic material, and any other type of invention is the fact that the starting material 
is living matter, which triggers several legal and moral concerns. For instance, it has 
been argued that biotechnological inventions amount to mere discoveries that are not 
capable of meeting the traditional patent law requirements, or that biotech patents are 
contrary to generally accepted standards of morality.
77
  In particular, the patentability 
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of biotech inventions concerning isolated human genetic material has been highly 
controversial due to the intrinsic characteristics and the sensitive nature of this type 
of subject matter, which falls within the grey area between public and private 
research and raise questions regarding the privatization of human heritage or the 
potential problems of access to research results amongst others. 
As regards the application of the classical patentability criteria, since the 1980s 
patent laws and practices have generally had serious difficulties in keeping up with 
the rapid scientific progress in the biotechnology field,
78
 especially in human 
genetics. A particular example is the case of the requirement of industrial 
application. As stated earlier in this thesis, major advances in the discovery of the 
human genome immediately gave rise to a growing number of patent applications 
over human genetic sequences. However, many patent applicants filed their claims 
before a plausible use of the discovered sequences in industry had been identified, 
and thus failed to meet the patent law requirement of industrial application.    
A 1985 report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) observed that most countries desired biotechnology to adapt to patent law 
requirements and not vice versa and that the idea of adaptation or relaxation of the 
ground rules of patent law and practice for a particular technology and for inventors 
of a certain type was clearly controversial.
79
 Proposals such as improving patent 
quality through raising the patentability standards and reducing uncertainty in patent 
law decisions,
80
 and controlling costs
81
 are frequently presented as technical 
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solutions to the general difficulties in the patent system. However, none of these 
claims have had a major impact. Instead, patent laws and practices have been the 
subject of significant reviews and amendments to facilitate the grant of patents 
concerning genetic material.  
The increasing number of expectations that the biotech industry was raising led to a 
desire for establishing biotechnology patent law as a specialty area of legal practice 
that would offer specific and flexible standards for patenting biotech inventions, 
including those concerning human genetic material. In Europe, the 1998 Biotech 
Directive set the grounds for a new era in biotechnology patenting. However, the 
Biotech Directive not only recognized the patentability of biological inventions, 
which smoothed the path to obtaining patents on living material, but it also addressed 
important concerns regarding the interpretation of patent law rules within the context 
of human genetic inventions such as the implementation of the requirement of 
industrial applicability. The background and interpretation of the Biotech Directive’s 
requirement of industrial application for human gene sequences will be discussed in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
2.3. The EC Directive On The Protection Of Biotechnological 
Inventions 
2.3.1. The First Proposal For A Directive In Context  
Over the last few decades, biotechnological advances and their applications in 
medicine, industry and agriculture have been the focus of increasing attention in the 
EU. Both the 1983 Communication to the Council entitled ‘Biotechnology in the 
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 and the 1985 Commission White Paper on Completing the Internal 
Market (the 1985 White Paper) emphasized the need to improve the regulatory 
environment surrounding biotechnology, particularly the system of intellectual 
property rights, in order to facilitate the creation of a single market and promote the 
competitiveness of the European industry.
83
 Subsequently, the 1986 Single European 
Act introduced a new Article 8a of the 1957 Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community
84
 providing for the Community to adopt the decisions and 
measures necessary to progressively establish the internal market and implement the 
programme described in the 1985 White Paper. 
Also during the 1980s, important international events concerning genetic research 
and innovation took place such as the 1980 US Supreme Court decision in Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty,
85
 which confirmed that genetically modified organisms could be 
patented and formally opened the door for the possibility of patenting living matter; 
or important advances in recombinant DNA techniques which led, for example, to 
the discovery and patenting of human insulin. By the end of the decade, the feeling 
among European policy makers was that biotechnology was a key scientific field for 
the progress of innovation and competitiveness of the Community that needed to be 
promoted. 
Already in 1883, the Paris Convention defined the scope of patentable subject matter 
in a manner that included at least part of biotechnological inventions. It stated that 
the words ‘industrial property’ used in the convention were to be understood in the 
broadest sense, thus including not only products of industry in the strict sense, but 
also agricultural and mineral products, and all manufactured or natural products, for 
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In 1988 the principal international agreements concerning the protection of 
biotechnological inventions were the 1961 International Convention for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention),
87
 the 1963 Strasbourg 
Convention
88
 and the 1973 EPC. The UPOV Convention offers a sui generis form of 
intellectual property protection specifically adapted to protect plant varieties 
resulting from plant breeding processes with the aim of encouraging breeders to 
develop new varieties of plants. On the other hand, like the Paris Convention, Article 
3 of the Strasbourg Convention follows a flexible approach towards patentable 
subject matter. Moreover, although Article 2b of the Strasbourg Convention 
explicitly excludes plant and animal varieties from patentability, it does not preclude 
the patentability of inventions concerning any other type of living matter such as 
human genetic material. 
Further developments in harmonizing patent laws resulted in the 1973 EPC and the 
1975 Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market (Community 
Patent Convention), which never entered into force.
89
 Both conventions reflected the 
basic principles of the UPOV and the Strasbourg Convention with regard to 
biotechnological inventions but failed to provide solid provisions for the patentability 
of living matter.  
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Within this context, the European Commission (the Commission) presented to the 
Council of Ministers (the Council) a first proposal for a Directive on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions (First Directive Proposal) in October 
1988.
90
 The First Directive Proposal emphasized the importance of biotechnological 
research and development and considered the multiple challenges that the patent 
system encounters when applied to biotechnology. In this regard, although previous 
international efforts to improve legal protection for biotechnological inventions had 
not had significant impact, the First Directive Proposal relied on the existing 
legislative framework in biotechnology patenting with the objective of improving it. 
In fact, the text of the First Directive Proposal included a fairly detailed assessment 
of the existing laws on biotech patenting, particularly the EPC. 
In view of the existing legal framework, the Commission noted that the legal 
situation suffered from deficiencies and discrepancies in statutory provisions, 
regulations and their interpretation as well as a general shortage of case law, which 
might ultimately impede the proper functioning of the internal market.
91
 For 
example, the First Directive Proposal pointed out that the EPC did not consider the 
scientific developments that took place over the ten-year period previous to its 




Therefore, the proposal for the creation of a Directive on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions built on the idea that the existing legal system was 
outdated by scientific and technological developments; and thus, unable to satisfy the 
needs of the European industry.  In essence, the principal objective of the First 
Directive Proposal was to establish harmonized, clear and improved standards on the 
protection of biotechnological inventions, including the patentability of living matter 
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(such as human genetic material), effects of the exclusions from patentability of plant 
and animal varieties, scope of protection, and sufficiency of disclosure. It was 
believed that the adoption of a Biotech Directive would help to attract internal and 
external investments in biotech research, which would in turn facilitate the 
development of the European biotechnology industry, trade of biotechnological 
products, and establishment of a common market in this field.  
2.3.2. A Ten-Year Approval Procedure 
In order to adopt domestic laws in the EU, a cooperative procedure between the 
Commission, the Council and the European Parliament (the Parliament) must be 
followed. The procedural route for the adoption of the Biotech Directive was the 
(ordinary) co-decision procedure of Article 189b of the Treaty of Maastricht.
93
 Under 
the co-decision procedure, the Commission presents a proposal to the Parliament and 
the Council, which must be approved by a qualified majority of the Council and an 
absolute majority of the Parliament before it is adopted.  
Incidentally, while the Parliament was considering the First Directive Proposal, the 
EPO accepted to grant a patent for the at that time controversial Harvard Onco-
mouse patent application, which had been previously denied on the grounds that 
animals were excluded from patentability according to Article 53(b) EPC. However, 
in 1990 the EPO Technical Board of Appeal (TBA) ruled that only animal varieties 
as such were excluded and that the invention was not contrary to ordre public or 
morality. The TBA found that the process claim on the Harvard Onco-mouse was not 
an essentially biological process according to a balancing test that weighted animal’s 
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suffering and benefits for humanity.
94
 This decision showed that the EPO approach 
to Article 53 was to interpret exceptions and limitations to patent rights very 
narrowly, which caused controversy in the Parliament.
95
  
On the other hand, in October 1990 the US Department of Energy and National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) launched the HGP, an international scientific research 
project with the objective of determining the sequence of chemical base pairs in 
DNA, and identifying and mapping the approximately 20,000-25,000 genes of the 
human genome from both physical and functional perspectives. The $3 billion 
publicly funded project received the support from geneticists in the UK, France, 
Germany, Japan, China and India, and was finally completed in 2003.
96
 The HGP 
noted the importance of genetic research and the need to promote continuous 
innovation in this field. In this regard, while patents on biotechnological inventions 
relating to the human body raised concerns about access to knowledge and ethical 
questions, on the other hand, precluding the patentability of biotech inventions might 
have a negative impact on the development of the industry, which is highly 
dependant on patent monetization.  
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In October 1992 the Parliament voted to approve the First Directive Proposal subject 
to its amendments,
97
 and in December of the same year, the Commission approved 
an amended proposal (1992 Amended Proposal), which accepted half of the 44 
amendments proposed by the Parliament. However, the 1992 Amended Proposal was 
rejected by the Parliament in March 1995, mainly due to ethical issues. In the 
Parliament’s opinion, the proposal removed too many restrictions on the patenting of 
life forms,
98
 notwithstanding the fact that the TRIPS Agreement also gave members 
the possibility of excluding from patentability inventions the commercial exploitation 
of which is deemed to be contrary to ordre public or morality, and that the moral 
question was already considered in Article 53(a) of the EPC. The Commission on the 
contrary considered that theses questions were already sufficiently addressed in other 
legal instruments and thus focused on technical and harmonization objectives.  
After the Parliament’s rejection of the amended version of the First Directive 
Proposal, the Commission presented a new draft proposal in December 1995 (1996 
Amended Proposal), which was reviewed by six different Committees.
99
 After 
renewed opposition in Parliament and the adoption of 65 of the 66 proposed 
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amendments, a modified version was adopted in October 1997 (1997 Amended 
Proposal).
100
 The new text introduced changes in response to Parliament’s concerns, 
but also incorporated a new particular provision (Article 5(3)) aimed at providing a 
means to address the harmful effects that patents over isolated human DNA 
fragments of uncertain function might have on the progress of innovation in this 
industry.
101
 The new version was accepted by the Parliament and approved by the 
Council by a qualified majority (although the Netherlands voted against it) in 
November 1997.
102
 The proposal was subsequently agreed to as the Common 
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Position of the Council
103
 and finally on 12 May 1998, the Parliament formally gave 
its approval.
104
 The text of the Biotech Directive, consisting of a 65-paragraph 
preamble and 18 articles, was formally adopted on 16 June 1998 (Council Decision 
of 16 June 1998) and published in the Official Journal in August 1998.  
After ten years of discussions, the Biotech Directive finally became part of European 
Community law. Member States had two years from the date of entry into force (30 
July 1998) to ensure that their national laws were consistent with the new text. 
However, by 2003 only six Member States had implemented the Biotech Directive. 
Several countries failed to implement the new legislation (Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany,
105
 Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden) until 
required to do so by the courts in 2004-2005. Implementation of the Biotech 




The reasons why the majority of EU Member States resisted implementing the 
Biotech Directive may differ from country to country, however in a workshop held 
by the OECD in June 2001, the following concerns were identified: potential 
dependency resulting from (broad) DNA patents, reluctance of researcher to enter 
fields with already patented genes, monopolistic genetic testing practices, royalty 
stacking, and explosion of legal disputes.
107
 Put in a different way, the main concerns 
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around patenting biotechnology mainly related to patents concerning human genes 
and their effect on the progress of research. 
With regard to the compatibility of the Biotech Directive with the TRIPS Agreement 
and the EPC, when dealing with the Netherlands’ action for annulment the CJEU did 
not consider itself competent to assess the validity of the Biotech Directive with 
regard to the EPC, in that the European Community is not a party to it;
108
 and 
likewise, the Court declined its competence with regard to the compatibility of the 
Biotech Directive with the TRIPS Agreement, to which the European Community is 
a party for those aspects for which it is competent, in view of the fact that that 
Agreement is based on a principle of reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements.
109
Moreover, with regard to biotechnology, Article 27 of TRIPS 
Agreement takes a non-discriminatory approach towards this kind of invention. The 
Biotech Directive’s approach towards biotechnology relies on Article 27 and further 
confirms that the fact that the subject matter of an invention is living material, does 
not impede access to patent protection.  
2.4. Current EU Policy Towards Patenting Biotechnology  
The 1985 Commission White Paper on Completing the Internal Market
110
 and the 
subsequent 1998 Biotech Directive established the basis for a new phase in the EU 
biotech industry. Then in March 2000, the European Council met in Lisbon to assess 
the Union’s strengths and weaknesses in order to establish the basis for a structural 
reform in the EU (the Lisbon Strategy). The Lisbon Strategy set long-term growth 
and social targets for the next decade: 
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‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 




The means to achieve this goal included preparing the transition to a knowledge-
based economy and society by creating better policies for research and development 
and stepping up the process of structural reform for competitiveness and innovation. 
To foster economic growth, employment and social cohesion, under the new 
knowledge-based economy innovation and ideas would be adequately rewarded, 
particularly through patent protection. 
The Lisbon Strategy established the context for the next steps in the advance of 
biotechnology in Europe, which was considered to be a frontier technology with the 
potential to enhance Europe’s competitiveness, by setting general guidelines that 
triggered a series of interdependent reforms. In this regard, the 2002 Commission 
Communication ‘Life Sciences and Biotechnology – A Strategy for Europe’ 
proposed a comprehensive action plan for addressing the challenges posed by the 
biotechnology revolution in the knowledge-based economy.
112
 It urged for the 
development of pro-active policies to exploit the opportunities from the positive 
potential of life sciences and biotech, ensure proper governance, and address 
Europe’s international responsibilities. The Communication proposed 30 actions 
including the creation of a strong, harmonized and affordable intellectual property 
protection system, for the achieving of which Member States needed to transpose the 
Biotech Directive’s provisions into their national laws  (Action 5).
113
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A mid-term assessment report of the Lisbon Strategy’s achievements revealed that 
slow and limited progress had been made
114
 and stated the need to re-double efforts 
in order to meet the strategy’s goals. In respect of biotechnology, new strategic 
actions were adopted to promote the European biotech industry and the initial action 
plan on life sciences was refocused on specific and priority sectorial issues.
115
 In 
particular, intellectual property goals were re-directed towards more precise and 
defined objectives. Patent protection came to the forefront of the strategies to foster 
innovation, competitiveness, and knowledge transfer in life sciences.
116
 In this sense 
it was believed that effectively implementing the Biotech Directive would lead to the 
creation of an accessible and efficient patent system, which would in turn promote 
biotech innovation.
117
   
From the policies described above it can be read that for EU policy makers patents 
are considered to be a key means for boosting biotechnology innovation and 
research. Furthermore, even though over the past few years Europe has been coming 
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out of a deep economic crisis,
118
 the Commission continues stressing the need to 
remove unnecessary obstacles and reward innovation in promising industries such as 
biotechnology. Thus, one might expect that patent laws will continue to protect 
biotechnological and genetic inventions to the same (or further) extent in the coming 
decades. 
2.5. Concluding Remarks 
In knowledge-intensive industries like genetics, patents play a key role in helping 
companies to recoup the high amounts of capital invested to finance their projects. In 
this regard, after a long negotiation process between the Commission, the Council 
and the Parliament, the approval of the Biotech Directive established a new direction 
in the patenting of biotechnological inventions. The purpose of the Biotech Directive 
was to harmonise national patent laws regarding biotechnology throughout Europe, 
but also addressing some of the problematic issues that arise from the patenting of 
living matter, such as the conditions for the patenting of human genetic material, the 
increasing number of patent applications over isolated human gene sequences of 
unknown function, or the scope of patent protection for genetic inventions. 
This chapter was aimed at setting the context for the next chapters of the thesis, 
which will focus on the current approach towards the industrial applicability of 
inventions concerning human DNA sequences and its implications for the 
interpretation of other important patent law provisions regarding the patenting of 
human genetic information, such as the exclusion from patentability of discoveries 
and the scope of patent protection awarded to genetic inventions.
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3. THE EUROPEAN REQUIREMENT OF INDUSTRIAL 
APPLICATION   
3.1. Introduction 
Novelty, inventive step and industrial application constitute the three essential 
conditions that an invention has to fulfill in order to receive patent protection. History 
shows that the requirement of industrial application has always been a central aspect 
in an invention’s definition in modern patent systems. However, more recent 
interpretations of this requirement have set a very low threshold that has relegated 
industrial application to an almost inexistent patent law standard. 
This chapter of the thesis first studies the historical development of the European 
requirement of industrial application. The chapter then examines the rationale and 
objectives of this requirement, and the meaning and interpretation of Article 57 of the 
EPC and related provisions on industrial applicability.  Finally, the chapter discusses 
existing arguments in favor and against adopting a strict approach towards the 
assessment of an invention’s practical utility.  
3.2. The Development Of The Requirement Of Industrial Application 
3.2.1. Historical Background 
The principal aim of the patent system is to encourage innovation and social progress 
through granting exclusive monopolies over most sorts of inventions. To this end, 
rather than offering a definition of ‘patentable invention’, European patent law 





the exceptional rights that a patent monopoly confers.
119
 Thus, if an invention is not 
excluded from patentability and meets the standards established by the law, it should 
be then patentable.  
The patentability requirements of the current European patent system are the result of 
a long process of legal and policy debates over the question of what kinds of objects 
deserve to be the subject of discretionary government-granted monopoly rights. There 
is a novelty requirement to ensure that society is not preempted to use things that are 
already part of the ‘state of the art’. There is also the requirement of inventive step, 
which impedes inventors to obtain patents for things the creation of which is obvious 
to society. And finally, there is an industrial application requirement to guarantee that 
patented inventions can be utilized in industry; or, in other words, that the public can 
use those inventions and benefit from them.   
The history of European patent law reveals that the notion of industrial application 
has had a principal role in the development of today’s patent system. Historically, the 
function of the patent system was to advance the industrial arts, and thus social 
progress, by supporting new industries and industrial development.
120
 In particular, 
the events that took place during the period in which modern European patent laws 
were enacted influenced the inclusion of the criterion of industrial application in 
patent law regimes. In the seventeenth century a major scientific revolution took place 
in Europe. The works of authors like Francis Bacon, Galileo Galilei, René Descartes 
or William Harvey on applied science with utilitarian ends, as well as their ideas 
regarding physical laws, built the basis for western ideas of social and industrial 
progress.
121
 In this regard, the standard of industrial application was overall coherent 
with the at that time aim of fostering the development of tangible objects with a real 
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utility in practice. However, notwithstanding the influence of this period in the 
conception of industrial applicability as a criterion for the granting of patent 
monopolies, this idea is also found in the first forms of patent systems known in 
Europe.  
Patents began as instruments used by governments in later Medieval and early 
Renaissance Europe primarily to encourage the transfer and disclosure of more 
advanced foreign industrial practices through the emigration of skilled artisans.
122
 
Under the Tyrolean system in the Middle Ages, which was the basis of the Venetian 
system and the word invention,
123
 patents were granted or revoked by the state, 
depending on what was deemed to be useful.
124
 Novelty and inventiveness were only 
occassionally investigated while the main requirement was practical applicability.
125
 
In contrast, the Venetian Statute of 1474 then referred to the inventor of ‘any new and 
ingenious device, not previously made within our jurisdiction’. However the preamble 
to the statute’s text emphasized that the social and economic utility of such 
monumental legal innovation both depended on, and corresponded to, the practical 
utility of the inventions themselves.
126
 Soon after the Venetian Statute was adopted, 
the notion of patent law, including the requisite for an invention of being useful, 
spread from Venice to Germany, France and England. 
                                                 
122
 Paul A David, ‘The Evolution of Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda’s Thumb’ 
(Meetings of the International Economic Association, Moscow, August 1992). 
123
 Wegner (n 31) 3. 
124
 Ibid 5. 
125
 Ibid 5. 
126
 Christopher Wadlow, ‘Utility and Industrial Applicability’ in Toshiko Takenaka (ed), Patent Law 
and Theory (Edward Elgar 2008) 359. See also Jeremy Phillips, ‘The English Patent as a Reward for 





In Germany, inventions started to be patented about ten years after the adoption of the 
Venetian Statute.
127
 The criterion of practical usefulness as a pre-requisite for patent 
protection continued to be present in subsequent patent practice and a few centuries 
later, Article 1(1) of the first German Patent Act (Reichspatentgesetz) in 1877 stated 
that an invention had to be ‘gewerblich verwertbar’ (susceptible of industrial 
application) in order to be patentable.
128
 According to the provision at that time, 
patents were granted for inventions ‘that are novel and allow for industrial use’.
129
 
Industrial applicability was viewed as the central criterion for delimiting the scope of 
patentable inventions based on whether the claimed subject matter was part of trade 
and industry in the patent law meaning of the term.
130
 Furthermore, in relation to the 
requirement of industrial application, in the nineteenth century Germany developed 
the requirement of ‘technical advance’ (against the state of art). This doctrine was 
unique to German and Swiss law and established that a patentable invention had to 
demonstrate its technical superiority over what was previously known in the art.
131
 
However, although this approach may be regarded as having taken the concept of 
utility to its logical utilitarian conclusion, the standard of a ‘technical advance’ was 
abolished under the new law after the adoption of the EPC.
 132
  In fact, as in other 
European countries, the substantive significance of this requirement has gradually 
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Similarly, the use of patent grants to encourage the development of new industrial 
practices as an instrument of mercantilist policy spread in France during the mid-
sixteenth century.
134
 The French patent system, which developed in the wake of the 
Venetian system, provided that the Royal Academy of Science shall examine all 
machines for which privileges are solicited from His Majesty and certify whether they 
are new and useful.
135
 The law of 1791, which formally established a patent system in 
France, continued the practices of the ‘Ancien Régime’ under which inventors 
received royal privileges freeing them to exploit their inventions outside the confines 
of existing guild controls.
136
  As happened in Germany, the policy justification to 
grant patent monopolies in France was precisely to encourage inventors to put in 
practice their inventions in public, so that society could benefit from new 
technologies. Nonetheless, the specific requirement of industrial application was 
added in the new law on patents of July 1844 according to which only the ‘new 
industrial products’, the ‘new ways or new application of known means for obtaining 
a result or an industrial product’ could be patented, provided that there is an indication 
of the industrial applications in the patent application.
137
 Thus, since its origins dating 
back to the early Tyrolean system, the requirement of industrial application was 
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further reinforced during the Early Modern period of Europe and ultimately given a 
principal position in modern continental patent law regimes.  
In the UK, the first definition of patentable invention appeared in Section 6 of the 
1623 British Statute of Monopolies. The Statute granted letters patent (open letters) 
and grants of privilege in respect of any ‘manner of new manufacture’, and the courts 
solved the question of what constituted an invention by asking whether the invention 
was a manner of manufacture for which patents could be granted under the Statute of 
Monopolies.
138
  In this regard, the term ‘manner of manufacture’ revealed a close 
relationship between what should be a patentable invention and the practical arts;
139
 it 
suggested that patentable inventions where those that actually had an application in 
practice.
140
 Furthermore, the verb ‘to invent’ at that time carried very extensive 
connotations that were mainly related to industrial development objectives, such as 
bringing into use, find, establish or institute manufacture.
141
  Nonetheless, the idea of 
utility itself first appeared in English law in a 1624 discourse about the Statute of 
Monopolies by Sir Edward Coke, who stated that ‘in every such new manufacture that 
deserves a privilege, there must be ‘urgens necessitas’ and ‘evidens utilitas’’.
142
 
‘Evidens utilitas’ had no expression in the statute but since early times the courts 
accepted that inventions had to show both novelty and utility.
143
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Subsequently, the case law of the 19
th
 and part of the 20
th
 centuries on the concept of 
manner of manufacture shows that the idea of practical application (utility) was 
present in the courts’ understanding of what constituted a patentable invention within 
the meaning of the Statute.
144
 In 1932, utility was included in the 1907 British Patents 
and Designs Acts as one of the 16 grounds upon which a patent could be revoked.
145
 
Subsequently, the 1949 consolidating Act clarified that every claim in a patent 
application had to be useful.
146
  Therefore, like continental patent regimes, UK patent 
law has maintained the standard of industrial application as a fundamental 
requirement for the granting of patents. 
In fact, when discussions about harmonization of patent laws started in the mid-
1800s, once patent laws of various sorts were in place in most major European 
countries, including the British Empire, France and Germany,
147
 European domestic 
laws varied widely;
148
 however, all of them had some bearing on the criterion of 
industrial application.  
3.2.2. The Formulation Of Article 57 Of The EPC 
In response to growing interests in obtaining patent protection in foreign markets, 
national governments worldwide started to negotiate bilateral treaties for the 
protection of industrial property.
149
 However, these treaties did not prove to be 
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sufficiently effective in Europe so countries started to seek further unification of their 
patent laws. 
The Council of Europe of 1949 represented a leading step towards the development of 
a harmonized or unified patent system in Europe. The main underlying reasons behind 
the idea of harmonization were that unifying national laws would contribute to 
improved relations between the peoples of Europe
 150
 and, in more economic terms, 
that the fragmented national approach to protect technical inventions was contrary to 
good sense and rational economic behaviour.
151
 Discussions for the harmonization of 
substantive patent laws of the different countries followed over the next two decades 
and finally led to the Strasbourg Convention of 1963
152
 and the subsequent EPC of 
1973.  
The patent law requirement of industrial application set out in Article 52(1) and 57 of 
the EPC has its origins in the Strasbourg Convention of 1963, which represented the 
first step in the creation of a European patent. Developed under the Paris 
Convention’s provision for the making between Union States of special agreements 
for the protection of industrial property,
153
 the Strasbourg Convention sought to 
harmonize certain points of substantive patent law for promoting the European 
industry and establishing a common market in Europe,
154
 and contributing to the 
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future creation of an international patent system.
155
 An early draft of the agreement 
already described the patentability criteria by providing that the object of the 
application for a European patent must belong to the domain of technology, must be 
new and must have a quantum of invention.
156
 Subsequent work on substantive patent 
law focused, amongst others, on the question of the practical character of patentable 
inventions.  
The original proposal to the Council for the creation of a European patent system was 
submitted by French Senator Longchambon in 1949.
157
 Following this, a Committee 
of Patent Experts (the Committee) with representatives from all the Member States of 
the European Council was formed to study the proposal, and in 1953 a comparative 
study of national European laws was undertaken by the Secretariat-General of the 
Committee.
158
 Although the Longchambon proposal was finally dismissed, the 
Committee continued the preparatory works for the creation of a patent system in 
Europe. They carried out a national questionnaire,
159
 but given the imprecision of and 
diversity between national laws, in 1955 the Committee resolved to unify only those 
aspects of substantive law that were necessary to create a European system for 
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 In this regard, they identified the following patentability 
conditions as potential subjects of harmonization: industrial character, novelty, 
technical progress, creative effort, and influence of prior patent rights.
161
 Each of 
these questions was considered to be an essential element for the constitution of a 
common patent system in Europe. 
With regard to industrial character, the discussions of the Committee about the 
requirement of industrial application shed light on the importance of this question for 
defining an invention. The Committee remarked that the industrial characteristic is, 
apart from novelty, the only one that is required of a patentable invention by all the 
national regulations.
162
 For example in Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece 
and the Netherlands inventions were required to be ‘capable of industrial application’, 
in France and Turkey the law required inventions to ‘arise from any kind of industry’, 
and in the UK and Ireland in order to be patentable inventions needed to ‘be manners 
of manufactures’.
163
  Later in a 1960 Memorandum,
164
 the Rapporteur-general noted a 
‘certain uniformity of outlook’ in respect of the concept of industrial character. In his 
opinion, the comments showed that the patent systems existing in Europe were 
characterized by the ‘extreme terseness’ of their legal provisions on industrial 
character, the usual formula being ‘inventions which could be applied for industrial 
purposes’; the existence of a large body of case law built up over many years; the 
significant similarity between the structure of case law in different countries over the 
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concept of industrial character; and the existence of certain divergences, mainly in the 
sector of agriculture, derived largely from considerations of public interest.
165
 
Therefore, despite existing differences between domestic laws, the requirement of 
industrial application built upon similar basis in all European countries. 
Harmonization on the question of industrial application was finally achieved by using 
the wording ‘susceptible of industrial application’, which was the one employed in 
most European patent laws, and including inventions in the field of agriculture within 
the scope of the requirement. The final text of the Strasbourg Convention employs the 
word ‘susceptible’ rather than ‘capable’, the latter having also been used in some 
European countries in their definition of industrial application. However, the election 
of the term ‘susceptible’ was purely a matter of semantics and as the EPO Guidelines 
for Examination later explained, both terms have the same meaning in the context of 
industrial application and can be used interchangeably.
166
  
The result was Article 1 of the Strasbourg Convention stating that patents shall be 
granted for any inventions that are susceptible of industrial application, which are new 
and which involve an inventive step.  With regard to the industrial application 
requirement, Article 3 then specified that an invention should be considered as 
susceptible of industrial application if it can be made or used in any kind of industry 
including agriculture.
167
 In this respect, the explanatory memorandum of the 
preparatory documents for the draft of the Strasbourg Convention stated that Article 3 
is concerned with the industrial character of the invention and is to be understood in 
                                                 
165
 Pila (n 120) 140. 
166
 See the Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, as last revised in November 
2014, Part F-II, 4.9.  
167
 Strasbourg Convention (n 24) art 3. Germany had been a leader of the European movement for 
harmonization of the patent laws and, with regard to the question of industrial application, the EPC 
represents to a great extent an adoption of the German approach (by adopting the wording ‘susceptible 





the wide sense of Article 1(3) of the Paris Convention.
168
 These provisions were 
reproduced a decade later when they were incorporated in the text of the EPC. 
Preparatory works for the creation of a European Patent Convention started in 1961 
with the deliberations of the European Economic Community (EEC) Patents Working 
Party (the Working Party).
169
 The first discussions on inherent patentability were held 
in Brussels in 1961 and 1964, and focused on whether the proposed text should 
contain an express definition of invention, or whether it should follow the Strasbourg 
Convention approach of merely stipulating the availability of patents for new 
inventions that are susceptible of industrial application and involve an inventive 
step.
170 It is significant in this regard that the First Working Draft of the EPC dated 
March 1961 already contained Article 52(1) EPC in its present form.
171
 Finally, the 
conclusion reached by the Patents Working Party (PWP) was that inherent 
patentability should remain undefined in the EPC, as it had been adopted in many 
national laws without a ‘practical problem’.
172
 
Continuing the work of the Working Party, a second period of deliberations with a 
higher level of participation took place at the Inter-Governmental Conference for the 
Setting Up of a European System for the Grant of Patents (Luxembourg Conference) 
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between 1969 and 1972, which culminated at the Munich Conference in 1973.
173
 
With regard to the question of inherent patentability, the deliberations of the 
Luxembourg and Munich conferences focused on the types of subject matters that 
should be excluded from patentability,
174
 rather than on whether inherent patentability 
should be defined further than by providing a set of patentability requirements and 
exclusions. The result was Article 52 of the EPC, which does not provide an express 
definition of inherent patentability. Instead, it reaffirms the patentability requirements 
set out in the Strasbourg Convention and adds an open list, more refined than the 
exclusions in Article 2 of the Strasbourg Convention, of subject matters that are to be 
exluded from patent protection. 
By reproducing the same wording that the Strasbourg Convention had adopted, 
Article 52(1) of the 1973 EPC text provided that European patents should be granted 
for any inventions which were susceptible of industrial application, which were new 
and which involved an inventive step. In order to incorporate Article 27 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, this provision was amended in 2000 to specify the availability of 
European patents for inventions ‘in all fields of technology’.
175
 Nonetheless, the new 
wording did not change the general content and purpose of Article 52(1), neither with 
regard to industrial application. Today, Article 52(1) of the EPC, and thus the national 
laws of the EPO Member States, provides that European patents shall be granted for 
any inventions, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an 
inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application. As regards the 
requirement of industrial application, Article 57 of the EPC, which contains the same 
wording that Article 3 of the Strasbourg Convention, specifies that an invention shall 
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be considered as susceptible of industrial application if it can be made or used in any 
kind of industry, including agriculture.  
3.2.3. Interpretative Basis 
Pursuant to Article 23(3) of the EPC, the rules that govern the interpretation of the 
EPC and that are binding on the EPO are the text of the EPC and the Implementing 
Regulations.
176
 Principles of precedent are not applicable within the EPO. The EPC 
text and its Implementing Regulations do not refer to any prior legislation, which 
suggests that history is not part of their interpretative framework. Therefore, it could 
be drawn that the EPC, including the articles on the industrial application 
requirement, should be interpreted only according to the EPO’s own provisions, rules 
and interpretative criteria.  However, as an international treaty that has been part of 
the process of European legal harmonization, the EPC text should be subjected to 
other international and European agreements that can serve as interpretation 
guidelines.  
Following this same logic, the EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) stated in a 1984 
decision that, as an international treaty, the EPC has to be interpreted in accordance 
with the rules of interpretation developed in the so-called ‘law of nations’ or public 
international law, including Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.
177
 From 
those Articles derives the need to interpret treaties in light of their wording and 
context but also their object and purpose, and if needed, preparatory work and the 
circumstances of its conclusion. Within the context of the EPC, this would mean that 
the previous works on harmonizing European patent law and the travaux préparatoires 
of the EPC should have legal relevance as interpretive aids. 
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Another relevant agreement for the interpretation of the EPC is the Paris Convention 
of 1990. The EPC constitutes a special agreement within the meaning of Article 19 of 
the Paris Convention, which contains minimum standards for substantive intellectual 
property law harmonization, such as, for example, rules on rights of priority.
178
 In this 
regard, Article 87 of the EPC recognizes that a first filing made with the EPO gives 
rise to a right of priority under conditions and with effects equivalent to those laid 
down in the Paris Convention. Thus, the Convention is relevant to the EPC as for the 
interpretation of provisions on priority rights. On the other hand, the Paris Convention 
in Article 1(3) mandates the granting of patents across the whole range of industrial 
property. Moreover, the expression ‘capable of industrial application’ in the EPC is 
expressly and intentionally derived from the corresponding usage of the word 
‘industry’ in the Paris Convention.
179
 Therefore, although the Paris Convention does 
not contain substantive provisions, its conception of patent rights is relevant since its 
text forms an important part of the contextual background of the EPC.  
Furthermore, the EPO has also confirmed that although the TRIPS Agreement could 
not be directly applied to the EPC, it is appropriate to take its text into consideration, 
since it is aimed at setting common standards regarding the availability, scope and use 
of IP rights and gives a clear indication of more recent trends in patent law.
180
 As an 
example, Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, which ensures that different 
technological fields receive a treatment that is consistent with the aims of the system 
in each particular industry, may serve as a reference for interpreting certain provisions 
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of the EPC. Indeed, as mentioned above Article 52 of the EPC was amended to 
incorporate the mandate of Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, so the latter should be 
relevant for the interpretation of the corresponding EPC provision. 
Finally, there is the Biotech Directive of 1998. Some of the provisions of the Biotech 
Directive have been deliberately incorporated in the EPC Implementing Regulations. 
In particular, the EPO has adopted the Biotech Directive’s approach towards the 
industrial applicability of human genetic inventions as well as the Biotech Directive’s 
exclusions of several biotech inventions on the basis of ethical concerns.
181
   As Rule 
26(1) (previously Rule 23b) of the EPC confirms, the Biotech Directive shall serve as 
a supplementary means for interpreting the Biotech Directive’s provisions 
incorporated into the text of the EPC. 
In view of the above, it could be concluded that even though the EPC does not in 
theory rely on historical and external concepts as interpretative means, the EPO has 
recognized in several occasions the relevance of other previous and also subsequent 
agreements as interpretative aids. In particular, the recognition of the Vienna 
Convention, the Paris Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, and the incorporation of the 
Biotech Directive are especially relevant for the interpretative framework of the 
requirement of industrial application. Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention 
confirm that the provisions of the EPC shall be interpreted teleologically. With regard 
to the requirement of industrial applicability, this means that Article 57 EPC and 
related provisions should be interpreted in light of their historical meaning and 
purpose. On the other hand, Article 1(3) of the Paris Convention mandating that 
industrial property should be interpreted in its broadest sense sets a guiding standard 
that the EPO should follow with regard to the interpretation of the word ‘industry’ in 
Article 57 EPC. Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement would be consistent with changes 
in the interpretation of Article 57 in response to concerns of the patent system with 
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regard to specific technologies such as those relating to human genetic material. 
Finally, the incorporation of Article 5(3) of the Biotech Directive into Rule 29(3) of 
the EPC, which establishes the additional requirement for inventions concerning 
isolated human gene sequences of disclosing their industrial applicability in the patent 
application, entails the inclusion of the Biotech Directive as an interpretative 
guideline at least with regard to the EPC provisions reproducing the Biotech 
Directive. The Biotech Directive’s impact on the interpretation of industrial 
application in general and with regard to human DNA inventions will be extensively 
discussed in the next chapters of the thesis. 
3.2.4. The US Perspective 
The European requirement of industrial application essentially corresponds with the 
US patent law requirement of utility, both concepts sharing important 
characteristics.
182
 A comprehensive comparative analysis of the requirements of 
industrial application and utility falls outside the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is 
significant that like the criterion of industrial application, the utility requirement has 
historically taken a central role in the development of the current US patent system, 
which further confirms the importance of this requirement in patent law.  
The requirement of utility has its basis in the US Constitution, thus being a 
constitutional requirement and not a statutory one. ‘To promote the progress of 
science and useful arts’, Article 1 (Section 8) of the US Constitution specifically 
grants Congress the power to give inventors exclusive rights to their discoveries for a 
limited period of time.
183
 According to the Supreme Court, the basic quid pro quo 
contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is 
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the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility.
184
 Thus, 
inherent in Section 8 lies the patent law bargain that in exchange for disclosing useful 
innovations for the benefit of the public, inventors are granted exclusive rights over 
their patentable inventions.  
Of all the US requirements for patentability, only the utility requirement finds explicit 
mandate in the constitutional text. Since the passage of the first Patent Act in 1790, an 
inventor has been required to demonstrate that his invention is useful in order to 
secure a patent on it.
185
 Patentable subject matter is constrained by the constitutional 
phrase ‘useful arts’. Thus, the courts treat the utility requirement as a hybrid subject 
matter limitation by restricting the patent system to the useful arts.
186
 In other words, 
they use the utility requirement to distinguish applied technology from abstract 
knowledge.  
Apart from the Constitution, the modern US requirement of utility derives from other 
two sources, Congressional legislation implementing the Constitutional mandate, and 
federal court decisions interpreting the meaning of the word useful in the Constitution 
and in the implementing legislation.
187
 In this respect, the inclusion of the utility 
requirement in the very wording of the Constitution and its continued vitality 
throughout two centuries of patent statute amendments evidence its importance and 
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The concept of ‘utility’ itself has maintained a central place in all US patent 
legislation, culminating in the present law’s provision.
189
 The Patents Act, 35 USC 
Section 101, in addition to setting forth the categories of patent-eligible subject 
matter, requires that an invention must be useful in order to receive patent 
protection.
190
 However, the Patents Act does not provide a definition for the term 
‘useful’ so inventors have had to rely instead on the interpretations provided by the 
federal courts, primarily by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), its 




The requirement of utility is not usually an obstacle for mechanical and electrical 
applications, which generally have an end result or final use, but it raises greater 
concerns within the context of chemical and biological inventions that very often have 
an evolving utility, for example a general usefulness in basic research.
192
 In this 
regard, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and US courts have 
issued conflicting decisions over how the utility test is to be applied to a chemical or 
biological process that produces an already known product whose utility has not yet 
been determined.
193
 For example in Application of Nelson,
194
 the CCPA reversed the 
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USPTO rejection of the invention for lack of utility of a process useful for doing 
research on steroids, which were neither known to have any useful results. Then in 
Brenner v. Manson, the CCPA held against the USPTO decision that a process for 
producing certain known steroids does not need to show utility for the product as long 
as it is not detrimental to the public interest.
195
 These decisions also contrast with the 
earlier more liberal notion of utility as moral or beneficial utility in ‘contradistinction 
to mischievous or immoral’, which derived from Justice Story’s definition of a useful 
invention as one that ‘should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good 
policy, or sound morals of society’.
196
 
The different interpretations of the utility doctrine were eventually discussed by the 
US Supreme Court in the 1966 decision in Brenner v. Manson, which established the 
current utility standard by requiring patentable inventions to have substantial utility, 
in the sense that they provide a specific benefit in their currently available form,
197
 not 
only as an object of scientific inquiry.
198
 Brenner v. Manson is the last case where the 
US Supreme Court gave a judgement regarding the question of utility. Subsequent 
lower court decisions have taken a more or less liberal approach towards utility. For 
example, In re Brana the Federal Circuit reversed a rejection of claims to novel 
compounds that were structurally similar to a family of compounds displaying 
antitumor properties.
199
 While in Nelson v. Bowler, identifying a pharmacological 
activity of the claimed compound was sufficient for establishing a practical utility of 
                                                                                                                                           
194
 Application of Nelson, 280 F2d 172 (CCPA 1960) 180-181. Although a few years earlier in 
Application of Bremner, 182 F2d 216 (CCPA 1950) 217, both the USPTO and the CCPA rejected a 
patent application for lacking an assertion of utility and an indication of the use or uses intended. 
195
 Brenner v Manson (n 184) 522-523. 
196
 Lowell v Lewis, 15 Fed Cas 1018 (No 8568) (CCD Mass 1817) 1019. 
197
 Brenner v Manson (n 184) 534-535. 
198
 Ibid 529. 
199







 Then more recently In re Fisher the Federal Circuit held that 
‘utilities that require or constitute carrying out further research to identify or 
reasonably confirm a ‘real world’ context of use are not substantial utilities’.
201
 
Nonetheless, the leading approach (at least with regard to chemical and biological 
inventions) is the one established in Brenner v Manson, which set forth the standard 
that has been followed by subsequent decisions,
202
 and that eventually formed the 
basis of the current USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines.   
In 1995, the USPTO established a first set of examination guidelines in response to 
criticism by the patent bar that patent examiners were inconsistently and 
inappropriately rejecting inventions involving biotechnology and therapeutic method 
inventions for lack of utility.
203
 According to the 1995 guidelines, an asserted utility 
had to be specific and credible; however, nothing was mentioned about the long-
established requirement of substantial utility set forth in Brenner v. Manson and 
reaffirmed in subsequent decisions.
204
 In this regard, the public comments received on 
the Interim Written Description Guidelines on the patentability of expressed sequence 
tags (ESTs) suggested that the 1995 guidelines would lead patent examiners to the 
grant of patents based on nonspecific and nonsubstantial utilities, and that there was a 
need for revision or clarification of the 1995 Utility Examination Guidelines.
205
 As a 
result, a new version of the utility guidelines was published in December 1999 along 
with requests for additional public comments.
206
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In line with Brenner v. Manson and subsequent case law, the Revised Utility 
Examination Guidelines added a third element to the utility test, the requirement of 
having a ‘substantial’ utility. Then following public consultation, the USPTO further 
amended the guidelines in 2000, although not significantly, and published a set of 
training materials dealing with specific technology issues, for example in the field of 
biotechnology.
207
 The final version of the Utility Examination Guidelines entered into 
force in January 2001. 
In sum, the historical evolution of the criteria of industrial application and utility 
show that this requirement has played a principal role in the development of patent 
law and the establishment of a utilitarian patent system. Nevertheless, differences 
exist between the roots of and approaches towards the interpretation of both 
concepts.
208
 The next sections of this chapter will focus on the European requirement 
of industrial application and will include occasional references to the US criterion of 
utility when they are relevant for understanding certain issues and/or European 
decisions regarding industrial applicability.   
3.3. Industrial Application: Significance And Interpretation  
As Lord Hoffman’s decision in Biogen noted, the four conditions set out in Article 
52(1), namely novelty, inventive step, capacity for industrial application, and not fall 
within excluded categories, probably contain every element of the concept of an 
invention.
209
 Among those four conditions, the three patent law requirements are 
globally recognized as the principal standards that every invention has to meet for 
being awarded the monopoly that a patent grants. Thus, industrial application shall be 
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considered to be a patent law requirement sine qua non an invention cannot be 
patented. 
This part of the chapter analyses the importance and interpretation of the patent law 
requirement of industrial application. First, it explores the value of industrial 
applicability as a public policy tool; and second, it analyses the wording and 
interpretation of Article 57 of the EPC. 
3.3.1. Industrial Application As A Public Policy Tool 
The principal assumption underlying the creation of patent systems is that society will 
benefit from new technology if inventors have the incentive and reward of a patent to 
induce their effort and their investment in carrying out research. Thus, the ultimate 
purpose of patents is that in exchange for the concession of a patent monopoly, the 
invention needs to provide some valuable benefit to society.  In this sense, the 
requirements (novelty, inventive step and industrial application) and conditions for 
granting patents reflect the terms of the deal between the inventor and society.
210
  
From the four broad theories about the purposes of patents proposed by Mazzoneli 
and Nelson, it could be drawn that one of the principal objectives of patents is 
facilitating the practical use of inventions, including the development, application, 
commercialization and transfer of the patented technology.
211
 This idea flows directly 
from the broad instrumental or utilitarian conception of the patent system, according 
to which the patent system is successful to the extent that it results in getting more 
useful things for society.
212
 The Strasbourg Convention’s objective of promoting 
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technical progress is also consistent with this utilitarian view of patents.
213
 From this 
theoretical perspective, an invention would only be worthy of being patented if it 
makes a useful contribution to society. In this sense, for an invention to be of practical 
use, the public needs to know how they can make use of the patented technology and 
what the invention is for. Therefore, the criterion of industrial application, by 
requiring inventions to show a practical use in industry plays a central role in meeting 
the patent system’s utilitarian objectives as well as the interests of society. 
Innovation is a public good and patent law in general is ultimately aimed at having 
some kind of social utility. However, not all patent law provisions are equally able to 
achieve such objective. In this regard, industrial application is considered to be an 
essential requirement without which the claims of the patent system to promote 
technical and economic progress would seem to be null and void.
214
 Without requiring 
inventions to be capable of being used by the public, society would receive 
contributions in the form of monopolies that cannot provide any beneficial application 
in practice.  
Even though the reasoning behind the industrial applicability requirement could seem 
very simple, there is a certain lack of clarity as to its practical implementation. The 
fact that the industrial application doctrine has usually posed a low hurdle for patent 
applicants to clear,
215
 which has resulted in an equally low number of decisions on 
industrial applicability, has impeded the development of a substantial body of case 
law on this area. It has only been with the advent of complex and research-based 
technologies such as genetic engineering, that new rules and interpretations regarding 
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the industrial application requirement have been developed. Consequently, there is 
not a long-standing test or standard that can help authorities to determine the 
usefulness of an invention in patent law terms. This fact makes industrial applicability 
a malleable requirement that could be a versatile means for accomplishing public 
policy goals. 
In innovation systems based on patent protection mechanisms, patent law is the 
principal tool that governments can use for balancing the general interests of society 
against the economic interests of the inventor, by encouraging innovation, promoting 
the development of new technologies and contributing to the growth of human 
knowledge.
216
 Different preferences in the choice of patent law have arisen from 
political, cultural and other differences between states.
217
 And many choices in patent 
law inherently involve policy decisions.
218
 For example, depending on the level of 
inventive activity, authorities have traditionally moved from stricter approaches 
towards the application of patent law provisions to more flexible ones and vice versa. 
In this sense, among the different requirements and provisions stipulated by patent 
law, the industrial application doctrine has been remarkably adjustable and its 
interpretation and understanding has significantly fluctuated over time. In particular, 
the multiple ways of addressing the industrial applicability criterion frequently 
represent policy shifts to promote specific technologies.
219
 For instance, a strict 
interpretation of the meaning of industrial application would help reducing the level 
of patenting activity in knowledge-based areas of technology, while a more flexible 
approach would allow the patentability of early research results even if their practical 
applications have not been fully specified. 
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In this regard, the requirement of industrial application can serve as a barrier to the 
patentability of new inventions before any practical use has been found.
220
 Depending 
on the established policy objectives, authorities can widen or narrow the filter to 
allow or impede the patenting of certain claims. In other words, industrial application 
could be seen as a timing device that helps identifying when an invention is ready for 
patent protection and when it is necessary to carry out further research to determine 
its practical value.
221
 It avoids patents over inventions that may advance the industrial 
arts but not sufficiently to deserve the grant of the exclusive protection that a patent 
monopoly confers.
222
 Importantly, this gating function serves to ensure that society 
can make use of the patents that are finally issued.  
3.3.2. Article 57 EPC: Wording And Interpretation 
In the European system, the main provisions addressing the legal requirement of 
industrial application (and that are applicable to all fields of technology) are Article 
57 of the EPC, Rule 42(1)(f) of the Regulations, and Part G.III.1 of the EPO 
Guidelines for Substantive Examination. First, Article 57 of the EPC sets forth the 
industrial application requirement in general and the Regulations and Guidelines then 
further clarify, together with the EPO case law, some aspects of such provision. In 
this regard, the EPC Guidelines comments on Article 57 of the EPC note that the 
requirement of industrial application should be interpreted in very broad terms and 
thus, it shall only exclude very few inventions from patentability. For example, 
inventions that are clearly contrary to well-established physical laws. On the other 
hand, Rule 42(1)(f) remarks the importance of disclosing how an invention can be 
applicable in industry by providing that the invention’s description should indicate 
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explicitly the way in which the invention is capable of exploitation in industry only if 
it is not obvious from the description or from the nature of the invention. In these 
cases, applicants have to indicate some way in which the claimed invention can be 
industrially applicable. However, this requirement is only applicable when the 
possibility of industrial application is not clear to a person skilled in the art from the 
nature of the claimed invention.  
The wording of Article 57 of the EPC reveals three main concepts that form the core 
of the patent law requirement of industrial application.  This article reads that an 
invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial application if it can be made 
or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture. First, the article employs the 
term ‘susceptible’, which suggests future (potential) rather than present applicability. 
Second, the reference to ‘industry’ requires determining what fields are included 
within the scope of such term. Third, defining what kind of ‘application’ an invention 
needs to show is essential for understanding the tenor of the requirement. 
3.3.2.1. Susceptible (Capable) 
According to the EPO Guidelines for Examination, the expression ‘capable of 
exploitation in industry’ means the same as ‘susceptible of industrial application’. The 
difference between the terms ‘capable’ and ‘susceptible’ would just be a matter of 
semantics and both expressions would thus be interchangeable.
223
 As a synonymous 
of capable, susceptible means having the ability, fitness, or quality necessary to do or 
achieve a specified thing, or being able to achieve efficiently whatever one has to 
do.
224
 Thus, in contrast with the US requirement of utility, industrial application does 
not imply a need of showing actual use (past or present).
225
 In Europe, an invention 
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that is considered to be industrially applicable is an invention that is capable or 
susceptible of being used by or in industry.  In this respect, the reference to the term 
susceptible indicates the need of showing future or potential use. Thus, the focus of 
the requirement is on the idea of useful purpose, rather than actual usefulness. 
Decisions like Chiron Corporation in the UK,
226
 noting that the requirement of 
industrial application requires that the invention should relate to something that has a 
useful purpose, confirm that the criterion of industrial applicability is one of potential 
or future usefulness. However, claims with over broad potential applications are not 
acceptable.
227
  This question was further clarified within the context of gene patents 
after the incorporation of the Biotech Directive into the EPC text in 1999. The EPO 
decisions in Max Planck and Zymogenetics explained, in part by linking this question 
to issues of disclosure, that vague and speculative objectives that might or might not 
be achievable are not acceptable.
228
 There has to be at least a prospect of a real as 
opposed to a purely theoretical possibility of exploitation, if it was not already 
obvious from the nature of the invention or from the background art. It should not be 
left to the skilled reader to find out how to exploit the invention by carrying out a 
research programme.
229
 A concrete benefit or advantage must be identified, thus 
avoiding leaving the whole burden to the reader to guess or find a way to exploit an 
invention in industry without any confidence that any practical application exists.
230
 
That is, applicants must provide a clear indication of a real and achievable function. 
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3.3.2.2. Made Or Used 
Article 57 requires that the invention ‘can be made or used’ in any kind of industry. 
Despite of using the conjunction ‘or’, this provision should not be interpreted as 
providing alternatives, either capable of being made or capable of being used, that 
enable the invention to comply with Article 57; but it requires that an invention is 
capable of being carried out in real practice.
231
 This question has often received little 
attention from patent authorities. It has only been with the emergence of genetic 
inventions, and the subsequent incorporation of the Biotech Directive in the EPC text, 
that more comprehensive decisions clarifying how an invention must be capable of 
being made or used have been developed. Before that, decisions on Article 57 were 
mainly focused on the concept of industry or the interface between the disclosure 
requirements and industrial applicability. 
According to the 2004 EPO decision in Max Planck, the expression ‘made or used’ 
implies that there must be some profitable use for which the substance can be 
employed, in the sense that at least one industry may benefit from the invention.
232
 In 
this regard, the decision in Zymogenetics further stressed the need to describe the 
subject invention in sufficiently meaningful technical terms that it can be expected 
that the exclusive rights resulting from the grant of a patent will lead to some financial 
or other commercial benefit.
233
  
However, regional and national laws and practices concerning the extent to which the 
practical use of the invention must be useful or profitable vary significantly. At one 
end of the spectrum, the requirement of industrial applicability is met as long as the 
claimed invention can be made in industry without taking into account the use (or 
                                                 
231
 Florian Leverve, ‘Patents on Genes, Usefulness, and the Requirement of Industrial Application’ 
[2009] JIPLP 289. 
232
 Max Plank (n 228) point 4. 
233





usefulness) of the invention.
234
 At the other end of the spectrum, in other jurisdictions 
the usefulness of the claimed invention is fully taken into consideration for the 
determination of industrial applicability.
235
 In this regard, two broad different types of 
usefulness can be defined, general and specific. General usefulness would refer to the 
case where an invention addresses a human problem or meets a need; in contrast, 
specific usefulness would refer to cases when inventions actually work and produce a 
technical result that can be specified.
236
 However, to a greater or lesser extent, the 
problem centers on the degree of specific usefulness that an invention shows. Hence, 
those jurisdictions that consider industrially applicable all inventions that can be 
made, independently of how useful they are, would apply a clearly less demanding 
standard for testing the requirement of industrial application. 
Nevertheless, certain common features can be identified between national practices, 
as well as consistency between the EPO approach and the core concepts extracted 
from national practices.
237
 First, an invention must be applicable in any non-mental 
activity that belongs to the useful or practical arts that are included in the meaning of 
the word industry. Second, the invention shall be capable of being applied in industry 
in the sense that it must have a useful or practical application.
238
 It is not sufficient 
that the claimed invention can be simply made or used but an invention should have 
practical or useful purposes and should produce a real result to whatever extent.  
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Finally, the requirement that the invention can be made or used in industry also covers 
cases where no vendible products result. Traditionally, if an invention had any market 
value, it was presumed to be useful.
239
 Therefore, examiners paid little attention to the 
requirement of industrial application because if the public could not find a profitable 
use for the patented invention, this one would fall into disuse;
240
 and thus, the patent 
monopoly would not impose any real restrictions in the marketplace. However, with 
the advances in research-based industries like gene technologies there are an 
increasing number of inventions that do not end in a final vendible good. In these 
cases, parameters other than the marketability of the product must be examined for 
assessing the industrial application of these inventions. 
In this regard, a particular question that arises when discussing what types of uses are 
capable of meeting the requirement of industrial application is whether the use of an 
invention for purely research purposes is acceptable. In most industrial fields, 
research issues are not regarded as a problem in Europe as it is considered to be a 
potential form of industrial application.
241
 It is only in fields like genetics that this 
issue becomes problematic due to the massive amount of inventions that are only 
useful in the context of research. In these cases, the patentability of such inventions 
would depend on the level of experimental evidence and specification of the function 
or functions of the substance concerned. This issue will be discussed in the next 
chapter of the thesis. 
3.3.2.3. Any Kind Of Industry 
The comparative study that was undertaken previous to the adoption of the Strasbourg 
Convention emphasized that the word industry was generally understood in domestic 
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laws as a defined field of economic activity that may be taken in a narrow sense, in 
opposition to agriculture, or in a wide sense, as a human activity oriented towards 
practical ends. However, even though there were differences between national 
practices, most countries generally admitted that inventions that were agricultural in 
their destination although industrial by their method of operation would fall under the 
scope of the law.
242
 Major divergences only appeared with regard to purely 
agricultural activities with no industrial implications at all like breeding or harvesting.   
Article 57 of the EPC provides a very flexible approach in determining the range of 
industries that are relevant to its norm.  For the purposes of the requirement of 
industrial application, the notion of industry is construed in the widest possible sense 
and admits inventions in any kind of industry, including agriculture.
243
 In this respect, 
the EPO Guidelines for Examination emphasises that industry should be understood 
in its broad sense as including any physical activity of technical character, such as 
activities which belong to the useful or practical arts, including enterprises in the 
cosmetic field, and that it does not necessarily imply the use of a machine or the 
manufacture of an article.
244
 In the same line, the case law of the EPO indicates that 
the term industry has to be interpreted broadly so as to include all manufacturing, 
extracting and processing activities of enterprises that are carried out continuously, 
independently and for commercial gain.
245
 However, this definition of industry would 
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not include private and personal activities. The fact that an activity is connected with 
professional activities does not give such act, which essentially belongs to the private 
and personal sphere, an industrial character.
246
 Nonetheless, the range of activities 
that would fall outside the definition of industry is very limited in practice. 
A 2003 report of the WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents on the 
European requirement of industrial application further confirms this approach. 
According to the report, one common aspect to all countries is that industry is 
interpreted in the broadest possible sense.
247
 The report also presents some examples 
of what countries view as industry. For instance, Sweden indicates a list of activities 
like commerce, forestry, public administration, gardening, hunting, fishery and 
defense.
248
 Another example is the UK Manual of Patent Practice, which refers to any 
useful and practical activity, as distinct from intellectual or aesthetic, that is not 
excluded and does not restrict industry neither to tangible material nor to purely 
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commercial or profitable activities.
249 
The report leads to the conclusion that the scope 
of the term industry in Article 57 is also interpreted by national institutions in a very 
broad sense so as to include almost all commercial enterprises. 
3.4. Flexible Versus Strict Interpretations Of Industrial Application 
The industrial application requirement has traditionally been construed and 
interpreted quite broadly, so patent applicants have usually seen it as a low hurdle for 
patentability. Given the historical importance of the industrial application requirement, 
it might be expected that it would be of fully equal importance in patent law with 
novelty and inventiveness.
250
 However unlike the other criteria, this requirement has 
not been assessed against the changing state of the art, thus requiring incremental 




The EPC requirement of industrial application was not designed to impose a high 
barrier to patentability and as soon as some sort of practical application within a very 
wide range of activities is identified, industrial applicability could be acknowledged. 
In fact, this provision has been frequently used to move aside patent applications over 
nonsense or very extravagant inventions. For instance, the example of a perpetual 
motion machine that would contravene both Newton’s third law of motion and the 
first law of thermodynamics that is described in the EPC Guidelines,
252
 or cases such 
as the UK Thompson’s Application over an invention consisting of ‘a means for 
purveying energy for the future comprising an engine in the form of a contra-
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rotational drive plate and fan that serves to create a pressure differential above and 
below drive plate without consuming fuel in the process’.
253
  
The industrial applicability criterion is an essential means for guaranteeing that 
society can extract some beneficial use from patented inventions, and thus a too 
flexible approach towards Article 57 EPC can lead to undesirable results. Moreover, 
although patent law is technology-neutral in theory and does not distinguish between 
different technologies, it can be technology-specific in application.
254
 The 
characteristics of inventions vary a lot across industries and a very broad 
interpretation of industrial application in all cases will difficultly meet the utilitarian 
goal of the patent system in all cases. Therefore, it is important to find an adequate 
level of stringency in applying the industrial application standards in order to achieve 
the proper balance in the patent bargain.  
3.4.1. Arguments In Favor Of Adopting A Broad Approach Towards Industrial 
Application 
First, there is the argument that in most cases, inventions will be industrially 
applicable because an inventor of a new device generally builds that device with a use 
in mind. In other words, an inventor will create a device because a specific potential 
use exists.
255
 Thus, it would be difficult to find inventions that do not have any 
potential use at all. It would only be in fields like chemistry or biotechnology that 
previously unknown random possible uses frequently arise. For example the maker of 
a new compound in many cases does not know the compound’s ultimate use. The 
inventor may seek to find the cure for a disease and may discover a function that has 
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no value for that purpose but of great importance for a different application.
256
 
However in these cases it has been argued that although the final real use of the 
substance may not be defined until sometime after production, that substance already 
has useful properties from the moment of its creation.
257
 Thus, the time when an 
industrial application is found is irrelevant as long as some useful function exists. 
Second, it has been claimed that a very rigorous industrial application standard may 
inhibit the dissemination of information in certain fields, and that this approach would 
be inconsistent with those policies underlying the patent system that acknowledge the 
public benefits that result from the wide dissemination of information in all fields of 
technology.
258
 The lower the industrial application standard is set, the easier it will be 
obtain a patent, and thus the incentive to file early will be increased. Early filing 
promotes early disclosure and therefore, early access to patented technologies.
259
 So, 
lower industrial application standards, by encouraging early filing, would promote 
early dissemination of knowledge. On the contrary, high standards would discourage 
or delay patent applications and, thus, hinder the dissemination of information.  
Third, it has been claimed that in a patent regime with a low industrial application 
requirement, duplicative research efforts would be minimized by early disclosure of 
the patented invention, which would encourage competitors to make arrangements 
with the patent owner, cease development of equal products,
260
 or invent around. The 
latter, in particular, is usually seen as an effective means for advancing technology.  
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Fourth, time and progress have dramatically altered the inventive landscape and today 
inventions usually offer potential benefits far earlier than commercial 
marketability.
261
 Based on this premise, it has been argued that today inventions do 
not need to become final products with real practical applications in order to be 
industrially applicable, but they are already useful at earlier stages. For example, 
discoveries that are the subject of serious scientific investigation may be sold 
commercially to researchers long before they have ripened into products for sale to 
the general public.
262
 The value of inventions has changed in the last decades and new 
industries like biotechnology or software are responsible for the development of 
inventions that do not need to become a final product for being applicable but are very 
useful at an early stage. 
Fifth, excessive industrial application standards could discourage innovation. There is 
little evidence that patents over inventions at an early stage of development such as 
research results may impede access to knowledge and future innovation.
263
 However, 
a high standard may stifle innovation by encouraging inventors to stop carrying out 
research on new discoveries and keep their inventions secret if they fear that a patent 
will not be granted.
264
 Moreover, today private funding plays a key role in research 
and development and a strict industrial application requirement could stop investors 
from continuing investing in innovative projects.  
Finally, it has been argued that if an invention is not applicable in industry, it will not 
have commercial success and will not impose any relevant burden to society, while if 
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the invention proves to be a commercial success, it will benefit the public. In those 
cases where an invention is useless to society, then the exclusive monopoly that a 
patent grants becomes worthless.
265
 Therefore, the holder of such a patent would be 
taking nothing from the public because the public would not be attracted to make, use, 
or sell a useless invention. These patents would merely disclose information to the 
public;
266
 and therefore, there would not be any negative consequences if patents were 
granted on such inventions. 
3.4.2. Arguments Supporting A Strict Interpretation Of Industrial Application 
The main argument in favor of adopting a strict approach towards industrial 
application is that a low standard would stifle research and development by rewarding 
individuals who do not contribute to innovation by providing a beneficial useful 
product to society. A low standard would enable researches to patent inventions 
without fully understanding their specific functions.
267
 The holders of these patents 
would then be able to receive royalties from subsequent innovators who wish to carry 
out further research.
268
 A low standard would confer patent rights to useless 
inventions that create a monopoly of knowledge and confer power to block off whole 
areas of scientific development, without compensating benefit to the public.
269
 A very 
relaxed interpretation of industrial application would allow the grant of monopolies 
that would have the inevitable effect of hindering the freedom of research.
270
 On the 
contrary, a high standard would force inventors to continue research until a real 
practical application is found. Under this view, a strict interpretation would fit better 
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with the objectives of providing society with beneficial and useful inventions that the 
patent system pursues. 
Second, the main policies underlying the patent system do not support a flexible 
standard. The incentive to invent theory is not sustainable as a justification for a broad 
requirement because it does not account for today’s merger of the traditionally 
distinct public and private spheres, which provides sufficient incentives to invent 
basic upstream products in many industries.
271
 Likewise, neither does the incentive to 
disclose theory, since if a clear use has not been identified, it cannot be disclosed. A 
narrow industrial application requirement would strengthen patent law’s incentive to 
disclose by allowing upstream, basic research to remain in the public domain, while 
promoting disclosure of downstream innovation with a real practical utility.
272
 With 
regard to the incentive to innovate theory, which maintains that patents induce firms 
to carry an invention through to market, a narrow requirement enhances innovation 
and collaboration by allowing property rights further downstream while leaving basic 
discoveries in the public domain, thus promoting competitive, creative development 
of early research.
273
 It seems therefore that a loose application of Article 57 of the 
EPC would contradict fundamental policy ideas behind patent law regimes. 
Third, the inventive contribution of a patent resides on its practical utility. If patents 
were granted over materials at the stage when they are only an experimental 
contribution towards a final and useful result, then they would not constitute a 
significant practical outcome that provides the most inventive of all the contributory 
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 Patents without industrial application are useless monopolies. An invention 
without a current or foreseeable use has no practical value. Correspondingly, there is 
no sense in attributing the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or 
importing an invention that is worthless.
275
 In this regard, a stringent approach 
towards industrial application serves to guarantee that a real practical contribution to 
industry exists, or in other words, a higher standard would protect society from 
monopolies on useless inventions. 
Finally, philosophical approaches to patent law also support a strict standard. For 
instance, the labor-based theory advanced by John Locke supports a narrow 
interpretation providing that property rights should only be granted to things that add 
value to society and do not harm common resources. Within the context of patent law, 
Locke’s notion of awarding property rights would support a narrow requirement 
according to which the public should retain the right to access ‘upstream’ products 
such as research tools while property rights are to be granted for ‘downstream’ 
innovations which are of value to society.
276
 Locke’s approach is primarily concerned 
with protecting the interests of society wherever property rights exist. Therefore, 
ensuring that patented inventions provide a realizable benefit to society essentially 
concurs with this approach. 
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
The requirement of industrial application has historically played a key role in 
achieving fundamental patent policy objectives. By requiring that inventions provide 
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a real practical contribution to the industrial arts, the industrial applicability criterion 
helps to ensure that society can ultimately benefit from patented technologies. 
However, industrial application has not always received much attention in 
contemporary patent legal and policy discussions. Despite its historical importance as 
an essential pillar in the justification of patent systems, the requirement of industrial 
application has not generally posed a significant challenge to patent applicants. With 
the adoption of the EPC, it was clarified that this requirement should only impose a 
barrier to patentability in extremely limited situations. Nonetheless, a very flexible 
approach towards interpreting industrial application would encourage the patentability 
of inventions that are incapable of performing a practical function in industry. Thus, it 
seems important to find an adequate level of stringency in applying the industrial 
application standards in order to achieve an optimal balance between the private and 
public interests at stake in patent systems.  
The purpose of this chapter was to offer a comprehensive understanding of the 
history, significance and interpretation of the requirement of industrial application in 
the European patent system. The chapter sets the basis for analysisng the changes 
introduced by the Biotech Directive regarding the interpretation of industrial 










4. THE EUROPEAN REQUIREMENT OF INDUSTRIAL 
APPLICATION IN HUMAN GENE INVENTIONS 
4.1. Introduction 
Following the important developments in molecular biology that took place during the 
1990s, concerns arose regarding the growing number of patent applications over 
human DNA sequences and related proteins of unknown function that were not 
capable of showing any application in industry. To deal with this issue, the Biotech 
Directive included several provisions requiring applicants to disclose the industrial 
application of inventions concerning isolated human gene sequences at the time of 
filing the patent application. The new standard was later incorporated into the 
Implementing Regulations to the EPC.
277
 As a result, a full new body of case law on 
the industrial application of gene sequences and encoded proteins has been developed 
in recent years.  
The chapter first studies the main scientific concepts underlying the creation of 
inventions based on human genetic information and then examines the patenting 
landscape of isolated human DNA fragments and their corresponding proteins and the 
demand for a response to the growing number of patent claims over human gene-
related inventions of unknown use. Second, the chapter deals with the justifications 
for adapting patent systems to new technologies to then explore the background of 
Article 5(3) of the Biotech Directive and its incorporation into the EPC system. Third, 
the chapter examines the EPO case law on Rule 29(3) of the EPC. Finally, the chapter 
analyses the case of Eli Lilly v. Human Genome Sciences (HGS) before both the UK 
Supreme Court and the EPO, and the implications of these decisions for the biotech 
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industry. The case of Eli Lilly v. HGS was selected because it provides a concise 
overview of the EPO approach towards the industrial applicability of human DNA 
and also shows how the EPO and national courts can consistently interpret the 
Biotech Directive’s requirement of industrial applicability for human genes and gene 
fragments. 
4.2. The Patent Claim: Protein-Coding Genes Of Unknown Function 
4.2.1. The Scientific Concepts 
Since the discovery of the DNA structure and recombinant DNA techniques the 
principal pursuit of biotech research has been to decipher genes, entire genomes, and 
the proteins they can produce.
278
 In consequence, the inventive landscape within the 
biotech field started to see more and more inventions, and patent applications, 
concerning human genetic material.   
DNA - which can be described as the code through which living organisms pass their 
traits to offspring- and RNA -a related molecule made from DNA- are the two basic 
kinds of molecules that carry the genetic code, and that, through specific regions or 
sequences called genes, provide cells with the instructions for producing or coding 
proteins.
279
 DNA is contained in the nucleus of almost every human and mammalian 
cell with the exception of very basic forms of life such as bacteria. 
A polypeptide or protein is a chain, or sometimes linked chains, of amino acids that 
perform many essential functions in the body. Proteins are polymers, that is, 
molecules that contain many copies of a smaller building block, covalently linked by 
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 Such building blocks are α-amino acids that are specified by the 
genetic code, of which there are 20 that occur regularly in the proteins of living 
organisms.
281
 A protein typically has from 50 to 2000 amino acids, there being 
proteins consisting of approximately 30,000 amino acids.
282
 One protein differs from 
another based on the sequence of amino acids, and it is this sequence of amino acids 
that determines the protein’s ultimate function. Because of their many different 
shapes and chemical properties, proteins can perform a wide range of functions inside 
and outside the cells that either are essential for life, or provide selective evolutionary 
advantage to the cell or organism that contains them,
283
 or provoke disease. Thus, 
characterizing the structures and functions of proteins is essential for understanding 
how cells work.  
Genes activate the production of proteins by bringing together different combinations 
of amino acids in specific orders. Different genes attract different amino acids that in 
turn combine to produce different proteins, which make cells function in different 
ways.
284
 A gene normally includes non-coding regions (introns) as well as protein 
encoding regions (exons). The first step in gene expression is removing the non-
coding regions of RNA as the RNA is transcribed into mature messenger RNA 
(mRNA), which contains the protein-encoding regions of a gene.
285
 The mRNA of an 
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organism can then be isolated and copied to a mirror image of itself in a 
complimentary (more stable) DNA sequence (cDNA), which has the same sequence 
of nucleic acids as the original piece of DNA in the organism’s genome.
286
 When an 
organism is discovered to produce a protein that could be useful in other contexts, this 
protein is isolated and a small portion of its amino acid sequence is determined in 
order to identify which particular gene codes for that protein.
287
 Once the gene has 
been identified, it can be used to artificially produce the desired protein. 
In the living organism, only parts of the mRNA are translated into a protein. It is the 
genetic code what specifies which amino acids are added to the protein based on the 
mRNA sequence.
288
 Given the existence of 20 amino acids but only 4 bases, groups 
of several nucleotides must somehow specify a given amino acid.
289
 However, even 
with only four bases, the number of potential DNA sequences is very large for even 
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the smallest of DNA molecules; a virtually infinite number of different genetic 
messages can exist.
290
 Moreover, some of these amino acids can modify when already 
part of a protein.
291
 Researchers thus need to identify the sequence of nucleotides in 
DNA that encodes the amino acid sequence of a particular protein, which is the 
encoding gene of that protein.  
There appear to be about 30,000-40,000 protein-encoding genes in the human 
genome.
292
  These genes are more complex than in other organisms, with more 
alternative splicing generating a larger number of protein products,
293
 being some 
genes able to produce up to 25,000 different proteins by combinatorial splicing.
294
 
The coding DNA regions are therefore the carriers of most of the genetic information 
that is responsible for phenotypic functions. However, they represent only 3-5 per 
cent of the total DNA.
295
 ESTs, which are short subsequences of a cDNA sequence, 
identify only these interesting coding fragments, selecting the main portions of the 
human genome.
296
 EST cDNAs do not usually encompass the entire sequence of the 
original mRNA (they are usually 200 to 500 nucleotides long, and are generated by 
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sequencing either one or both ends of an expressed gene), and consequently do not 
give complete DNA sequence information. Nonetheless, experiments have 
traditionally included the use of ESTs in attempts to the discovery and mapping of 
human genes,
297
 and the novel proteins they code for.  
Then in the 1990s the traditional ‘wet lab’ approach to biotechnology was substituted 
by a new computer-assisted approach called ‘bioinformatics’, which allows 
researchers to identify and isolate gene sequences and the corresponding proteins by 
comparing sequence homologies with previously identified and characterised 
genes.
298
 Use of sequence comparisons between different proteins to deduce protein 
function has expanded substantially in recent years as the genomes of more and more 
organisms have been sequenced.
299
 However, notwithstanding the value of these 
comparisons for acquiring an insight into protein structure and function, researchers 
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have to be careful when attributing to one protein, or a part of a protein, a similar 
function or structure to another based only in amino acid sequence similarities.
300
 
There are examples in which proteins with similar overall structures participate in 
different biological processes and display different functions as well as cases in which 
functionally unrelated proteins with dissimilar amino acid sequences have very 
similar folded structures.
301
 The reason for this is that whereas the number of genes is 
strictly limited, the functions and utilities of those genes are not, and therefore the 
value of ESTs is limited since they only represent a part of the original DNA 
sequence.  
As explained above, the sequence of DNA is what specifies the sequence of amino 
acids in a protein. In this regard, bioinformatics helps to predict the amino acid 
sequence of a protein from the cDNA that codes for it. That is, in order to determine 
the structure and properties of such protein, researchers can use computer-assisted 
techniques to compare sequences and if two proteins share similar sequences across 
regions assume that they will have similar structure and properties. However, these 
are just suppositions. The amino acid sequence of a protein might be used to assign 
the protein to a particular protein family or superfamily, the members of which often 
but not always have a significant degree of homology and have similar functions.
302
 
Therefore, although this information could provide an indication of the function of the 
protein in question, in some cases proteins have a wide range of different functions 
even when they are part of the same family.
303
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Thus, the fact that a protein can be ascribed to a particular family does not necessarily 
provide a clear indication of its function. Protein families also evolve by duplication, 
mutation and the exchange of whole functional domains; for example, 
immunoglobulin receptors involved in immunity share sequence similarities with 
various cell-signalling receptors that are involved in nervous system development 
such as nerve growth factor.
304
 Their structures may show similarities but their 
functions differ.
305
 Therefore, it would be inaccurate to hold that by uncovering the 
existence of a protein, its function would always be immediately known although in 
some cases it might be possible to make an ‘educated guess’.  
4.2.2. The Patenting Landscape In The 1990s: Growing Number Of Claims Over 
Genetic Fragments Of Unknown Function  
There are 2.9 billion base pairs in the human genome, which are arranged into 
approximately 30,000 genes. The complete map of the human genome was completed 
in 2003, however, today scientists still do not know the properties of many genes, 
what proteins they can produce, and so their functions remain uncovered.
306
 
Nonetheless, ascertaining the role of a genetic sequence is essential for treating 
multiple diseases since many genetic disorders occur when one or more nucleobases 




The ultimate benefit from genetic research does not lie in the disclosure of the 
obvious, that is, that a gene can produce a protein, but in the deliberate discovery and 
identification of an important function that is useful for society; for example, that 
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chemokine receptors can function as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) co-
receptors.
308
 The challenge is to match the genetic codes with their practical 
applications in order to better understand how genes work, what role they play in our 
bodies and how they can be used to cure disease.
309
 If no practical use is disclosed, it 
is less justifiable to allow the grant of exclusive monopoly rights that may simply 
impose barriers to further research. Patenting gene parts without a known function 
would mean a departure from the traditional patent bargain that allows a patent on an 
invention in exchange for the disclosure of a useful contribution to the art. This is also 
true in other fields of technology, however, given the importance of genetic research 
in human healthcare and other key areas, awarding patents that are not readily useful 
poses an unnecessary threat to the progress of research in this field. 
The first patents on human DNA sequences issued in the 1980s did not raise too many 
concerns because they related to long-awaited drugs such as granulocyte colony 
stimulating factor or erythropoietin.
310
 Inventions usually met the patentability criteria 
because researchers generally started research with a known protein with activities of 
interest and used that information to identify the encoding gene, which was a difficult 
and laborious process.
311
 However, advances in the identification of the human 
genome generated worldwide entry of patent applications over gene-related 
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 many of which did not disclose any function.
313
 Today, patent 
protection is often sought for methods and substances that relate to isolated DNA 
and/or RNA sequences, as well as the proteins encoded by them,
314
 even if their 
functions have not been determined. This is because the value of gene sequences 
mainly resides in the proteins they can produce, which are the ones that control the 
functioning of the human body, and thus obtaining a patent for these substances gives 
the patentee the power to charge a royalty to everyone who wants to access this 
information.  
In attempting to sequence the human genome, scientists of the HGP first sequenced 
short portions of human DNA sequences (ESTs) to use them as tools for sequencing 
entire genes.
315
 The use of EST technology to locate protein-coded gene sequences 
was technically refined in the 1990s and brought to an efficient large scale on the 
basis of methods that were developed in the 1970s and 1980s.
316
 However, as 
explained above, ESTs are small subsequences of cDNA that cannot code for a 
complete, functional protein or even any part of a protein.
317
 The interest in them 
comes from the idea that they could be the subject of patent applications claiming not 
only the ESTs but also any gene associated with the ESTs, any protein encoded by the 
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genes, and any antibodies that bound to the proteins.
318
 Thus, in the 1990s companies 
like Incyte, Celera Genomics, and Human Genome Sciences filed tens of thousands 
applications over ESTs or single base-pair mutations (single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs)),
319
 many of which did not disclose well-defined functions 
like the function of related proteins, or the industrial applicability of the claimed gene 
sequence.  
In particular, the 1991 patent application by the US NIH over ESTs at the US Patent 
and Trade Mark Office (USPTO) represented a turning point in the discussions over 
the industrial applicability of human gene patents. In June 1991, the NIH filed a 
patent application involving partial cDNA sequences and ESTs.
 320
  This application 
was not released to the public but from the relevant literature it can be reasonably 
deduced that it included claims relating to the identification of approximately 6,800 
partial cDNA sequences, the so-called ESTs (around 340) and their protein 
products.
321
 Both kinds of sequences were claimed to be of practical utility based 




This and other patent applications at that time suggested that scientists were using 
rapid screening and sequencing of large numbers of DNA sequences to randomly 
sequence segments of human DNA without knowing what protein they coded for.
323
 
Today, it is still often the case that the only known utility of an isolated and purified 
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DNA or RNA sequence is its scientific significance as an object for further research. 
Their real useful functions can, if at all, only be implemented as a result of increased 
intellectual and expert efforts.
324
 Unlike fully sequenced genes with known and 
exploitable functions, for example for specific therapeutic and diagnostic uses, most 
ESTs only serve to discover new genes, identify an expressed gene of unknown 
function or as a marker for localisation of a gene on a physical map of genome.
325
 In 
consequence, patenting genes started to look less like rewarding the creation of useful 
downstream products and more like patenting scientific information. Although other 
organizations filed similar patent applications in the 1990s and maintained those 
filings,
326
 the NIH later reversed its position on EST patents and abandoned its 
applications. A few years later, on 6 October 1998 the USPTO issued to Incyte 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the US Patent No 5817479 for ‘Human Kinase Homologs’, the 
first patent known to include ESTs.
327
  
Similarly in Europe, soon after the EPO started to accept patent applications in June 
1978,
328
 the first attempts were made to patent important molecular biology 
achievements.  However, determining the exact amount of applications and patent 
grants over human genes is somewhat difficult due to the fact that the International 
Patent Classification (IPC)
329
 does not provide a specific mark for isolated human 
gene fragments. The IPC does not distinguish between human or animal genes, and 
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patents over genetic information are generally assigned more than one mark. The 
most relevant classes include C12N and C07K. C12N covers inventions within 
genetic engineering relating to DNA and RNA, while C07K relates to proteins and 
peptides and may cover genetic sequences that encode proteins. More specifically, 
C12N15/12 to C12N15/28 describe genes encoding animal proteins.  
Between 1978 and December 1997, one year before the adoption of the Biotech 
Directive, the EPO published 1,251 patents relating to genes encoding animal 
(including human) proteins. Some examples are the European patent EP0411946 over 
DNA encoding human GP 130 protein or EP0431065 regarding a full-length human 
laminin binding protein cDNA sequence. A more specific search in the EP database 
shows that within the same time period, the EPO published approximately 408 patents 
with the words ‘DNA’ or ‘human’ or ‘gene’ in the title, and both words ‘DNA’ and 
‘human’ in the title or abstract and C12N15 as the IPC classification. For its part, the 
Gowers Review reported in 2006 that patents had already been granted for almost 20 
per cent of human gene DNA sequences by patent offices worldwide, 4,382 out of the 




Because many of these inventions rarely disclosed a substantially specific practical 
use but also raised doubts about their novelty and inventive character, these patents 
became controversial because they were perceived as low-quality patents that were 
not able to meet the patent law criteria.
331
 In particular, the question of industrial 
application has gradually become an integral part of the policies regarding the 
patentability of DNA related inventions. 
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4.2.3. The Inventor’s Perspective V. The Public Response To The Patenting Of 
Useless Gene Sequences 
Despite of being aware that many of their genetic inventions are not industrially 
applicable, biotech companies continue stressing the need to protect their work at a 
stage when an actual use cannot be shown but there is evidence that a significant use 
will follow from further research. The main argument is that although genes per se are 
generally of limited direct application, they are of substantial value since they enclose 
information that can give rise to the development of important innovations in essential 
sectors such as healthcare.
332
 In this regard, the contribution to the art of genes goes 
beyond their industrial application. Thus, patenting newly discovered genes of 
unknown functions would still encourage inventors to continue research in this field. 
Another frequent claim relates to the long duration between the discovery of a 
specific gene sequence and the final realization of a useful product. For example 
ESTs, unlike penicillin, are not medications themselves but need further 
transformation before they can be used in practice.
333
 However, companies consider 
patent protection to be important before they have been able to identify a specific 
industrial use, so they can start recouping their investments and continue developing a 
finally useful product.  
In this regard, because of the highly expensive and competitive nature of genetic 
research, companies try to obtain patent protection at the earliest possible stage before 
the exact applications or functions of the substances are known.
334
 Their argument is 
that if it can be established that an invention might be capable of use in the future, 
once further research has been undertaken, then this should prove sufficient to allow a 
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 With patent protection, companies would then reinforce their position 
in the market and would attract more potential investors. 
On the other hand, patent authorities, interest groups and other stakeholders 
worldwide have expressed concerns against increasing patenting of genes or parts of 
genes of unknown use. In the early 1990s, the USPTO began rejecting patent 
applications over inventions of potential therapeutic value for lack of utility if the 
patent applicant could offer no proof of clinical efficacy.
336
 Nonetheless, in February 
1997, after having refused the NIH applications, the USPTO decided that ESTs were 
patentable even if their only utility was as biochemical probes or generally as research 
tools,
337
 for forensic identification, tissue type or origin identification, chromosome 
mapping and identification, and to tag a gene of known and useful function.
338
 
However, a strict interpretation of the utility requirement has persisted in general 
terms in the US, and ultimately led to the implementation of new utility guidelines 
aimed at reinvigorating the utility requirement. In this regard, after implementing its 
Utility Examination Guidelines in January 2001, which reflected the reasoning of the 
US Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson,
339
 the USPTO began to frequently reject 
ESTs patent applications.
340
 The principal question with regard to the utility of 
genetic material is basically whether patents shall be granted in exchange for some 
new information for which current practical value cannot be established.  
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Concerns against granting patent protection to gene sequences with no known 
function have also been raised by biomedical researchers and patient advocates. For 
example, Dr James Watson made public his disagreement with the NIH position 
towards the patentability of newly discovered ESTs.
341
 On the other hand, Dr Daniel 
Cohen, one of the pioneers behind the HGP, said that he did not believe it was right to 
file such patent applications by stating that ‘if you have no knowledge of the function 
of the sequence, then you should let people compete freely to discover it’.
342
 These 
reactions show the importance of not overlooking the requirement of industrial 
application for the advance of science. 
With regard to the policy discussions attempting to define the appropriate scope of 
DNA patent claims and the invention’s utility, Lisa Feisee from the Washington, DC-
based Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) noted the problematic character of 
this issue and held that ‘it’s not very complicated to find ESTs. It’s not like you’ve 
done invention of any sort, basically anyone can do it’.
343
 According to this view, the 
real contribution of patents over ESTs would reside on their practical utility and not 
on their mere existence in isolation. 
The 1995 report of the National Academies Policy Advisory Group (NAPAG) of the 
Royal Society stated that merely isolated genes should fall under the sphere of basic 
discoveries and that patents should only be granted to achievements that had been 
carried far enough to demonstrate practical results.
344
 In this regard, the authors 
considered that the EPC requirement of industrial application might be too broad to 
ensure a clear separation between the spheres of discovery and invention, and 
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recommended the introduction of a separate requirement of utility into the EPC. In a 
subsequent report, however, the Royal Society held that the growing tendency to file 
for patents over scientific knowledge with no practical information could be 
addressed by applying the requirements of industrial application and sufficiency more 
rigorously, for example by implementing the ‘specific, substantial and credible’ test 
developed in the US.
345
 
A few years later, the Nuffield Council also adopted a fairly critical position 
regarding the patenting of genetic sequences, such as ESTs and SNPs, of unclear 
function. Considering the deleterious effects that these patents (specially those 
concerning research tools) may have on further progress of genetic research and the 
successful exploitation of its results, the Nuffield Council expressly stated that this 
practice should be discouraged, recommending the review and strengthening of the 
requirement of industrial application so that the grant of a patent reflects more 
properly the inventor’s contribution.
346
 
And then in 1997, the Human Genome Organisation (HUGO) published a statement 
expressing their concern that patenting ESTs of uncertain functions would unduly 
make subsequent innovation dependent of such patents.
347 
In particular, the HUGO 
1997 statement stressed its agreement with allowing patents when a specific function 
has been identified, that is, the useful benefits of genetic information, but explicitly 
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opposed the patenting of randomly isolated gene sequences encoding proteins without 
specified utility, for example, ‘as probes to identify specific DNA sequences’.
348
  
4.2.4. The Requirement Of Industrial Application As The Framework For 
Action 
Concerns with respect to the industrial application of isolated human genes have been 
expressed from both sides of the spectrum, which demands for a response addressing 
both public and private interests. In this regard, the relevant question is whether the 
patent practice should adhere to the conventional conceptions or rather, how the 
existing concepts should be applied to fit in best with the technology.
349
 With regard 
to the issue of patenting genes of unknown function, the requirement for an invention 
of being industrially applicable addresses this specific challenge, and is therefore the 
proper framework within which the patentability of such genes should be dealt 
with.
350
 Therefore, in order to ensure that inventions related to human genes are only 
patented if they actually show a clearly defined industrial application, the Biotech 
Directive included a set of specific provisions addressing this issue. The reasoning, 
interpretation and implications of such rules will be analysed in the next part of this 
chapter. 
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4.3. Industrial Applicability Of Gene Fragments: The Biotech 
Directive’s Approach  
4.3.1. Modifying Existing Standards To Accommodate New Technologies 
There has been much debate regarding the extent to which existing patent law regimes 
need to be revised to accommodate new frontier technologies like biotechnology. In 
most countries inventions in this field are not subject to special provisions and they 
have been accommodated by general patent law standards. However, in Europe the 
disparity in approaches between Member States, for example the Netherlands refusing 
to apply patent law to biological material, triggered the Commission’s initiative to 
enact a specific directive dealing with the patentability of biotechnological inventions 
in 1988.
351
 The proposal for a directive was part of the wider strategic goals of 
completing the internal market and promoting the European biotechnology sector.  
There are different options for dealing with the various issues that arise from the 
patenting of genetic material including the creation of a sui generis form of 
protection; imposing compulsory licensing for specific gene patents; raise the 
threshold of patent law standards, noting that patent law criteria operate differently, 
and have different importance in different fields of the creative environment;
352
 or 
avoid patenting of genetic information at all.
353
 In order to address concerns over the 
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patenting of gene fragments of unknown function, the industrial application 
requirement was found to be the most suitable means to do so at the time the Biotech 
Directive was adopted. In this regard, the Biotech Directive introduced Article 5(3) 
(and related recitals) imposing a rigorous interpretation of the industrial application 
standard by requiring the disclosure of a more than speculative function of the 
invention at the time of the patent application. 
Adapting law to the characteristics or needs of a particular industry is explained by 
the fact that, in theory, statutory patent law does not distinguish between different 
industries but provides technology-neutral protection to all kinds of technologies.
354
 
Since changes in an industry over time present significant structural problems for 
patent law, some have suggested that the unified rules suitable for the old, 
homogenous world are no longer appropriate in today’s increasingly complex 
innovative landscape.
355
 Any new technology presents the patent system with 
transitional difficulties in adjusting the standards of patentability, establishing 
doctrinal procedures, and developing legal doctrine to address technology-specific 
aspects.
356
 Since the EPC and other previous legislations were adopted, technology, 
and especially life sciences, has evolved dramatically along time. In general-purpose 
patent law regimes, rights cannot be modified according to the protection actually 
needed and the reward structure cannot be adapted according to the market structure 
in which the innovator operates.
357
 However, one-size does not fit all, so adapting 
certain rules according to the needs of a particular industry would allow better 
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accommodating scientific and technological developments as well as providing more 
optimal incentives to innovation. 
Despite the significant amount of patent applications over genetic material, in 1998, 
no patents had yet been granted for ESTs or SNPs in Europe.
358
 However, it was the 
boom of patent applications concerning human gene sequences what triggered fears 
that patents would be granted over discoveries the practical application of which was 
not even determined yet.
359
 The rapid developments that were taking place in the field 
of human genetics, coupled with the growing number of patent claims directed at 
obtaining patent protection over isolated gene fragments of unknown or highly 
speculative function raised the question of whether the existing patent system was 
sufficient, or even appropriate to deal with these kinds of inventions.
360
 To address 
this issue, it was argued that the requirement of industrial application should be more 
stringently applied for these types of claims,
361
 which would help ensuring that 
inventions rather than fundamental discoveries were the subject of exclusive rights.  
Therefore, through the Biotech Directive the Commission sought, among other 
objectives, to give greater importance to the criterion of industrial application in order 
to prevent the systematic grant of patents over gene fragments of unknown practical 
use. This approach also reflected the increased importance in the US of the 
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corresponding requirement of utility.
362
 More importantly, by inserting a strict 
interpretation of the requirement of industrial application for human genes, the 
framers of the Biotech Directive were also emphasizing that in cases such as the 1991 
US NIH application for partial DNA sequences (ESTs) of which no function or utility 
was known at the time of the patent application, patent protection will not be 
awarded.
363
 This idea received further support from the USPTO and the Japan Patent 
Office (JPO) at the tripartite meetings,
364
 other organizations, and the scientific 
community,
365
 who had expressed fears that patenting genes of unknown function 
could pose undue barriers to scientific research and ultimately impair innovation. 
Nonetheless, to ensure that the genetics industry’s high path progress continues, 
existing patent law doctrines, and in particular the industrial application criterion for 
patentability, must be carefully construed and enforced. Asserting the patent law 
requirement of industrial application depends on continuing agreement with respect to 
the policy that best promotes innovation, and the balance of competition and 
compensation in this field.
366
 It should impose a real but not unbridgeable hurdle to 
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the patentability of gene related inventions,
367
 thus addressing the interests of 
patentees and third parties and maintaining a fair basis for exclusivity that accurately 
reflects an invention’s contribution to the art.
368
 Patent law and policy must strike a 
balance between the traditional scientific aim of maximizing the production of 
knowledge and the traditional commercial aim of maximizing its exploitation.
369
 In 
this regard, a pondered and well-defined standard of industrial applicability may be 
the best means to achieve an appropriate and reasonably predictable balance between 
the private and public interests at stake in this industry.  
4.3.2. Background And Adoption Of Article 5(3) Of The Biotech Directive 
Despite the lack of unanimous acceptance that biological inventions could be patent 
eligible, the patent laws of European countries did not formerly include any special 
provisions regarding these types of inventions.
370
 In this regard, the First Directive 
Proposal noted that ‘the patent system, when applied to biotechnology, encounters a 
number of particular problems (…) in relation to ethics as well as in relation to the 
traditional patent law concepts of patentable subject matter, discovery, novelty, 
sufficient written disclosure, industrial applicability and the extent and exhaustion of 
patent protection’.
371
 Therefore, as explained earlier in this thesis, the First Directive 
Proposal aimed to reduce several of the deficiencies and discrepancies that statutory 
law such as the EPC had not addressed. In particular, although the original text 
proposed did not include any specific provisions regarding industrial application, 
subsequent proposals sought to address the fact that a growing number of patent 
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applications concerning human genes were incapable of showing any industrial 
application.   
It was not until the 1996 Amended Proposal that specific provisions regarding the 
industrial applicability of gene sequences were incorporated.
372
 In response to the 
rejection of the 1992 Amended Proposal by the Parliament in 1995,
373
 the 
Commission presented a more comprehensive text, which later constituted the basis 
for the final Biotech Directive. Although the Parliament’s rejection was concerned 
with the proposal’s insufficiency in addressing ethical issues, in the 1996 Amended 
Proposal the Commission also introduced changes regarding the industrial application 
of inventions relating to the human genes. In particular, Recital 15 of the 1996 
Amended Proposal, which corresponded with Article 3 of the same text, specified that 
inventions concerning the human body and its parts were not patentable unless they 
were isolated and capable of industrial application.  
Subsequently, amendment 16 (regarding Recital 16 (new Recital 16e)) of the Report 
on the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions of 25 June 1997
374
 introduced a requirement 
that at least one industrial application should be actually disclosed in the patent 
application of inventions concerning sequences or partial sequences of a gene. The 
1997 Report also proposed a similar amendment for Article 3 of the 1996 text by 
introducing a specific provision, Article 3(3), which stated that the industrial 
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application of a sequence or a partial sequence of a human gene must be disclosed in 
the patent application. 
Both the 1997 Amended Proposal
375
 and the text finally adopted in 1998 included the 
provisions regarding the need to disclose the industrial application of inventions 
concerning human genes and gene sequences in the patent application. As a result, 
one area where the Biotech Directive apparently goes beyond previously existing 
requirements is Article 5(3), which mandates that in order to be patentable, the 
industrial application of an invention regarding the sequence or partial sequence of a 
gene must be disclosed in the patent application.  
Article 5 of the Biotech Directive provides that the human body, at the various stages 
of its formation and development, and the simple discovery of one of its elements, 
including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, cannot constitute patentable 
inventions. However, the Biotech Directive accepts in paragraph 3 of the same 
provision that such elements can be patented if, in addition to be isolated from the 
human body, applicants disclose the industrial application of these inventions. 
Recitals 22, 23, and 24 of the Biotech Directive further clarify this.  
In particular, the Biotech Directive clarifies in Recital 23 that a mere DNA sequence 
without indication of a function does not contain any technical information and is not 
therefore a patentable invention.
376
 Then Recital 24 provides that in cases where a 
sequence or partial sequence of a gene is used to produce a protein or part of a protein, 
it is necessary, in order to show industrial applicability to specify which protein or 
part of a protein is produced or what function it performs in order to be patentable. 
Nonetheless, these recitals are somewhat confusing in the sense that proteins can have 
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one or more biochemical functions (biological, chemical, pharmaceutical) and the 
Biotech Directive does not specify the type of function that has to be disclosed, for 
instance, the commercial application resulting from the biochemical functions.
377
 As 
it will be analysed later in this chapter, subsequent interpretation of this requirement 
by the EPO has provided clarification on this. 
4.3.2.1. Public Response To The Biotech Directive’s Approach Towards The 
Industrial Application Of Human Gene Sequences 
An explicit provision requiring that applicants claiming a DNA sequence should 
specify in the patent application its industrial utility, which protein (or part of a 
protein) is produced or what function it performs was something that patent applicants 
were keen to avoid.
378
 For example, a frequent argument against such approach is that 
the commercial utility of DNA sequences often goes far beyond simple protein 
expression.
379
 Besides, Article 5(3) and accompanying recitals received severe 
criticism from entities such as the British Group of the International Association for 
the Protection of Intellectual Property (AIPPI), who contended that to seek a specific 
function goes beyond the mandate of the Biotech Directive and that the same fairly 
low level of utility (or industrial applicability) that is required in other areas of 
technology should be applied to ESTs, SNPs and genomes.
380
 It was claimed that 
raising this standard would interfere with the innovation progress in biotech sciences 
by hurting leading companies that had applied for patents on large numbers of ESTs, 
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However, this initiative has been widely praised by institutions like HUGO, which 
welcomed the Biotech Directive’s clarifications on the interpretation of specific 
patentability requirements with regard to genetic inventions. In particular the 
provision that mere DNA molecule and its sequence without indication of function 
does not contain technical information and cannot be an invention.
382
 HUGO noted 
that while the USPTO accepted the use of tags as probes to identify specific DNA 
sequences as demonstrating utility, this decision would affect later innovation in 
which ESTs are involved since it would be in one way or another dependent of such 
patents. The organization emphasized that DNA molecules and their sequences, be 
they full-length, genomic or cDNA, ESTs, SNPs or even whole genomes of 
pathogenic organisms, if of unknown function or utility, as a matter of policy, should 
be viewed in principle as part of pre-competitive information, and initiatives to put 
them in the public domain, as the Consortium of industry and academia attempted are 
desirable.
383
 According to HUGO the process required to isolate the full-length gene 
and determine its biological function from an EST is considerably more difficult, 
produces more social benefit and thus warrants the most protection and incentive.
384
 
The UK Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys (CIPA) has also expressed its support 
to the Biotech Directive’s approach as a means for striking the balance between 
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innovators and society by ensuring that speculative patent applications relating to 
human genes will not succeed.
385
  
On the other hand, the leader of the US component of the HGP, Francis Collins, 
praised the similar US initiative since it pursued reducing the number of ‘generation 
one’ patents, where there is just a sequence of unknown utility; and increase the 
number of ‘generation two’ applications, where there is a sequence and homology 
suggests a function; and ultimately, ‘generation three’ inventions, more suitable for 
patent protection because there gene sequences have biochemical, or cell biological, 
or genetic data describing function.
386
  
4.3.3. Incorporation Of Article 5(3) Into The EPC And National Laws 
The EU is increasingly participating in patent policy and after the incorporation of 
key provisions of the Biotech Directive into the text of the EPC, this part of EU law is 
now an essential component of European patent law regarding the protection of 
biotechnological inventions. Nevertheless, this does not give the EU jurisdiction over 
the EPC since the EPO is not a EU institution and the EPC is thus not part of EU 
law.
387
 However, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, the EPO has expressly indicated 
its intention of using the Biotech Directive as a supplementary means of interpretation 
with regard to the rules reproducing the Biotech Directive’s text.
 388
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In 1999, by decision of the EPO’s Administrative Council,
389
 some of the Biotech 
Directive’s provisions were incorporated into the Implementing Regulations to the 
EPC. Article 5 of the Biotech Directive was reproduced in Rule 23e (now Rule 29)
390
 
of the EPC Implementing Regulations and entered into force, as did the rest of the 
incorporated provisions on 1 September 1999. The new rules were deemed to be 
retrospectively applicable to all applications awaiting grant, cases and opposition 
proceedings that were pending at that date.
391
  
Since the Biotech Directive is part of EU legislation, all EU Member States were 
required to incorporate the Biotech Directive’s provisions into their national laws. 
With regard to Article 5(3) and related recitals, while most countries have adopted 
these provisions, some have diverged in implementing them. For example France 
incorporated the Biotech Directive in the Intellectual Property Code and excluded 
from patentability discoveries of components of the human body like whole or partial 
human gene sequences, however it has not expressly provided for the patentability of 
isolated gene sequences that disclose their industrial application.
392
 Another example 
is Denmark, where the Biotech Directive was incorporated into Danish Law in May 
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2000 but Article 5(3) was reproduced in Section 18(1)(5) of the Danish Patent and 
Supplementary Protection Certificate Order,
393
 which requires an ‘express 
explanation’ of the industrial application of a gene. The Biotech Directive’s essential 
requirement of a specific definition of the industrial applicability of a gene and 
corresponding protein is thus not mentioned in the Danish Patents Act itself, but only 
in this complementary Order. However, these cases are exceptions to the majority of 
countries, which have implemented Article 5 of the Biotech Directive (Rule 29 of the 
EPC) entirely as Members of the EU and signatory countries of the EPC. 
4.3.3.1. Status Of New Rule 29(3) EPC 
After the incorporation of Article 5(3) of the Biotech Directive into the EPC 
Implementing Regulations, questions arose regarding the status of the new 
requirement. First, clarification was needed regarding the status of EPC Rule 23(e)(3) 
(now Rule 29(3)) with respect to EPC’s Article 57 general requirement of industrial 
application. Since the EPO is not a body of the EU, there were doubts as to the 
relationship between the Biotech Directive’s provisions, which are rules of EU 
supranational law, and the EPC rules, which emanates from an intergovernmental 
treaty. According to Article 249 of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(EC Treaty),
394
 the provisions of the Biotech Directive are binding to all the Member 
States. However, the same provisions, after being incorporated into the EPC 
Implementing Regulations are under Article 164(2) of the EPC subsidiary to the 
provisions of the EPC, thus to Article 57 of the EPC in the event of conflict.    
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The EPO had the opportunity to clarify this issue in Icos Corporation where the 
Opposition Division (OD) rejected the idea of superiority of Article 57 of the EPC.
395
 
However, appeal to this decision was declared inadmissible and the EPO Board of 
Appeal could not discuss the issue further.
396
 Later in Zymogenetics the appellant 
argued that Rule 23(e)(3) could not change the interpretation of Article 57 EPC since 
the Implementing Regulations were not to be used for changing the initial basic 
meaning of the EPC without infringing Article 164(2) EPC. According to the 
appellant, Recitals 22, 28 and 34 of the Biotech Directive all emphasized and made 
clear that the legislative intention was not to change relevant basic law, including the 
provisions on susceptibility to industrial application. In this regard, requiring an 
indication of a use or of a function of a DNA sequence would be in conflict with the 
EPC since such a requirement was not derivable from Article 57 itself, and the later 
should prevail. However, the Examining Division found no conflict between Rule 
23(e)(3) and Article 57 of the EPC.
397
 It stated that in the light of the new rule, Article 
57 EPC could no longer be interpreted in the classical sense, according to which if the 
protein in question could be made then industrial applicability was shown; but the 
existence of Rule 23(e)(3) EPC required an examination as to whether or not the 
requirement of Article 57 EPC was fulfilled. 
A second question that needed clarification was whether decisions concerning the 
interpretation of Rule 29 could be appealed before the CJEU. In Warf,
398
 it was 
argued that since Rule 29 mirrors the wording of Article 5 of the Biotech Directive, 
                                                 
395
 Novel V28 Seven Transmembrane Receptor/ICOS CORPORATION [2002] OJEPO 293 (EPO 
(OD)). 
396
 V28 receptor/ICOS (T 1191/01) [2002] (EPO (TBA)). For a further discussion on the implications 
of the decision in Icos Corporation with regard to the status of Rule 23(e)(3) see Aerts, ‘The Industrial 
Applicability and Utility Requirements for the Patenting of Genomic Inventions: A Comparison 
between European and US Law’ (n 225). 
397
 Zymogenetics (n 229) point VII (summary of the reasons given by the examining division). 
398





the EPO EBA in interpreting Rule 29 EPC is interpreting the law of the EU and is 
thus required (as a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decision there is 
no judicial remedy) by Article 234 of the EC Treaty
399
 to ask for a ruling by the 
CJEU. However, the EBA held that because the Boards of Appeal of the EPO are not 
courts or tribunals of a Member State of the EU and they apply the provision because 
it is law under a specific rule of the Implementing Regulations to the EPC, and not 
because the Biotech Directive is a source of law to be applied directly, there is no 
power under the EPC for a Board of Appeal to refer questions to the CJEU. 
Therefore, only national courts could refer questions of law to the EU Court of 
Justice. 
4.3.4. The Initial Interpretation Of The New Standard By The EPO 
Article 5(3) of the Biotech Directive did not attract much attention during and 
immediately after the drafting and negotiation process.
400
 Furthermore, while the 
Biotech Directive made clear how important the requirement of industrial application 
was in gene patenting, it did not provide concrete indications on how the EPO and 
national patent offices were to apply the standards set in Article 5(3) and related 
recitals. Thus, given the few number of EPO and national courts’ decisions dealing 
with the issue of industrial applicability, it remained uncertain how the relevant 
authorities should interpret the new provisions. The most certain feature of Article 
5(3) was that the criterion of industrial application when applied to gene fragments, 
and the proteins they code for, was no longer compatible with the traditional broad 
interpretation of Article 57 EPC. 
In 2000, comparative studies between the Japanese, US and European patent offices 
shed light on the interpretation of industrial application in the patentability of DNA 
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 In the examples discussed, the EPO considers two interpretations of 
Article 57 and distinguishes between cases where a polynucleotide can clearly be 
made, and thus the utility requirement is fulfilled,
 
and cases where the usefulness of 
an EST is not know and thus no one would make it in an industrial context.
  
In the last 
case, the EPO concludes that if an EST has no specific function, it cannot be used in 
industry and therefore does not satisfy the utility requirement.  
The trilateral study also contained a conclusion with the main points revealed through 
the comparative exercise, which could be summarized as follows: (1) a mere DNA 
sequence without indication of a function or specific asserted utility is not a 
patentable invention; (2) a DNA sequence, of which specific utility is disclosed such 
as use as a probe to diagnose a specific disease, is a patentable invention as long as 
there are no other reasons for rejection; and (3) a DNA sequence showing no 
unexpected effect, obtained by conventional method, which is assumed to be part of a 
certain structural gene based on its high homology with a known DNA encoding 
protein with a known function, is not a patentable invention.  
The three offices, through discussion at the Trilateral Technical Meeting of June 
2000, confirmed the following additional conclusions: (1) all nucleic acid molecule 
related inventions, including full-length cDNAs and SNPs, without indication of 
function or specific, substantial and credible utility, do not satisfy industrial 
applicability, enablement or written description requirements; and (2) isolated and 
purified nucleic acid molecule related inventions, including full-length cDNAs and 
SNPs, of which a function or specific, substantial and credible utility is disclosed, and 
which satisfy industrial applicability, enablement, definiteness and written description 
requirements, would be patentable as long as there is no prior art (novelty and 
inventive step) or other reasons for rejection such as best mode in the US or ethical 
grounds in the EPO or JPO.  
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A particular question that arises from these conclusions is whether the EPO equates 
the concepts of ‘function’, ‘utility’, and ‘industrial application’ within the context of 
DNA patenting. From the trilateral study, it seems that the EPO refers indistinctively 
to the three terms.
402
 In contrast, the Biotech Directive does not use the term ‘utility’ 
and with regard to the use of the terms ‘function’ and ‘industrial application’, 
different parts of the Biotech Directive seem to offer different insights.
403
 Recital 24 
of the Biotech Directive appears to refer to the specification of the coded protein’s 
function as the means to show industrial applicability wherein Article 5(3) refers to 
the industrial application of the protein-encoding gene sequence. Recital 23 then uses 
the word ‘function’ on its own and thus can be interpreted both ways. Nonetheless, a 
link can be established between the function related to the gene sequence on the one 
hand and the industrial application connected to it on the other hand. The history of 
the origins of Article 5(3) shows a close relationship between both terms. While the 
wording of Article 5(3) adopted by the Parliament in the first reading still referred to 
‘function’,
404
 the wording as finally adopted refers to the ‘industrial application’ of 
the sequence or partial sequence of a gene. Furthermore, in any event, what is 
certainly clear is that the Biotech Directive sought to avoid the grant of patents to 
inventions that, although can be manufactured, do not have any known practical 
applicability at the time of the application.  
In addition to the 2000 comparative study, after incorporating Article 5(3) of the 
Biotech Directive into the EPC Implementing Regulations, the EPO has developed a 
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substantial body of case law addressing the question of industrial application in 
human gene patents pursuant to Rule 29(3) of the EPC.  
4.4. The EPO Case Law On Rule 29(3) Of The EPC 
The standard set by Rule 29(3) of the EPC raised a number of questions among 
applicants and other stakeholders regarding how the new rule would be applied in 
practice by the EPO boards. First, given the influence of the US approach towards the 
utility of biotech inventions in the discussions prior to the adoption of Article 5(3) of 
the Biotech Directive, it was expected that the US utility doctrine could have a role in 
the EPO’s interpretation of Rule 29(3). However, no EPO decisions were available to 
confirm such assumption. A second question related to where the EPO would draw 
the line between abstract interesting research results and industrially applicable 
inventions. Concretely, clarification was needed on whether the EPO would follow 
previous case law, and it would therefore be enough that an invention could be made 
or used to comply with the industrial applicability criterion. If however more than that 
had to be shown, then a third question would arise regarding the type of information 
that has to be disclosed in the patent application. In this regard, given the importance 
of genetic inventions to society, the EPO would also need to consider whether there 
would be exceptions, for example for inventions important for healthcare, to the 
standards established by the EPO case law on Rule 29(3). Finally, clarification 
regarding the type and amount of evidence that is acceptable for purposes of Rule 
29(3) was also highly desirable. 
The EPO has gradually answered these questions by discussing each of those issues 
through a number of decisions on the interpretation of Rule 29(3) EPC. This part of 
the chapter will analyse the main of these EPO decisions in an attempt to offer a 
comprehensive understanding of how the new approach towards industrial application 





4.4.1. Following The US Approach: Specific, Substantial And Credible Utility 
The first time that the EPO gave a decision dealing with the industrial applicability of 
DNA inventions was in the Icos Corporation case,
405
 where the patent related to a 
human DNA sequence encoding the amino acid sequence of the polypeptide V28 
seven transmembrane receptor (V28 7TMR).
406
 Opponents argued that no practical 
use of the invention was shown while the patentee held that the specification 
disclosed how to make the V28 protein and also uses of this protein mainly as a 
receptor involved in immunological processes.
407
 In particular, the opposition held 
that the specification in this case did not disclose a ligand binding (connection) to said 
protein (V28 7TMR) and thus its function as a receptor was only based on the 
structural characterization of the claimed sequence. Therefore, immunological 
properties specific to V28 7TMR, for example other than general housekeeping 
cellular functions, could neither be acknowledged.
408
  
The EPO OD found the patent invalid for lack of industrial application, inventive 
step, sufficiency and technical character. With regard to industrial application, this 
decision is noteworthy because when assessing the practical function of the claimed 
invention under Article 57 in conjunction with Rule 23b-e (now Rule 29(2) and (3)) 
of the EPC, the EPO followed the US ‘specific, substantial and credible test’ and 
found the list of potential uses disclosed in the application to be speculative in the 
sense that they were not specific (concrete), substantial and credible since the 
involvement of the claimed protein in immunological or inflammatory processes had 
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not been demonstrated in vivo, and thus not industrially applicable.
409
 Since no 
function of the V28 protein was sufficiently disclosed in the patent application, for 
instance a biological function valuable for therapeutic use or as a marker for use in 
diagnostic, it was found that no industry would be interested in manufacturing such 
protein.  
Icos Corporation is the leading case on the interpretation of industrial application for 
human gene-related inventions. This decision shows that for human DNA inventions 
to meet the requirement of industrial applicability, it is no longer enough that the 
claimed invention can be made or used, but a substantial, credible, specific, and 
therefore not speculative use of the invention has to be disclosed at the time of the 
patent application. The OD at the EPO interpreted the Biotech Directive’s 
requirement of disclosing the industrial application of human gene patents in line with 
the US utility doctrine formulated in the USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines.
410
 
Thus, this decision again highlights the increasingly close and interchangeable 
identity between the definitions of industrial application and utility.
411
 Furthermore, it 
also confirms the shift in the EPO’s interpretation of industrial application from a 
requirement of being made or used, to a requirement that demands an explicit 
specification of usefulness.  
                                                 
409
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4.4.2. The Distinction Between Interesting Research Results And Industrially 
Applicable Inventions 
Although the decision in Icos Corporation established a landmark ruling for future 
decisions on the industrial application of human gene inventions, it left open the 
question of whether a research use alone can amount to industrial applicability. Even 
though the first opponent in this case (Smithkline Beecham) specifically argued that 
the use of a newly identified protein in research is not equivalent to industrial 
application,
412
 the OD decided not to discuss this issue and did not provide any 
guidance on the matter. However, later in Salk Institute
413
 the EPO TBA took the 
opportunity to discuss this question and concluded that interesting research results 
without a readily identified industrial application would prove insufficient. In this 
case, the board felt it necessary to examine whether for the claimed heterodimeric 
human receptor or dimer
414
 and for the claimed method to modulate transcription 
activation of a gene, which is the first step in gene expression, it could be ascertained 
from the description the way in which they are capable of being exploited in industry; 
or whether what the applicant had described was merely an interesting research result 
that might yield a yet to be identified industrial application.  
In answering this question, the board agreed with the appellant in that the application 
disclosed the presence of cooperative interactions, that is, a stable association or 
affinity between two specific types of receptors, to form heterodimeric receptors and 
also provided evidence on the use of these heterodimers for modulating suitable 
transcription expression systems.
415
 According to the TBA, the activities and products 
disclosed in the application were not aimed at an abstract or intellectual character but 
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at a direct technical result that could be clearly applied in an industrial activity like 
modulation of the expression of a gene or product of interest in a particular expression 
system, screening of products with specific pharmacological activity, etc.  
A few years later in Max Planck,
416
 the TBA further clarified where the borderline 
between real inventions and mere research results resides. In this case the application 
disclosed a newly identified, isolated, enriched and purified polypeptide of human 
origin called brain-derived phosphatase 1 (BDP-1), which was described as having 
certain structural features involved in cellular signal transduction pathways and a 
possible role in the maintenance of basic cellular functions (cellular housekeeping) 
and in certain types of cancer.  The description also suggested that the claimed protein 
was a member of a specific protein family (the protein tyrosine phosphatase proline-, 
glutamic acid-, serine- and threonine-rich (PTPases-PEST) family). BDP-1 was the 
first non-transmembrane protein, that is not capable of passing across a membrane, 
for which this combination of distinct structural and functional features was disclosed, 
which would make it a promising target for therapy intervention, the manufacture of 
anti-cancer drugs, and for the elucidation of the molecular mechanisms underlying 
cancer development. However, the EPO Examining Division (ED) found the patent 
invalid for lack of industrial application. The decision was upheld by the TBA, 
against the applicant argument that the elucidation of such a biological effect and/or 
cellular function should provide sufficient to justify an industrial application.  
In its decision, the TBA emphasized that the fact that a substance could be produced 
or made in some way is not enough, but a profitable use for such substance needs to 
be disclosed.
417
 Besides, the TBA relied on public policy grounds to reject the 
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application by noting that the purpose of granting a patent is not to reserve an 
unexplored field of research for an applicant,
418
 and thus research results, although 
they can be very interesting scientific achievements of remarkable merit, are not 
eligible for patent protection unless it is shown that such results can be applied 
industrially.
419
 This is because the whole burden to guess or find a manner to exploit 
an invention cannot be left to the reader, who would not even known if any practical 
application actually exists.
420
 Therefore, the applicant has the duty to identify and 
describe the practical value of the claimed invention and how such invention could be 
used in industry. 
In view of the decisions in Salk Institute and Max Planck, it appears that the EPO has 
established a distinction between inventions that show some ‘profitable use,’ and are 
thus susceptible of industrial application, and patent applications consisting of vague 
and speculative indications of potential functions that amount to merely interesting 
research results that require further work for identifying a specific industrial 
application. Following this same approach, the decision in Zymogenetics developed 
several principles that further defined the concept of ‘profitable use’ set in Max 
Planck. In this case the application disclosed an isolated polynucleotide, encoding a 
ligand-binding receptor polypeptide
421
 comprising a sequence of amino acids of the 
human transmembrane receptor Zcytcor1.  It contained claims to the polynucleotide, 
the polypeptide, and to antibodies which specifically bound to the polypeptide. The 
receptor was identified as a putative member of a family of cytokine receptors
422
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known as the hematopoietin receptor family, which had a role in the proliferation, 
differentiation and activation of immune cells. Furthermore, therapeutic applications 
directly derivable from the biological function of the invention had been adequately 
disclosed. They included the treatment of diseases such as rheumatoid arthritis, 
multiple sclerosis and diabetes, reduction of rejection of tissue or organ transplants 
and grafts. The ED found the patent invalid for lack of industrial application under 
Article 57 and Rule 23(e)(3) EPC. However, in appeal, the TBA held that the 
application had a plausible practical utility. 
In this case, the board considered that the need to show a profitable use was to be 
understood in a broader sense than that of an actual or potential economic profit or of 
a commercial interest. The invention claimed should have a sound and concrete 
technical basis that could lead a skilled person immediately, without need of carrying 
out further research,
423
 to a practical exploitation in industry.
424
 In this regard, 
‘concrete benefit’ refers to the need of disclosing in definite technical terms the 
purpose of the invention and how it can be used in industrial practice to solve a given 
technical problem, this being the actual benefit or advantage of exploiting the 
invention. On the other hand, ‘immediate’ conveys the need for this to be derivable 
directly from the description, if it is not already obvious from the nature of the 
invention or from the background art.
425
 Purely theoretical or speculative claims 
would not be acceptable under this interpretative standard. 
Subsequent EPO decisions followed the interpretation of profitable use that was set in 
Zymogenetics. For example, in Bayer the TBA found that the only use of the claimed 
human polypeptide comprising the amino acid sequence of sequence SEQ ID NO: 24 
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was to find out more about the polypeptide itself and its natural function(s), and thus 
it did not amount to an immediate concrete benefit.
426
 
4.4.3. Types Of Functions That Can Make A Protein Industrially Applicable 
Pursuant to Rule 29(3) of the EPC, the function of the protein encoded by a claimed 
gene sequence has to be disclosed. However, this rule does not specify the exact type 
of function that needs to be disclosed in order to comply with this requirement. The 
TBA at the EPO addressed this question in Zymogenetics. In this case, the TBA first 
explained that the function of a protein, and the nucleic acid encoding it, could be 
seen at three different levels: molecular function (biochemical activity of the protein), 
cellular function (participation of the protein in cellular processes), and biological 
function (influence of those cellular processes in which the protein takes part within a 
multicellular organism, for example in the forms of cancer, inflammation, etc.).
427
 
The TBA then clarified that each functional level may encompass multiple functions, 
but nevertheless, the elucidation of one particular level of function might result, under 
certain conditions, in a straightforward industrial application, even if the other levels 
of activity remain completely unknown or only partially characterized. Besides, this 
decision also recognized that there can be cases where none of these levels is shown 
but the industrial applicability of a protein is derived from its specific structural 
features.
428
  Moreover, in accordance with the broader interpretation of profitable use 
set in Max Planck, the TBA confirmed that none of those levels is more important 
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 and that the immediate concrete disclosure of one of them might 
prove sufficient for acknowledging industrial application. 
4.4.4. Inventions With Functions Known To Be Essential For Human Health 
Purposes 
The TBA explained in Max Planck that in cases where the function of an invention is 
known to be essential for human health, such invention immediately suggests a 
practical application. These could be for instance the cases of insulin, human growth 
hormone, or erythropoietin. However, in cases where a substance is isolated and 
characterized but the function is unknown, complex or incompletely understood, and 
no disease is identified as being attributable to an excess or deficiency of the 
substance, then the invention is deemed to have no practical application.
430
 According 
to this decision, a protein related invention will show industrial applicability if it is 
identified, its function is completely understood, a disease or condition is determined, 
and its correlation with such disease or condition is characterized.  
Moreover, it must be noted that in light of the Max Planck’s test for inventions 
relevant to human health, it would appear that the understanding (disclosure) of the 
biological function is of primary importance since it is there that a correlation with a 
disease or condition may be made. In contrast, knowledge of the two other functions, 
molecular and cellular functions, might be more suitable to characterize the nature of 
the relationship between the claimed substance and the disease or condition,
431
 which 
is also required in the test.  
Later in Genentech the patent application provided a structural characterization of 
human polypeptide receptors, which enabled their assignment to the category of 
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receptors that bind members of the PF4A family of chemokines;
432
 and thus indicated 
what their function could be, for instance the disclosed receptors could have 
therapeutic potential in connection with inflammation and wound healing.
433
  
However, their ligands had not been characterized, and thus their function was not 
completely understood. The OD at the EPO rejected the claims for lack of a credible 
function. In appeal, taking into account the common general knowledge at the filing 
date, the board found that chemokines as a family were considered not only to be 
interesting in fundamental research; but it acknowledged that PF4-related proteins are 
attractive targets for the development of new therapeutic agents, for example for anti-
inflammatory, healing and tissue repair purposes, and thus important for the 
pharmaceutical industry irrespective of whether or not their role had been clearly 
defined.
434
 Therefore, because of its relevance to human health purposes, industrial 
applicability was acknowledged.  
The same approach was reiterated in Zymogenetics,
435
 where the TBA recognized 
that if an invention is clearly described and plausibly shown to be of use in healthcare, 
for example to cure a rare or orphan disease, then the benefit is immediate and 
concrete even without pursuit of trade. 
4.4.5. Evidence: What Type And How Much Is Required 
The introduction of Rule 29(3) of the EPC also raised questions regarding the amount 
and type of evidence that is necessary to consider that a gene sequence and related 
protein show an indication of function, and is therefore a patentable invention. In this 
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regard, the OD in Icos Corporation left this question open by limiting its decision to a 
general comment saying that despite the data provided, the polynucleotide sequences 
disclosed in the patent application were based on a speculative function. However, 
several later EPO decisions and statements have provided applicants with significant 
guidance on the type and amount of evidence that is required to show industrial 
application. Yet of course, each case has to be considered on its own merit and if a 
profitable use can readily be identified based on the description, taking into account 
common general knowledge at the priority date as well as the prevalent view of the 
person skilled in the art, industrial application can be acknowledged despite the 
absence of actual experimental data.
436
 Hence, an educated guess of a plausible 
function might be enough in some cases.
437
 However, if the alleged function of a 
claimed substance is not credible beyond mere speculation, the EPO will request 
experimental evidence demonstrating the function.
438
 Therefore, what is important is 
that the evidence shown is enough to identify a function, no matter how much, if any, 
experimental data are provided. 
Another question for consideration relates to the type or nature of the evidence that is 
admitted to demonstrate industrial applicability. Today genetic research heavily relies 
on computer-assisted methods like bioinformatics, thus applicants would need to 
know whether in silico evidence is deemed sufficient or if wet-lab results are still 
required. In this regard, the EPO has confirmed in several decisions the validity of 
bioinformatics and other computer-assisted methods for assigning a function to a 
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 Although the probative value of such methods is to be seen on a 
case-by-case basis,
440
 these decisions show that the EPO recognizes their value as an 
integral part of scientific investigations and their capacity to lead to plausible 
conclusions regarding the function of a product before it is actually tested.  
Finally, the EPO has clarified the degree of homology that is needed in order to show 
sufficient probative value. In principle, the EPO will not accept homology data if the 
homology is below 55 per cent or if it involves only homology across a protein’s 
restricted region or motif. However 80 per cent homology in DNA sequences and 95 
per cent at the protein level could be acceptable if such degree of homology is present 
across the whole coding sequence and not only in a motif.
441
 The decisions in 
Pharmacia and Human Delta illustrate such approach. In Pharmacia, a degree of 89,6 
per cent amino acid sequence identity was rejected,
442
 while in Human Delta, the 
TBA accepted a structural identity of at least 95 per cent as sufficient proof for the 
alleged function.
443
 Moreover, in this case the TBA emphasised the fact that DNA 
claims are not required to be limited to a very specific sequence but may embrace 
molecules having a certain degree of homology and/or identity to such specific 
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 which allows applicants to protect their inventions against arbitrary 
modifications of the specific sequences.  
4.4.6. Implications For Future Patent Applicants 
A set of basic principles can be drawn from the EPO case law on the industrial 
application of gene sequences and related proteins. First, the EPO has confirmed the 
growing closeness between the US utility criterion and the European requirement of 
industrial applicability. The implementation of Rule 29(3) of the EPC has shed light 
on the question of whether the European patent law requirement of industrial 
application is actually equivalent to the US requirement of utility. In this regard, the 
EPO interpretation of the Biotech Directive’s new rule on the industrial application of 
human DNA inventions indicates that both criteria industrial application and utility 
are essentially interchangeable, at least within the context of human gene patenting. 
The requirement of industrial application as applied by the EPO has evolved toward 
an actual test of the usefulness of an invention,
445
 closer to the US approach. The 
general requirement of industrial application would be fulfilled if the invention can be 
made or used while utility is fulfilled when the invention is useful and has a positive 
and practical benefit to society.
446
 While the appropriateness of adopting the US 
specific, substantial and credible test for assessing the industrial applicability of 
European patents is somewhat questionable,
447
 Rule 29(3) of the EPC harmonises 
both concepts by introducing a more ‘useful’ character for the European 
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 In theory, this more utility-like approach is only for human DNA 
patents, but its implications have extended to other fields.  
Second, the case law on Rule 29(3) EPC has provided a clearer distinction between 
what would be mere research results and inventions with a real application in industry. 
On the one hand, there are those patent applications consisting of vague and 
speculative claims over inventions that do not disclose any practical utility, and thus 
further research would be needed to identify at least one potential use of such 
inventions in industry. And on the other hand, there are applications that describe a 
profitable, immediate, and concrete benefit; that is, a substantial, specific and credible 
utility of the claimed invention. 
Third, the EPO boards have also expressly recognized the importance of genetic 
research for biomedical research by exempting patent applications concerning 
inventions that are essential to human health from showing a specific application in 
industry. In these cases, the EPO accepts the idea that if an invention can lead to the 
development of important solutions for human healthcare, then industrial applicability 
can be immediately acknowledged. 
Fourth, there is certain flexibility on the types of functions that can be disclosed for 
the purpose of showing industrial applicability. However, the appropriateness of 
disclosing a particular type of function will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
Finally, the EPO case law had made clear that computer-assisted methods are an 
accepted means for determining the practical utility of an invention. Moreover, if a 
certain degree of homology is shown using such methods, industrial applicability 
would be acknowledged if the other conditions for showing industrial application are 
also fulfilled. 
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In addition to this set of principles, it should also be noted that with these decisions, 
the EPO has not only answered questions regarding the interpretation of Rule 29(3) of 
the EPC as applicable to human DNA inventions, but it has further clarified the 
interpretation of the requirement of industrial application in general. These decisions 
have revived the main principles behind the criterion of industrial application, thus 
reemphasizing its important role within the patent system. In fact, most of the criteria 
that arise from the EPO case law on the industrial applicability of human gene 
inventions are now part of the interpretative context of Article 57 EPC that is 
applicable to all technology fields. In particular, as noted in the previous chapter of 
the thesis, the requirement of showing a profitable use of an invention in industry in 
the sense of an immediate concrete benefit, as opposed to vague and speculative 
indications of possible objectives that might or might not be achievable by carrying 
out further research, are explicitly included in the EPO compilation of case law for 
interpreting industrial application in general.
449
 This makes sense since gene patenting 
may decrease along time and inventions in other research areas that are rapidly 
evolving may pose similar challenges for the assessment of the industrial applicability 
of such inventions in the future. 
With regard to the question of whether Rule 29(3) of the EPC has effectively imposed 
a barrier to the patenting of gene sequences of unknown function, there is now a 
significant number of decisions confirming that the requirement of industrial 
application has raised the bar to the patentability of human genes. Some 
commentators sustain that the new approach has raised the industrial applicability 
requirement from a non-existent standard to an unacceptably high standard,
450
 and 
that Rule 29(3) of the EPC now provides major obstacles to the granting of claims for 
ESTs, especially when they are to be used as probes for the isolation of full-length 
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genes of unknown function.
451
 They argue that the test of industrial application is now 
of a higher standard in cases involving gene sequences than for other inventions,
452
 
which also raises doubts regarding the compatibility of Rule 29(3) with Article 27 of 
the TRIPS Agreement. In particular, the difference between the European industrial 
applicability requirement that is applicable to human DNA inventions and inventions 
in other technical fields suggests that the non-discrimination principle, as stated by the 
TRIPS Agreement, has no direct effect. 
However, the pragmatic approach that the EPO has taken towards interpreting both 
Article 57 and Rule 29(3) of the EPC within the context of human gene patents shows 
that the current industrial application criteria meet the challenges posed by gene 
technologies by providing a suitable barrier to the grant of patents on inventions of a 
speculative nature. Yet it provides flexibilities in those cases where an invention’s 
function is known to be especially important for human health. Nonetheless, given the 
importance of striking the balance between public and industrial interests, it would be 
desirable that the EPO keeps an impartial, realistic and pragmatic implementation of 
the industrial application criteria for these types of inventions. 
Finally, it should also be noted that the nature of the activities that are covered under 
the notion of ‘profitable use’ is bound to evolve. While a disclosure may not generate 
a profitable use in the sense currently accepted, it may still be of value for some of the 
intermediate activities in which companies are now increasingly involved.
453
 Thus 
this test may be further broadened in the future to cover new activities in the 
innovative progress of gene technologies. 
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4.5. The Case Of Neutrokine Alpha: Eli Lilly V. Human Genome 
Sciences 
The 2009 EPO decision and the 2011 decision of the UK Supreme Court in the case 
of Eli Lilly v. HGS have provided additional conclusions with regard to the 
interpretation of the requirement of industrial applicability for human gene inventions. 
This case illustrates very well the EPO’s position on the interpretation of Rule 29(3) 
of the EPC and provides a good example of how the EPO Boards apply previous EPO 
decisions on industrial application consistently. Furthermore, this case shows the 
differences between the approaches of the UK courts and the EPO towards the 
industrial applicability of isolated human proteins and their encoding genes, and how 
coherence between their decisions has eventually been achieved with regard to this 
question. 
In 1996, the US biotech company HGS, using homology screening, identified a new 
member of the tumour necrosis factor (TNF) ligand superfamily, which they named 
Neutrokine alpha (Neutrokine-α). Subsequently, HGS filed a patent application at the 
EPO that included claims to the nucleic and amino acid sequences of Neutrokine-α, 
therapeutic and diagnostic applications of the protein, and antibodies to the protein.
454
 
The application described an extensive, but slightly contradictory, list of potential 
activities and uses of Neutrokine-α based on its membership of the TNF ligand 
superfamily.
455
 These included activities that are believed to be useful for both 
immune suppression and enhancement; effects on the mobilization, proliferation, 
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differentiation and migration of stem cells; and the treatment of leukaemia, amongst 
others. However, the patent application as filed did not provide any experimental data 
that could demonstrate the claimed biological properties and activities of Neutrokine-
α. 
Eli Lilly & Company was involved in a similar research project and had also 
independently identified Neutrokine-α sometime after HGS. Following the grant of 
HGS’s patent in August 2005, Eli Lilly initiated opposition proceedings before the 
EPO and revocation proceedings before the English High Court, where the applicant 
had designated the patent.
456
 Eli Lilly argued with regard to industrial application that 
the HGS’s invention was not capable of practical utility. The company alleged that 
the application was speculative and that it did not disclose the invention clearly and 
completely enough for it to be performed by a skilled person in the art. 
Before the High Court gave its judgment, the patent had already been found invalid in 
the EPO opposition proceedings on grounds of added matter (Article 123(2) EPC) and 
lack of inventive step (Article 56 EPC). In contrast, the High Court finally held the 
patent invalid for lack of industrial application, insufficiency and obviousness. 
However, although the EPO held the patent invalid on a different ground, the EPO 
OD and the High Court adopted similar reasonings in reaching their decisions. With 
regard to industrial application, the High Court noted when reasoning its decision that 
there were only two UK decisions regarding industrial application at that time.
457
 For 
this reason, Kitchin J decided to carry out an exhaustive review of the EPO case law 
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 besides considering the  ‘specific substantial and credible’ test 
introduced by the USPTO in Brenner v Manson.
459
 Following this, Kitchin J 
formulated a set of nine principles for assessing the utility of genetic inventions.
460
 
These principles, by reflecting the EPO approach towards the interpretation of the 
industrial applicability requirement, posed a higher barrier for the patentability of 
inventions concerning human genes and related proteins.  
Subsequently, parallel appeal proceedings were heard before the EPO and the English 
Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal decided to stay proceedings until the EPO had 
reached its decision, however, the procedural cooperation between tribunals finally 
resulted in conflicting findings. The TBA at the EPO upheld the European patent on 
the basis of more restricted claims. It found that the application disclosed a concrete 
technical basis for the skilled person to recognise an industrial exploitation of the 
claimed invention.
461
 Nevertheless, Jacob LJ dismissed the appeal at the English court 
for lack of some reasonable credible use for any member of the TNF ligand 
superfamily.
462
 Jacob LJ attempted to explain why the outcome of the court had 
differed from the EPO decision based on the differences between the decision-making 
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processes in the English courts and the EPO. English trials at first instance, which 
involve intensive investigation and testing evidence, were contrasted with the 
opposition procedure at the EPO, which was referred to as ‘administrative’ because it 
usually accepts the admission of fresh material on appeal and does not include cross-
examination or compulsory disclosure documents. Thus, the evidence before the EPO 
and the English Court of Appeal and the manner in which they considered and tested 
it were remarkably different. Therefore, although the EPO and the English Court of 
Appeal were applying the same principles, the standards by which those principles 
were applied differed between them. Furthermore, Jacob LJ reminded that although 
the UK courts should follow any principle of law that is laid down by the TBA, they 
still reserve the right to differ if this implies that the commodore would ‘steer the fleet 
on to the rocks’.
463
 
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeal’s finding, HGS brought the case before the UK 
Supreme Court,
464
 which in November 2011 handed down its first judgment on a 
patents case. Lord Neuberger overturned the earlier decisions of the Court of Appeal 
and the High Court and brought the UK position on industrial application into line 
with the EPO approach. In doing so, Lord Neuberger first reviewed Article 5 of the 
Biotech Directive, domestic and US jurisprudence, and the case law of the EPO.
465
 He 
then referred to submissions by the Bioscience Industry Association (BIA) arguing 
that raising the bar on industrial application would cause major damage to the biotech 
industry.  Following this, Lord Neuberger elucidated fifteen principles from the TBA 
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jurisprudence that were applicable to Article 57.
466
 In view of these principles, which 
essentially overlap with the nine principles described by the High Court, Lord 
Neuberger found that the information disclosed in the patent application on 
Neutrokine-α was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of industrial application.  
Several important conclusions can be drawn from the final resolution of this case. 
First, this case provides a very good example of how national courts and the EPO, 
although applying the same standard, can arrive at different conclusions due to 
differences in the decision-making process and the kind and amount of evidence that 
is examined. In this case, both the English Court of Appeal and the TBA at the EPO 
were relying on the same EPO decisions and criteria for assessing the claimed 
invention’s compliance with Rule 29(3) of the EPC. However, as Jacob LJ indicated 
himself, the English courts more rigorous procedure with regard to the investigation 
and testing of evidence, as opposed to the EPO more relaxed requirements regarding 
the provision of evidence, may lead to a different outcome.  
Second, this case shows that although the national courts of EPO Member States 
should follow the EPO’s interpretation of the EPC, they may recognize the EPO’s 
approach but still decide not to apply the EPC provisions in the same way and 
develop their own interpretative criteria. Nonetheless, in its decision the UK Supreme 
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Court expressed its intention to harmonise the UK’s interpretation of the EPC with 
that of the EPO and other contracting states.
467
 Therefore, this express declaration 
could be seen as a significant step towards consistency between the decisions of the 
EPO and national courts. In this regard, the fact that the final decision of the UK 
Supreme Court followed the approach taken by the EPO TBA further confirms this 
intention and may encourage national courts to work on reducing differences with the 
EPO and other European countries in this or other patent law areas. 
Finally, the finding of the UK Supreme Court shows judicial concerns about the 
antagonistic forces faced by inventors when deciding whether to file a patent 
application. On the one hand, if an inventor files a patent application early without 
sufficient evidential data to support their claims, they risk both not obtaining the 
patent and having publically disclosed their invention. However, if the inventor waits 
until further experimental data are obtained, there is the risk that a competitor will 
obtain the patent first. In this regard, the UK Supreme Court relied on the policy 
argument concerning the need to reduce the risk of discouraging investment in 
bioscience, whereby a too high threshold to satisfy the requirement of industrial 
application may discourage innovators from investing in research and development. 
Nonetheless, although the UK Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of such strong 
industrial interests in its decision may be seen as an indicative of the courts relaxation 
towards the assessment of industrial applicability, no other decisions from the EPO, 
or other European courts indicate that this is the case. 
4.6. Concluding Remarks 
Before the adoption of the Biotech Directive there were few decisions interpreting the 
requirement of industrial application and the EPO and national patent offices often 
relied on extraordinary examples to illustrate when an invention was not capable of 
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industrial application. However, with the introduction of EPC Rule 29(3) the EPO 
case law on the industrial application of human DNA sequences has progressively 
provided a mechanism to raise the bar to the patentability of genetic inventions of 
speculative function. Furthermore, the EPO decisions on the industrial application of 
human gene sequences have not only answered key questions with regard to the 
interpretation of the standard set by Article 5(3) of the Biotech Directive, but they 
have also clarified important issues for the interpretation of the general requirement of 
industrial application as applicable to all fields of technology. These decisions have 
revived the fundamental ideas behind the criterion of industrial application, thus 
reemphasizing its important role within the patent system. 
This chapter aimed to offer a detailed analysis of the background, meaning and 
practical implications of the requirement introduced by Article 5(3) of the Biotech 
Directive (later incorporated into Rule 29(3) of the EPC) of disclosing the industrial 
application of sequences and partial sequences of human genes in the patent 
application. It provides the basis for understanding the following chapters, which will 
focus on the implications of Article 5(3) of the Biotech Directive in the interpretation 
of the exclusion of discoveries with regard to human DNA sequences and in 












5. THE EXCLUSION OF DISCOVERIES IN HUMAN 
GENE PATENTS: THE ROLE OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
APPLICATION REQUIREMENT 
5.1. Introduction  
The distinction between discoveries and inventions is especially difficult in cases 
where the claimed subject matter is a newly discovered genetic sequence rather than a 
final product incorporating it. The EPO has dealt with this issue by implementing the 
so-called ‘isolation principle’ according to which the process of separating the genetic 
material from its natural source can give a discovered substance the character of 
invention. However, after the adoption of the Biotech Directive ‘isolation’ is not 
enough, at least for inventions concerning human genes. Article 5(3) of the Biotech 
Directive introduced the additional requirement of disclosing the industrial 
application of human DNA sequences for them to acquire the status of invention. 
Therefore, since the Biotech Directive entered into force, in order to become an 
invention the claimed human genetic material needs to be isolated and its utility has 
also to be disclosed in the patent application. Thus, studying the role of the 
requirement of industrial application in ‘transforming’ isolated newly discovered 
human genetic substances into patentable invenions is essential for understanding the 
relationship between the exclusion from patentability of abstract discoveries and the 
requirement of industrial application, as well as the interpretation of the notion of 
invention whithin the context of human gene patents.  
This chapter first studies the exclusion from patentability of discoveries and the 
inherent requirement for an invention under the EPC, and the role of the requirement 
of practical applicability in the assessment of the requirement for an invention in 





concerning human genetic material to then explore the EPO isolation approach 
towards the patentability of naturally occurring substances. Finally, the chapter 
analyses the Biotech Directive’s introduction of Article 5(3) as a new element in the 
distinction between discoveries and inventions in the case of human genes. It 
discusses the justification, interpretation and implications of such approach. 
5.2. The Exclusion From Patentability Of Discoveries In European 
Patent Law  
5.2.1. Discoveries As Excluded Subject Matter Under The EPC 
A basic premise of European patent law is that patents are to be granted for inventions 
as opposed to abstract subject matter such as discoveries. A central problem of the 
patent system is therefore to distinguish what is patentable from what is not, taking 
the notion of invention as the reference standard.
468
 Article 52(1) of the EPC (which 
corresponds with Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement) makes clear that only 
inventions can be protected by patent rights. However, neither the TRIPS Agreement 
nor the EPC provide a definition of ‘invention’ in patent law terms. 
In respect of patents rights, the TRIPS Agreement aims inter alia to reduce differences 
between the patent systems of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Member States 
and achieve technological neutrality and effective enforcement of patent law.
469
 It 
requires Member States to provide equal protection without discrimination to 
inventions in all fields of technology.
470
 However, the text of the TRIPS Agreement 
gives certain flexibility to Member States to define for themselves what an invention 
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is, as well as for excluding specific types of subject matter from patent protection, for 
instance, diagnostic methods for the treatment of humans, plants, and animals other 
than microorganisms, or inventions the commercial exploitation of which is necessary 
to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human or animal health.
471
 
Nonetheless, the absence of an express definition of invention does not imply that 




In Europe, the patent law notion of invention is defined from the requirements and 
exclusions of Article 52 of the EPC. The requirement for an invention is set in Article 
52(1) in conjunction with Articles 52(2) and 52(3) of the EPC, the latter two referring 
to a number of exclusions that are not considered inventions and thus are excluded 
from patent protection.
473
 The exclusions under Article 52(2) (a) to (d) have in 
common that they refer to activities that do not aim at any direct technical result but 
are rather of an abstract and intellectual character,
474
 and thus do not fit in the 
objectives of the patent system of promoting the creation of innovative technical 
products and processes rather than abstractions.
475
 Amongst others, Article 52 of the 
EPC excludes discoveries ‘as such’
476
 from patent protection.  
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The difference between discoveries and inventions is an elementary feature of 
virtually all patent law regimes,
477
 especially since the exclusion of discoveries and 
the requirement for an invention have particular meanings in patent law, which reflect 
fundamental policy objectives including the encouragement of innovation and the 
reward of endeavor.
478
 Therefore, drawing an appropriate boundary between 
unpatentable merely discovered phenomena and patentable inventions is essential for 
preventing the patent system from unduly restricting access to fundamental scientific 
discoveries
479
 that do not reach the standards of creativity and technicality necessary 
for being granted patent protection.  
In non-legal terms, a discovery is the act of uncovering something for the first time. It 
has been frequently described as finding something that was previously unknown but 
pre-existing in nature, or as the identification of properties and utilities unknown so 
far, and thus not part of the legal definition of state of the art.
480
 The Geneva Treaty 
on the International Recording of Scientific Discoveries of 3 March 1978 defines 
discovery as ‘the recognition of phenomena, properties or laws of the material 
universe not hitherto recognized and capable of verification’.
481
  It follows, therefore, 
that a discovery is not the result of creation efforts, even if creativity has been needed 
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to reveal information concealed in nature;
482
 but its merit resides on a different type of 
work, directed at uncovering a reality rather than creating it, or on the discoverer’s 
serendipity.   
Thus, they fall in the category of concepts or knowledge that already exist and are just 
waiting to be discovered by man.
483
 Moreover, because of their abstract character, 
discoveries are consequently not yet directly applicable in industry and not of obvious 
industrial application.
484
 Both inventions and discoveries contribute to the advance of 
knowledge, but inventions do it through the application of that knowledge,
485
 while 
discoveries need to be further developed to become applicable.
486
 Although 
discovered knowledge can be new in the sense that nobody knew about its existence, 
this knowledge per se will difficultly have a concrete application in industry. This fact 
makes the patent law requirement of industrial application a key factor in the 
distinction between inventions and excluded discoveries. 
The EPC does not define discoveries, but only excludes them from patentability due 
to their abstract character or lack of technical character.
487
 Moreover, neither the EPC 
nor the EPO practice explain what ‘abstract’ means in patent law terms. With regard 
to the exclusion of discoveries, the EPO Guidelines provide that if a new property of a 
known material or article is found, it would constitute a mere discovery and would be 
unpatentable; but if, however, such new property is put to practical use, the result is 
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an invention of technical character that may be patentable.
488
 Thus, the line of 
demarcation between the mere discovery of a natural substance and its 
characterization as an invention would depend on the degree of human technical 
intervention that has been necessary to reduce that discovery to practice.
489
 Therefore, 
it seems that it is in the explanation of what gives an invention technical character 
that, although in negative terms, the definition of discovery as such in terms of patent 
law may be found.  
On the other hand, pursuant Article 52(3) of the EPC, the exclusion of discoveries 
only refers to discoveries ‘as such’. The inclusion of this limitation shows the EPC’s 
aim of narrowing the scope of exclusions as much as possible.
490
 In practice, the as 
such approach has led to an ‘anything added’ approach that allows the patentability of 
discoveries as long as something else is added by man.
491
 This interpretation of the as 
such limitation has had a profound impact on the scope of the exclusion of discoveries 
from patentable inventions. Narrowing the scope of the exclusion of discoveries has 
resulted in a corresponding expansion of the scope of subject matter eligible for patent 
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 Such expansion has been especially controversial in the field of 
biotechnology, mainly given to the presence of preexisting natural elements that have 
been discovered by man in all inventions within this field.  
In contrast, an invention is, in non-patent law terms, a new product or process with no 
previous existence. It is the creation of something that did not exist before,
493
 and that 
improve the objective world existing in nature.
494
 Moreover, all inventions are the 
result of human intelligence. A phenomenon is a discovery rather than an invention if 
human intelligence has not intervened in obtaining it.
495
 In this regard, a central 
question would be whether the completed invention depends on, or is a result of, 
mental activities of the person who carries it out.
496
 This, however, does not mean that 
an invention cannot be based on a previous discovery.
497
 In many occasions, 
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discoveries can be put to practical use and give rise to important inventions. For 
example, since the discovery of epinephrine (adrenaline) in 1901, this hormone has 
been the basis of multiple inventions in the pharmaceutical field
498
 that are very 
important in the treatment of many health problems such as cardiac arrest or asthma.   
Moreover, many times discoveries and inventions are identical from the point of view 
of the amount of work behind a concrete result. The research activity that leads to the 
identification of unknown, although pre-existing, phenomena or to the determination 
of their unknown characteristics, substantially equates the activity leading to the 
creation of a new product.
499
 Therefore, it is not the level of effort behind discovering 
and inventing something that determines when there is a real invention. The principal 
question in the discovery-invention dichotomy is at what point along a line of 
research an addition to scientific knowledge adds enough technical character as to 
transform a mere discovery into an invention.
500
 In this regard, it is thus essential to 
determine what constitutes technical character within the context of patent law. 
There is little case law on the specific exclusion from patentability of discoveries but 
the EPC deals with this issue in the EPC Examination Guidelines,
501
 where, as it will 
be discussed later, special emphasis is given to the distinction between discoveries 
and inventions within the context of biological patents. 
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5.2.2. The Requirement For An Invention In The EPC 
While the EPC clearly states that patent protection is only available for inventions, it 
does not include a precise definition of what an invention is in terms of patent law. It 
only provides: (1) an open list of subject matter that are not inventions and are thus 
excluded from patent protection and (2) a set of requirements that an invention has to 
comply with in order to be patentable.
502
 Apart from this, there are no other 
provisions within the EPC explaining what gives a phenomenon the character of 
invention. However, determining what is and what is not an invention is essential for 
understanding inherent patentability,
503
 as well as for demarking a clear distinction 
between inventions and discoveries.  
When considering the EPC and the Implementing Regulations all together, the 
concept of invention can be defined as a technical solution (pertaining to a technical 
field and having technical features/teaching or producing a technical effect) to a 
technical problem.
504
 Presumably, the requirement for an invention of having 
technical character, or in other words, of providing a technical contribution to the art, 
is based on a long-standing legal practice in at least the majority of Contracting States 
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 In this regard, several EPO decisions acknowledge that the need of 
technical character is an implicit, fundamental pre-requisite for all inventions.
506
 It is 
a pre-patent determinant, or a condition sine qua non for all inventions.  
Thus a given phenomenon may be an invention within the meaning of Article 52(1) of 
the EPC if, for example, a technical effect is achieved by the invention or if technical 
considerations are required to carry out the invention.
507
 Patented inventions are 
therefore technically inventive, new and useful solutions to technical problems, while 
discoveries fail the requirement of technical character for being an invention, and thus 
the main criterion of patentability under Article 52(1). 
In this regard, in Friction reducing additive the EPO Enlarged Board of Appeal 
pointed out that the essential difference between inventions and discoveries is the lack 
of existence of technical character. This case concerned an invention claiming a new 
use for a known compound for a particular purpose, based on a technical effect 
described in the patent. When giving its decision, the board stated that:
 508
 
‘In particular cases it may clearly be necessary to consider and decide whether a 
claimed invention is a discovery within the meaning of Article 52(2)(a) EPC. An 
essential first step in such consideration is (…) to determine its technical features. If, 
after such determination, it is clear that the claimed invention relates to a discovery or 
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other excluded subject-matter ‘as such’ (…) then the exclusion of Article 52(2) EPC 
applies’. 
The EPC does not define ‘technical character’. Although it is clear that abstract 
phenomena such as discoveries do not possess technical character, there is no actual 
basis for this requirement in the EPC.
509
 Rules 42 and 43 of the EPC Implementing 
Regulations only state that the invention must relate to a technical field and solve a 
technical problem, and that the claims shall define the invention in terms of its 
technical features.
510
 Thus, apart from the clarification of what types of subject matter 
lack technical character, the EPC does not provide any substantially reliable 
explanation of what constitutes technical character. 
Since the term technical is nowhere specifically defined, it has to be interpreted on a 
case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, a few keynotes can be identified. First, it can be 
noted that the notion of technical in patent law is very broad and has no clear 
boundaries as to its precise meaning. Under the EPO system, patents are available for 
inventions in all fields of technology, so the requirement for an invention of 
belonging to a technical field is interpreted very broadly and includes unconventional 
fields such as agriculture.
511
 Moreover, with the rapid development of modern 
technologies such as genetic engineering, the tendency has been to expand the number 
of fields for which patent protection is available.  
Second, technical character does not mean that natural elements cannot be part of an 
invention. The concept of invention as used in patent law can be defined as a 
technical solution that utilizes laws of nature or controllable natural forces that cannot 
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as such be obtained without the interference of human intelligence.
512
 All human 
creations are ultimately based on natural sources. Thus, the presence of natural 
elements is not an impediment for being an invention with technical character. This 
fact is especially relevant in the distinction between discoveries and inventions in the 
biotechnology field. 
Third, despite the lack of a clear definition, it is presumable that technical implies 
applied knowledge or practical sciences as opposed to theoretical or abstract 
knowledge. The fact that inventions solve technical problems suggests that the 
industry is ready to receive and evaluate them,
513
 something that would not happen in 
the case of abstract discoveries. The foundation of the exclusion from patentability of 
discoveries is that they belong to the world of theoretical knowledge and do not have 
any form of technical utility.
514
 In this sense, technical character has been described as 
requiring a human action on the physical world producing an objectively discernible 
material result directed at improving industrial activities, as distinct from other 
activities such as administrative or professional arts.
515
 This notion of technical, as a 
condition related to the practical sciences and industrial activities reveals an important 
connection between the technicality of an invention and its applicability in industry. 
As will be examined later in this chapter, the overlap of the invention requirement and 
industrial application is more pronounced in the case of gene patents, although a close 
relationship between both concepts is also implied in various European decisions.
516
 
However, apparently, these two pre-conditions for patentability are not exactly the 
same. 
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The requirement of industrial application plays a very important role in the distinction 
between discoveries and inventions since mere discoveries of an abstract character are 
unlikely to have any applicability in an industrial field.
517
 This criterion essentially 
overlaps with the requisite of technical character since those subject matters that are 
technical are usually useful and have some applicability in industry. However, not all 
knowledge with industrial application is technical in the sense that it is understood by 
the EPO.
518
 Although both requirements are intimately related,
519
 they are not 
substitutes or synonymous, but are two distinct standards that have to be fulfilled 
independently.
520
 Nonetheless, changes to the interpretation of industrial application 
with regard to human DNA inventions suggest that there is not such independence 
between the criteria of technical character and industrial applicability in the particular 
field of human genetics.  
Moreover, given that the EPO does not define what technical means, assuming that 
something that has a practical function that can be used in some kind of industry may 
not have technical character would impose a rather artificial interpretation of the 
notion of technicality. Technical essentially relates to practical applications of more 
abstract phenomena. In this regard, the EPO has continuously explained in its 
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Guidelines for Examination that if a discovery is put into practice, it becomes an 
invention and can therefore be patentable if the other patentability requirements are 
met.
521
 Thus, saying that something that is applicable in industry, being industry a 
technical field, is not necessarily technical in terms of patent law does not provide any 
clarity but increases the level of uncertainty surrounding the European requirement 
for a technical invention. Nevertheless, even considering both criteria as independent, 
they are still intimately related since being industrially applicable is essential for 
proving the existence of some technical effect.  
Finally, under the EPC system, there is an obligation to ensure that the subject matter 
of a patent application is scrutinised and not presumed. Article 27(1) of the TRIPS 
Agreement as well as Article 52(1) of the EPC expresses society’s decision that the 
patent system is not fit for creations that are not inventions.
522
 Not every claim that 
meets the conditions of patentability is a patentable invention; there must first be an 
invention.
523
 It is important to mark a clear distinction between the concept of 
invention as a general and absolute requirement of patentability from the relative 
criteria of novelty, inventive step, and the requirement of industrial applicability.
524
 
Thus, in principle, the assessment of whether there is an invention should be strictly 
separated from and not confused with the examination of the other three patentability 
requirements. 
In this regard, there are two essential questions to which all patent applications need 
to respond. First, it is necessary to analyse whether there is an invention in terms of 
patent law, and second, whether such invention fulfills the essential patentability 
criteria of novelty, inventiveness and industrial applicability. In other words, 
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patentability under the European system involves satisfying a two-step test: step one 
consisting of analysing whether the claimed subject matter is an invention and, if so, 
proceed to step two in order to determine whether the invention is new, inventive and 
industrially applicable.
525
 There must be an invention, and if there is an invention, it 
must satisfy the requirements of novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability in 
order to be patentable. However, the requirement of being a technical invention and 
having an industrial application are very much intertwined in the case of human gene 
patents. 
5.3. The Exclusion Of Discoveries Within The Context Of Biological 
Inventions 
5.3.1. Inventions Concerning Naturally Occurring Substances: A Challenge To 
The Traditional Definition Of Invention 
The European patent law exclusion of discoveries from patent protection is especially 
relevant in the patenting of inventions concerning living material.
526
 In particular, 
Article 52(2)(a) of the EPC raises significant questions when dealing with inventions 
over genetic material previously existing in the human body, like applications 
claiming patents on complete genes, DNA sequences, cDNA, ESTs or SNPs.
527
 For 
example with regard to natural genes, their variants and their correlation with disease 
states, the identification of a preexisting gene and its variants would represent a 
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discovery in the non-legal sense of the term.
528
 However, such discoveries may 
constitute inventions in patent law terms if a technical character is acquired, like 
applying in practice a discovery that had not previously been in effect.
529
 In other 
words, the application of the exclusion of discoveries to pre-existing naturally 
occurring substances such as genetic sequences basically refers to the question of 
whether biological material can be considered to be an invention even if the 
characteristics of such material are identical to its in situ natural status. 
The discovery of naturally occurring substances in patent law refers to the idea that 
natural substances that are the result of Mother Nature’s handiwork are not inventions 
and therefore not patentable.
530
 This doctrine is not unique to European patent law but 
is inherent in patent law in general.
531
 Historically, patent examiners, courts and 
legislators have sought to define a clear distinction between inventions, which may be 
patentable, and mere discoveries of natural products, which are, in principle, not 
patentable.
532
 The rationale behind this is that the simple discovery of nature’s 
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creations is not an invention and must be accessible to everyone to utilize,
533
 since the 
man has not added any input to such products but has only uncovered their existence.  
Despite the apparently clear classification of natural substances within the category of 
discoveries, this doctrine has not been substantially defined, which has generated 
some confusion among both practitioners and their clients who generally are scientists 
and corporate executives.
534
 Previous understandings of property and life have 
changed following the impact of key developments in the biotech sciences that view 
living materials with inheritable characteristics as potential subjects of exclusive 
rights.
535
 Moreover, it adds to the confusion that all tangible items, especially in 
biotechnology, are products of nature in the sense that nature provides the source 
materials. In this regard, the fact that something is found in nature may be viewed as a 
weak objection to patentability.
536
 Furthermore, nature also invents practical solutions 
for technical problems, like in the case of mutations responding to hostile 
environments.
537
 So the question is how to distinguish, for the purposes of patent law, 
an invention from a product of nature.
538
 The truth of the matter is that the answer to 
this problem is more a policy issue than a legal one.  
In the case of human DNA inventions, the exclusion of discoveries has always played 
a relatively large role in comparison with other technical fields. For inventors in the 
field of genetics, the exclusion of discoveries poses the clearest barrier for obtaining 
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patent protection since many inventions in this area solely involve the discovery of 
genomic DNA or specific biological functions. Thus, in order to facilitate the grant of 
patents, it is in the distinction between discoveries and inventions that traditional 
patent law conceptions have been more significantly modified to accommodate the 
needs of inventors in gene technologies. Both the requirement for an invention and 
the exclusion of discoveries have been revised to a point in which the notion of 
invention has become blurred and now invades the subject matter traditionally 
included within the concept of discovery.
539
 In fact, the scope of the definition of 
invention has been expanded to cover, under certain conditions, inventions 
concerning naturally occurring human genes. 
5.3.2. The European Approach Towards The Patentability Of Discoveries 
Concerning Human Genetic Material 
The blurred line between non-patentable discoveries of human genetic substances and 
technical inventions over such basic raw material has been addressed by the EPO by 
applying the so-called isolation principle. This approach allows the patentability of 
naturally occurring substances once they have been isolated by man using technical 
means. In the case of human genetics, the isolation logic makes it possible to 
transform the discovery of human DNA into an invention by isolating a specific gene 
or gene sequence. 
Already before the First Directive Proposal in 1988, the EPO had been recognizing 
isolation as the step giving technical character to discoveries of natural elements. The 
1987 EPO Examination Guidelines did not make specific mention to inventions 
                                                 
539
 Westerlund (n 308) 23 and 36; Schertenleib, ‘The Patentability and Protection of DNA-Based 
Inventions in the EPO and the European Union’ (n 288). Nonetheless, this new approach has not 
ceased to be controversial. It has raised fears that patents will be granted to fundamental discoveries, 
thus having an unwarranted impact on biomedical innovation at large, see Conley and Makowski (n 
530); Leverve (n 231). Concerns against excessive ownership over upstream inventions will be 





concerning DNA or other elements of the human body but they provided with regard 
to naturally occurring substances in general that:
540
 
‘If a man finds out a new property of a known material or article, that is mere 
discovery and unpatentable. If however a man puts that property to practical use he 
has made an invention which may be patentable. (…) To find a substance freely 
occurring in nature is also mere discovery and therefore unpatentable. However, if a 
substance found in nature has first to be isolated from its surroundings and a process 
for obtaining it is developed, that process is patentable (…)’.  
Therefore, the EPO admitted the patentability of products or substances that were 
previously occurring in a mixture of natural elements but had not been identified, by 
understanding that in these cases the invention resides on the identification of the 
substance and isolation for useful purposes in a usable or pure form in which it did 
not exist in nature.
541
 This approach was again emphasized in the 1988 Joint 
Statement of the USPTO, EPO and JPO, which stated that:
542
 
‘Purified natural products are not regarded under any of the three laws as products of 
nature or discoveries because they do not in fact exist in nature in an isolated form. 
Rather, they are regarded for patent purposes as biologically active substances or 
chemical compounds and eligible for patenting on the same basis as other chemical 
compounds’. 
However, although the EPO had established a fairly clear doctrine on the patenting of 
isolated natural substances, it did not address the issue of human body elements, 
neither had the EPO included the isolation approach in the texts of the EPC or the 
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Implementing Regulations. This question was only explicitly addressed in the EPO 
Examination Guidelines. The solutions provided in the Guidelines offered valuable 
guidance for the examining bodies at the EPO, and seemed to meet many of the needs 
of applicants. Nonetheless, they were handicapped by the fact that they are neither 
binding on the Board of Appeals of the EPO, deciding in final instance on 
patentability, nor on national courts competent in nullity procedures regarding 
European patents.
543
 As a result, the EPO patent grant practice and the Examination 
Guidelines were developing on a case-by-case basis that reflected the immediate 
needs of the Examining Division and did not deal with all problems in this area or did 
not do so in an exhaustive manner.
544
 There was an almost complete lack of any 
reliable legislative guidance on the distinction between discoveries and inventions in 
the field of human genetics that could respond to the concerns of the European 
biotech industry.
545
 To address this issue, the Biotech Directive included specific 
provisions interpreting the distinction between discoveries and inventions and the 
isolation doctrine for inventions related to the human body. 
The Biotech Directive fully applied the well-known distinction between discoveries 
and inventions that the EPO had set with regard to biotechnology. It abides by the 
limitations existing under the relevant provisions of the EPC and the national patent 
laws of the Member States, and it is therefore primarily based, amongst other things, 
                                                 
543
 First Directive Proposal (n 90) point 33. The EPO Examination Guidelines contain detailed 
instructions for the personnel of the EPO on the practice and procedure to be followed in the various 
aspects of the examination (e.g. formal examination, search, substantive examination, opposition and 
other procedures, etc.) of European applications and patents in accordance with the EPC and its 
Implementing Regulations. 
544
 First Directive Proposal (n 90) point 44. 
545
 See Ibid, point 27, page 13 explaining that the existing legal framework for protecting 
biotechnological inventions in the Member States did not either satisfied the needs of science and 






on the assumption that discoveries as such are not regarded as patentable 
inventions.
546
 With regard to human genetic material, Article 5 of the Biotech 
Directive was drafted to clarify the distinction between discoveries and inventionz in 
relation to human body elements. In this sense, the Biotech Directive confirmed the 
EPO practice of excluding naturally occurring elements as they are found in nature 
and prohibited at first instance the patentability of human genes in their natural 
status.
547
 In this regard, the Biotech Directive excluded human genes in their natural 
form because they constitute mere discoveries, but also in response to fundamental 
principles protecting the dignity and integrity of the person.
548
 Moreover, this 
exclusion also responds to fears that allowing patents on life would lead to the undue 




However, after excluding from patentability human genes in their natural form, the 
Biotech Directive then reaffirms in Article 5(2) the long-standing practice of the EPO 
that naturally occurring substances are considered to be patentable inventions 
provided they are isolated from their surroundings.
550
  Here is relevant the 
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Commission commentary to Article 2 of the 1992 Amended Proposal which clarifies 
that only ‘parts of the human body’ per se, which means parts of the human body as 
found inside the human body, are unpatentable.  
The Commission re-emphasized this approach in its 2005 report to the European 
Parliament and the European Council pursuant to Article 16c of the Biotech 
Directive.
551
 In this report the Commission supported the logic set out in the text of 
Article 5(2) of the Biotech Directive and clarified that as explained in Recital 21 the 
reasoning is that, to qualify for patentability, an element from the human body, 
including a sequence or partial sequence of a gene, must, for instance, be the result of 
technical processes that have identified, purified, characterised and multiplied it 
outside of the human body and that cannot be found in nature.
 
 
A reading of Articles 5(1) and 5(2) together explains how the principles of Article 52 
EPC are to be applied in the case of inventions related to human genes. The Biotech 
Directive allows the patenting of the human gene sequences if they are isolated from 
their natural surrounding, ‘even if the structure of that element is identical to that of a 
natural element’.
552
 Such interpretation confirms that the results of genomic research 
can be patented if they are isolated and other conditions are met, although the rights 
conferred by the patent do not extend to the human body and its elements in their 
natural environment.  
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The exclusion from patentability of the human body and its parts is also in line with 
UNESCO’s view that ‘the human genome in its natural state shall not give rise to 
financial gains’,
553
 which implicitly refers to the distinction between patentable 
inventions and simple discoveries as a fundamental distinction in the context of an 
increasing demand for patents in the field of human genetics.
554
 Furthermore, this 
practice is also consistent with the 1997 Council of Europe Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine.
555
 
Articles 5(1) and (2) of the Biotech Directive were incorporated into new Rules 
23e(1) and (2) (now Rules 29(1) and (2)) of the EPC Implementing Regulations in 
1999,
556
 which reproduce the same wording laid out in the Biotech Directive. The 
EPO Guidelines for Examination were also amended to introduce the Biotech 
Directive’s provisions concerning the patentability of human body parts in the light of 
the exclusion of discoveries. In this regard, new section 2a was incorporated in Part 
C-IV (which deals with issues of patentability) of the 2003 Revised Guidelines.
557
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5.3.3. The EPO’s Implementation Of The Isolation Doctrine  
As it can be seen from the previous section, the isolation principle has been part of the 
EPO practice since before the Biotech Directive was adopted in 1998. Some examples 
of patents granted over inventions relating to isolated human DNA are EP0041313 
granted in 1990 regarding DNA sequences, recombinant DNA molecules and 
processes for producing human fibroblast interferon; EP0101309, granted in 
September 1991 relating to a DNA fragment encoding human H2-preprorelaxin; or 
EP0630405 relating to DNA sequences and novel seven transmenbrane receptors, 
which was granted in April 1998 althoug revoked in June 2001. 
In particular, the question of whether isolated human genetic material could be 
patentable was debated before the OD of the EPO in the Relaxin case.
558
 The patent 
was challenged among other grounds under Article 52(2)(a) EPC for not being 
concerned with an invention but with a discovery. The appellants claimed that the 
essence of the invention, which was elucidation of the genetic sequence of the H2-
relaxin gene, was no more than a discovery of the characteristics of a substance that 
had existed in nature probably for many thousand years. So, in the meaning of the 
provision of Article 52(2)(a) EPC, the patent related to a discovery and, thus, was not 
patentable.  
However, the patentees argued that according to new Rule 23(e)(2) EPC introducing 
the Biotech Directive, it was clear that patent protection should extend to elements 
isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical process 
even if the structure of that element was identical to that of a natural element. In line 
with the patentee’s argument, the OD re-emphasised the long-standing practice of the 
EPO and stated that the claimed DNA fragments encoding the human protein 
preprorelaxin or to the human preprorelaxin per se, had been obtained by technical 
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 were not to be considered as discoveries, and therefore, did not fall 
within the category of unpatentable inventions. 
More recent cases such as ICOS Corporation, University of Utah, Zymogenetics or 
Eli Lilly have also acknowledged the patentability of isolated human genes. For 
example, in the case of the University of Utah’s breast and ovarian cancer patent 
application, the main claim related to: 
‘An isolated nucleic acid which comprises a coding sequence for the human BRCA1 
polypeptide, wherein said polypeptide (…) comprises the amino acid sequence of 
SEQ ID NO: 82 (…)’.
560
 
The patent was granted in November 2001 and opposition proceedings were 
immediately filed with some opponents arguing that the patent was against Article 
52(2)(a) of the EPC since the claimed genes were discoveries and not patentable. 
However, the OD rejected this objection and applied the logic laid out in Rule 29(2) 
(former Rule 23(e)(2)) of the EPC. In appeal, the TBA at the EPO also confirmed the 
previous EPO practice in the Relaxin case as well as the compliance of the isolated 
nucleic acid probes claimed by the applicant with Rule 29(2) of the EPC.
561
 
Another example is the case of Eli Lilly where the appellant (HGS) withdrew all its 
previous requests to file a new main request with the word isolated in its main claim: 
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5.3.4. Objections To And Justifications For Patenting Isolated Human Genes 
5.3.4.1. Arguments Against The Isolation Approach 
Despite existing arguments supporting the isolation principle, the application of this 
approach in the patenting of human genetic material has also raised concerns in 
different social groups, including claims that the isolation doctrine overrides the 
patent law distinction between discoveries and inventions.
563
 In this regard, critics and 
objections to the isolation principle can be reduced to the question of whether 
isolation is enough to transform natural elements into human made inventions.  
5.3.4.1.1. Natural And Isolated Genes Are Identical 
The most frequent claim against the grant of patents over isolated genetic material is 
that the resulting isolated substance is identical to, and has the same properties that 
such element in its naturally occurring status. The argument is that isolated, purified 
and synthesized human genes maintain identical or very similar characteristics to 
those in their natural form and realize the exact same function.
564
 The resulting 
products do not change substantially from what exists in nature, except for purity and 
stability.
565
 That is, genetic substances in their natural and purified versions are 
essentially indistinguishable and do the same. Moreover, the fact that the process for 
isolating a gene sequence or protein involves human made techniques that cannot be 
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 is not relevant since the subject of the patent is the isolated human 
genetic material and not the technique that is employed to obtain it. 
5.3.4.1.2. Trivial Human Intervention 
Another very frequent objection is based on the argument that the intervention of 
human intelligence in the isolation process is trivial. In this regard, it has been 
claimed that man does not create genes or their corresponding proteins by isolating 
them, but simply discovers them.
567
 Genes are nature-made substances that are unique 
in the sense that scientists cannot artificially create them to produce identical results 
such as coding for the same protein.
568
 Thus, individuals may alter, modify, isolate or 
interfere with the natural properties of genetic material in different ways, but cannot 
possibly invent and produce DNA. Furthermore, the value of the techniques involved 
in the isolation process has also been questioned. It has been argued that the process 
of isolating human genetic material does not entail too much intellectual effort or 
ingenuity but that isolation is now a routine process carried out on a daily basis.
569
 
Therefore, a significant level of human intervention cannot be found in the isolated 
DNA substances or in the process for isolating them.  
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According to this view, granting patents over isolated genes or proteins seem to be too 
much of a reward for bioengineers. It has been argued that the reward of being 
granted a patent should be proportional to the expended efforts rather than to the 
contribution that has been made - for example, in spite of the fact that isolated gene 
sequences can be extremely important for the development of cures to diseases 
affecting people worldwide -, or the money that has been invested; then awarding a 
patent for easily isolated natural substances would be excessive.
570
 Furthermore, as 
biotechnological developments are mostly based on previous knowledge and research 
outcomes, it may seem unfair that the final contributor in the research chain, who 
‘only’ isolates a certain substance, gets such an award. 
5.3.4.1.3. Discrimination In Favour Of Human DNA Patents  
Finally, given the simplicity of the isolation process, equating the extraction of a gene 
from its natural environment with inventions having technical character raises 
questions about the compatibility of such approach with Article 27(1) of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which requires patent protection for all types inventions under the same 
conditions.
571
 Nonetheless, the TRIPS Agreement is aimed at establishing minimum 
standards that countries may modify to accommodate the needs of a particular 
industry. 
5.3.4.2. Arguments Supporting The Isolation Approach 
Notwithstanding existing concerns, the reality is that biological sciences, especially 
gene technologies, have evolved to a point where it is increasingly difficult to set the 
barrier between upstream research that is more related to discoveries and downstream 
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inventions. As a result, the patentability of isolated genetic material have gained 
growing acceptance among private and public stakeholders. 
5.3.4.2.1. Substantial Change Between Genes In Their Natural Status And Their 
Isolated Form 
The first argument counteracting critics to the isolation doctrine is that there is a 
substantial difference between DNA sequences as they exist in the body and their 
isolated version. The process of isolating allows a different degree of accessibility to 
the desired substance
572
 in the sense that an element from the human body is 
physically removed making it available for the first time in a tangible incarnation 
outside the human body.
573
 The resulting invention derives from natural substance but 
it is man-made and could not possibly come into existence without human 
intervention.
574
 Therefore, all products based on isolated genes would be the result of 
human activity, since such genes did not exist in their isolated form prior to their 
creation in the laboratory.  
On the other hand, it can be noted that the isolated gene and its natural precursor are 
not fully identical. Genes in the body have both coding and non-coding regions, while 
isolated genes have been manipulated to eliminate the non-coding region but 
apparently still continue to perform the same function as a naturally occurring gene.
575
 
By eliminating the parts that do not carry any relevant genetic information, something 
new is added through the isolation process.
576
 The composition of the resulting 
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product is thus different and encompasses a technical teaching that is acquired due to 
human intervention. 
The argument that natural DNA and isolated parts of it are not the same has found the 
strongest support within the context of cDNA.
577
 Patent applications do not usually 
claim genomic DNA but inventions related to cDNA, which is a totally artificial 
construct.
578
 cDNA is the result of isolating and copying the mRNA of an organism 
into a mirror image of itself.
579
 The resulting cDNA is thus an artificial 
complementary copy of the original DNA, which possesses the same sequence of 
nucleic acids as the original piece of DNA in the organism’s genome. All cDNA is 
derived from and through laboratory procedures applied to compounds that do exist in 
nature. However, although a cDNA sequence’s structure is a copy of a naturally 
occurring mRNA molecule,
580
 the reality is that obtaining mRNA from DNA and 
translate it into cDNA involves a technical laboratory process that gives a new 
substance that is artificial and without DNA non-coding regions, and thus not the 
same as that which occurs in nature.
581
 In this regard, since most inventions over 
isolated genes cover ESTs, which are parts of artificially created cDNA, according to 
this view they cover something strictly different than the naturally occurring genomic 
DNA. 
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5.3.4.2.2. Difficulties In The Isolating Process 
On the other hand, isolating a gene sequence is not a straightforward process but 
involves great effort as well as human created technical processes and tools. The 
difficulty lies on identifying that a particular gene may have a valuable function like 
reducing the speed of tumour growth and spread, using information from computer 
analysis and laboratory tests.
582
 Moreover, it must be noted that measures for 
obtaining sequences, no matter how simple they might be, are of a technical nature.
583
 
Furthermore, the skilled person can also encounter important difficulties in isolating 
the product, such as the trials and errors required and the thorough research pursued in 
order to isolate and analyse the structure and function of the product in question.
584
 
Therefore under this view, granting patents to those biotech engineers that have spent 
their time and effort in identifying, isolating or purifying DNA sequences so as to 
make them available in a different form would be a proportional reward.  
5.4. The ‘Isolation Plus Industrial Applicability’ Doctrine 
Given the concerns regarding the amount of patents over newly discovered human 
genetic material without a known practical applicability, the drafters of the Biotech 
Directive felt it necessary to revise the distinction between discoveries and inventions 
in the realm of human gene patents. In this regard, next to the requirement of 
isolation, the Biotech Directive introduced the explicit requirement of disclosing the 
industrial application of inventions concerning isolated human gene sequences in the 
patent application. The implications of this new requirement on the interpretation of 
the industrial applicability of human gene sequences have been examined in the 
previous chapter of the thesis. In contrast, this chapter focuses on the implications of 
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Article 5(3) of the Biotech Directive on the interpretation of the exclusion from 
patentability of human genetic discoveries.   
The need of reducing a discovery to practice and make it useful in order to become an 
invention has always been part of the EPO practice,
585
 however it did not have any 
explicit reflection in existing legislation. In this regard, what the Biotech Directive 
does in Article 5(3) is basically to further refine the requirement of Article 3, which 
recognizes that isolated biological material is not a discovery and can be patented, in 
the context of naturally occurring human genetic material by imposing the additional 
requirement of disclosing the industrial applicability for isolated sequences or partial 
sequences of human genes for these substances to acquire the character of invention.  
While the Biotech Directive essentially confirms the EPO practice according to which 
isolated human material is patentable, it demarcates the line between discoveries and 
inventions more cleary in this context.
586
 Recital 34 of the Biotech Directive contains 
a conservative note stating that its text does not intend to change the meaning of 
discovery and invention developed by national, European and international patent 
law. However, with regard to human gene inventions, Article 5(3) adds important 
features to such definitions. Nonetheless, as indicated by Recitals 22 to 24, the 
requirement of specifying a technical function would only be applicable when gene 
sequences or partial sequences are claimed ‘as such’.  
In respect of the importance of the notion of usefulness in the distinction between 
inventions and discoveries concerning the human body, the First Directive Proposal 
explained that, although an invention may involve a naturally occurring substance, 
there would be a considerable difference between the product as it existed in nature 
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and the product in a useful form.
587
  Subsequently, in order to address European 
Parliament’s concerns
588
 regarding the need to clarify the difference between 
discoveries and inventions where the patentability of elements of human origin is 
concerned, the 1997 Amended Proposal
589
 as well as the final text kept the provisions 
on the additional requirement for isolated human gene sequences of disclosing their 
industrial application. In particular, even when the 1997 Parliament’s report did not 
specifically discuss the role of industrial application in acquiring technical character, 
Recital 16b of the 1997 Amended Proposal (incorporating amendment 16b of the 
1997 Parliament report) made clear that having a practical utility is what gives 
technical character to an isolated gene sequence.  
The Biotech Directive’s intention was to impose an additional requirement for 
isolated gene sequences so that isolating them is not enough for acquiring technical 
character, but the elucidation of a practical utility is also necessary for becoming an 
invention in patent law terms. Thus, while a mere discovery is not patentable,
590
 an 




5.4.1. Industrial Applicability As A Pre-Condition For Acquiring Technical 
Character 
The obligation of Article 5(3) has been generally understood as an additional 
requirement to the isolation principle for certain types of human body inventions. In 
these cases, being industrially applicable is what marks the distinction between the 
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teaching of a mere reproduction of genetic information (discovery) and the indication 
of a function of a DNA sequence contributing to a technically exploitable result 
(invention).
592
 If the claimed product is restricted to the mere reproduction of genetic 
information, it is merely an enrichment of the state of knowledge, a pure discovery; 
however, if as a result of the indication of the function, a claimed DNA sequence 
contributes to a technically exploitable result, it is an invention.
593
 Therefore, a simple 
isolated gene would not be patentable until it is usable in some specific industrial 
application.
594
 Isolation and function are the two key operative concepts for the 
patentability of human genes under the Biotech Directive. In this regard, a principal 
question is to determine the relationship between technical character, isolation and 
industrial applicability in these types of inventions.  
Articles 5(2) and (3) of the Biotech Directive equate isolated naturally occurring 
elements with an indication of function with elements produced as a result of a 
technical process. According to the Biotech Directive, the mere discovery of the base 
pair sequence of a gene is not an invention; but, however, locating and isolating a 
previously unknown gene, determining its function and making it accessible for 
further exploitation is a technical solution to a technical problem.
595
 By rejecting 
applications over gene sequences with unknown uses on the basis that they are not 
ready inventions,
596
 the Biotech Directive also addresses the fact that all genes that 
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are discovered have to be isolated first by various technical methods.
597
 Thus, the 
distinction between discoveries and inventions in this field is to be found somewhere 
else, namely, in the identification of a practical utility.  
It seems clear that the Biotech Directive relies on the notions of utility and function 
and their implications in the distinction between discoveries and inventions. 
Nevertheless, there has been much debate regarding what the correct interpretation for 
Article 5(3) should be. Recital 23 of the Biotech Directive states that a simple DNA 
section without indication of a function does not contain a technical teaching and 
hence does not represent a patentable invention. Such wording contradicts the EPO 
previous practice by equating technical teaching with patentable, while having a 
technical teaching is a pre-condition for being an invention, and not necessarily a 
patentable one. This would lead to the conclusion that an isolated gene without an 
indication of function would be an invention although not patentable even though it 
does not have technical character.  
Due to this (apparent) contradictory provision, for some, isolation is enough for a 
discovered DNA sequence to provide a technical teaching, and thus viewing Article 
5(3) as an additional ingredient for an isolated gene to become an invention would 
erroneously imply that Article 57 EPC would be an objection to the patentability of 
mere discoveries, rather than a patentability requirement for inventions.
598
 Moreover, 
doing so could also lead to the conclusion that if a patent application over a gene 
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The difficulty in achieving a clear conclusion on the status of Article 5(3) is reflected 
in the ICOS Corporation case where the OD at the EPO contradicted itself by first 
saying with regard to patentability that the claimed isolated gene was not a discovery 
and then that there was no technical character.
600
 However, in spite of the at times 
contradictory interpretation of Article 5(3), the prevailing view is that the provisions 
of Article 5 must be interpreted altogether as an integral requirement for human gene 
patents. In this regard, interpreting Article 5(3) as not essential for the distinction of 
discoveries and inventions over human genes would misunderstand the Biotech 
Directive’s aim of imposing the obligation to elucidate the function of an isolated 
gene as a precondition for obtaining technical character and thus be an invention. 
5.4.2. The Implementation Of The Isolation Plus Industrial Applicability 
Approach 
In order to discover a gene, this must be first isolated. Therefore, considering merely 
isolated human gene sequences without industrial applicability as possible patentable 
inventions seems arguable since it is how the discovery is applied that turns it from a 
pure discovery into a real benefit to mankind worthy of protection as an invention.
601
 
The criterion of function adds to the invention concept the aspect of practical use, an 
aspect which, for newly discovered human gene fragments may be the balanced 
course required for keeping the concept within the limits necessary to serve the 
fundamental objectives of the patent system.
602
 What must be patented is in every 
case the set of technical instructions that inventively solve a particular technical 
problem.
603
 Thus, an examination of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 of the Biotech 
Directive does not itself permit a clear delineation between discovery and invention 
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since a merely isolated gene does not provide any technical, practically applicable 
solution for a technical problem.  
The value of a patent mainly depends on the applicability of the associated invention. 
In this regard, a vertical test for technical character would only allow ‘knowledge 
ready to be carried out by any relevant person skilled in the art’ to be patented, while 
preventing other subject matter from being patented like mere descriptions of 
observations.
604
 Technical knowledge is something that a person skilled in the art can 
perform, as opposed to theoretical knowledge,
605
 such as isolated human DNA 
fragments of unknown utility. Therefore, the contribution to the art on which gene 
patents are based is the gene’s availability in a form that can be utilized by many, and 
not only by the inventor. 
In fact the Boards of Appeal at the EPO have treated inherent patentability and 
industrial character as related in several cases.
606
  In particular, after the Biotech 
Directive was adopted, the EPO decision in Multimeric highlighted the overlapping 
relationship between having technical character and being industrially applicable. In 
this case, the TBA equated being industrially applicable with not being a mere 
discovery of interesting research results.
607
  Moreover, the Board also noted that the 
question of whether a claimed subject matter is industrially applicable is directly 
linked to the question of whether the claimed object is a mere discovery, for example, 
the result of purely intellectual activity with no practical or technical character.
608
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Unfortunately that reasoning was not furthered since the invention was deemed 
susceptible of industrial application but the decision made clear that isolation of 
human genetic material is not enough and that identifying a concrete industrial 
application is also a pre-condition for the patenting of human genes. 
This view was also confirmed by the prosecution at the UK Court of Appeal in Eli 
Lilly v. HGS, which asserted that an objection to the patentability of a gene sequence 
based on Article 57 of the EPC (industrial application) is in effect no different from 
an objection that the disputed invention is a mere discovery.
609
 This same point was 
echoed by the Advocate General in Monsanto:
610
 
‘The great importance attached by Directive 98/44 to the function performed by a 
DNA sequence is naturally intended to permit a distinction to be drawn between 
‘discovery’ and ‘invention’. The isolation of a DNA sequence without any indication 
of a function constitutes a mere discovery and as such is not patentable. Conversely, 
the sequence is transformed into an invention, which can then enjoy patent protection, 
through the indication of a function that it performs’.  
Therefore, it can be validly concluded that, the European patent law requirement of 
industrial application has become an essential pre-condition for human gene 
discoveries to qualify as inventions. This requirement adds to the long standing 
isolation principle, thus imposing an extra hurdle that patent applicants need to 
overcome in order to obtain patent protection for discoveries concerning sequences 
and partial sequences of human genes. 
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5.5. Concluding Remarks 
Because biological inventions concern living matter that was previously occurring in 
nature, the exclusion from patentability of discoveries is rather relevant in the 
biotechnology field. In particular, the distinction between discoveries and inventions 
is especially difficult in the case of inventions over discovered human DNA 
sequences due to their intrinsic characteristics and the fact that in many occasions 
these substances do not produce a concrete technical effect (function) and thus do not 
posses technical character.  
The EPC Implementing Regulations and Examination Guidelines interpret the 
exclusion of discoveries of natural substances within very narrow limits, only 
excluding matter that is actually ‘freely occurring in nature’. Within the context of 
DNA patents, this means that as long as a gene sequence has been isolated from its 
natural surrounding, it can be patentable. However, Article 5 of the Biotech Directive 
introduced the requirement that in order to become an invention with technical 
character, a newly discovered gene sequence has to be isolated and its function also 
needs to be identified. Thus, according to Article 5, the two requirements need to be 
satisfied to transform a mere discovery of DNA material into a patentable invention.  
This new approach, which is consistent with the EPO’s traditional understanding of 
the requirement of technical character of an invention, has been incorporated into the 
EPC and now forms part of the EPO practice. In this regard, several EPO decisions 
have made clear that if no industrial application is disclosed, an isolated human gene 
sequence amounts to a mere discovery without technical character. 
This chapter aimed to offer an analysis of how the exclusion of discoveries is applied 
with regard to human DNA inventions focusing on the role that the requirement of 
industrial application plays in the distinction between discoveries and inventions since 






6. THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION OF HUMAN GENE 
PATENTS: THE ROLE OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
APPLICATION REQUIREMENT 
6.1. Introduction 
With the rapid development of gene technologies, patent authorities started to 
encounter difficulties in applying general rules on patent scope to inventions over 
genetic material. Before determining the scope of a patent it is necessary to define the 
invention’s contribution to the art. However, in the area of genetics, the proliferation 
of broad claims based on little prior art, such as patent applications claiming many 
functions for newly discovered ESTs, makes it difficult to carry out a clear 
delimitation of the technical contribution of inventions in this field.  
Article 9 of the Biotech Directive deals with the determination of patent scope for 
inventions consisting of or containing genetic information by limiting the scope of 
protection of these types of inventions to their ability to perform their function. In 
practice, this provision has been interpreted as establishing purpose-bound protection 
by reducing the patent scope awarded to the industrial application of the invention 
claimed by the patent owner when filing the patent application. In this regard, 
although it is arguable whether this interpretation should be applied to all or some 
types of genetic inventions, such approach would give the requirement of disclosing 
the industrial applicability of human DNA claims a key role in the determination of 
the scope of protection awarded to at least those inventions concerning human genetic 
material. 
This chapter first analyses the important role of patent scope in gene patenting by 
exploring the economics of patent scope and the controversies around the grant of 





compatibility between the principal economic theories on patent scope and the 
Biotech Directive’s approach towards the scope of protection of genetic inventions. 
The chapter then examines the interpretation of patent scope under the EPC through 
studying the EPC provisions on patent scope and their application to genetic 
inventions, to then analyse the role and interpretation of disclosure requirements for 
determining the scope of gene patents under the EPC. Following this, the chapter 
focuses on Article 9 of the Biotech Directive, which deals with the scope of protection 
of genetic inventions, as an additional provision to the EPC articles on patent scope 
that are applicable to all types of inventions. It reviews the historical background of 
this provision, analyses its interpretation as establishing purpose-bound protection, 
and discusses the approach taken by the Commission and the Parliament towards the 
implementation of this requirement. Finally, the chapter examines the CJEU decision 
in Monsanto v. Cefetra interpreting Article 9 of the Biotech Directive and its impact 
on the interpretation of this provision and the future of gene patenting. 
6.2. Patent Scope Of Genetic Inventions 
6.2.1. The Economics Of Patent Scope 
The economic significance of a patent depends on its scope. Together with length, the 
scope of a patent determines the limits of the monopoly power that a patent confers. 
In practice, patent scope relates to the flow rate of profit that the patentee can 
appropriate while the patent is enforceable.
611
 It refers to the extent to which the 
patent holder may exclusively exploit or improve the subject matter covered by the 
patent;
612
 in other words, patent scope equates to the range of products or processes 
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for which the patent owner has the right to prevent others from making, using, selling, 
or importing the patented invention.
613
 In this regard, patent disputes often revolve 
around the question of how different from the protected invention a product must be 
in order to avoid infringing the exclusive rights of the patent owner.
614
 Therefore, 
defining the scope of a patent clearly is decisive for determining the extent of the 
rights of the patentee but also the limitations that such rights impose to competitors.  
The Coasian theory of property allocation suggests that, with low or nonexistent 
transaction costs, parties will always bargain to a Pareto-superior solution (regardless 
of how entitlements are initially assigned) and the size of the rights should only affect 
the personal gains of individual parties.
615
 However, within the context of patent 
rights, further analysis of the Coase theorem has concluded that the size of patentees’ 
rights can make a difference in the equilibrium level of output of the bargaining 
parties.
616
 Broad and narrow patent rights have different impacts on technological and 
scientific progress. Thus, in order to decide what the optimal patent scope would be in 
a given technological field it is important to consider the effects produced by different 
models of patent scope on distinct innovation landscapes.  
The broader the scope of the patent, the larger the monopoly power of the patentee is, 
and the stronger his negotiating position. Broad patents confer power to exclude a 
greater number of competing goods from the market that may otherwise infringe the 
patentee’s rights.
617
 In this regard, public policy analysis of optimal patent scope is 
usually focused on the trade-off between reward to innovators and society’s access to 
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patented inventions. This trade-off between patentees and society has traditionally 
been solved by discussing the appropriate length of patents.
618
 However, several 
authors have more recently acknowledged the primary role of patent scope as a key 
policy element in patent regimes.  
If patent claims were unduly limited in scope they would not promote progress in the 
art by failing to provide adequate economic incentives to inventors.
619
 On the other 
hand, overly broad patents would improperly dominate a certain area of research
620
 
and probably reduce the social benefits of patented inventions since increasing the 
breadth of a patent is typically increasingly costly in terms of the dead-weight loss as 
the patentee’s market power grows.
621
 Thus, patent scope discussions usually 
concentrate on two main concerns. First, there is the idea that because patentees must 
disclose their inventions they should receive patent protection sufficient to prevent 
competitors from easily inventing around so that their patents are economically 
valuable.
622
 However, if a technological area presents many overly broad patents, this 
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may discourage competitors from investing in making improvements.
623
 Therefore, a 
second concern is that patents should be limited in scope to motivate other inventors 
to continue investing in research without fear of infringing a previous patent.
624
 This 
follows the need to achieve a balanced definition of patent scope that rewards 
innovators in exchange of a minimum welfare loss. Nonetheless, reconciling these 
two objectives is often difficult, especially in pioneer and fast developing fields such 
as genetics.  
6.2.2. Broad Patents And The Case Of Pioneer Innovations 
Patent claims that cover things significantly different from what the patentee actually 
invented can result in overly broad patents covering a too large area of innovation 
rather than a specific invention. This type of claiming may be found to be problematic 
since it often seeks to control either an overly large part of the existing technological 
landscape, that is, wide patent breadth, which refers to the range of currently 
foreseeable commercial products that the patentee intends to claim;
625
 or too many 
subsequent technologies, and thus, large patent depth, which refers to the currently 
unforeseeable range of products that the patentee intends to cover;
626
 or both.  
Discussions around the impact of broad scope patents are frequent within the context 
of pioneer innovations, like groundbreaking inventions belonging to fields the 
boundaries of which have not yet been determined such as genetics and other 
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advanced biotechnologies. In this sense, there are different views regarding the 
question of how large the scope of patent protection for pioneer inventions should be. 
Nonetheless the predominant argument is that meritorious pioneer inventions that 
open up a new scientific field or start new industries like first genetic inventions 
within the context of recombinant DNA technology are worthier of broader patent 
protection than more modest inventions or improvements on existing ideas.
627
  This 
approach relies on the policy-based rationale that if pioneer inventors in new fields do 
not receive enough protection, they will be unable to capture adequate returns from 
their inventions,
628
 while new entrants into the field will be discouraged.
629
 Moreover, 
to some extent, broad claiming in these cases could be said to follow naturally from 
the characteristics of pioneer patents since in newly opened fields there is usually 
little prior art to prevent inventors from over claiming.
630
 For instance, under this 
view, wide scopes of protection should be granted for pioneer patents over human 
gene inventions. 
Nevertheless, while the grant of broader patents may seem appropriate for inventions 
that represent a significant step in technical development, they are not suitable when 
the invention represents a minor technological advance in a no longer groundbreaking 
technology.
631
 However, the problem is that most cases fall somewhere in between 
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  Furthermore, given the highly innovative character of many 
inventions it is usually very difficult to foresee what future developments will follow 
or how difficult it will be to achieve them.
633
 For example, what might be pioneer 
now, may not be so innovative in a few years. Thus, in the field of genetics, where 
many inventions claim pioneer status, it is questionable whether all of them are 
entitled to it. In this regard, granting broad scopes of protection could be acceptable in 
the case of truly groundbreaking inventions but it becomes more difficult to justify as 
(formerly revolutionary) industries advance. Thus, inventions claiming pioneer status 
and thus broad scope of protection should be carefully examined in order to ensure 
the fair exchange objectives of the patent system. 
Nonetheless, since broad patent scope means that more improvements will fall within 
the exclusive right of the patentee, and thus excluded from the market, patent 
applicants are generally keen to file very broad patent applications, whether pioneer 
or not, in order to obtain patent protection as broad as possible.
634
 Broad patents allow 
companies to capture more royalties from competing companies who seek licenses to 
use the patented inventions.
635
 Therefore, what clients will expect from their attorneys 
is a broad and dominant approach to claim drafting that,
636
 if granted, will allow the 
patent holder to control a larger part of a technical area. 
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Another important factor influencing broad scope claims is the first-to-file system 
existing in Europe in which the first person that files a patent application is entitled to 
it if granted.
637
 This race to the patent office has its advantages such as simplicity and 
expediency as it is simpler to determine priority of application than priority of 
invention.
638
 However, it may also encourage premature filing of patent applications 
before a specific use for the invention has been identified, and thus claiming 
protection broader than the invention’s known contribution to the art, in order to 
avoid losing the patent to competitors with an earlier priority date.  
The issue of broad claims and optimal patent scope is especially controversial in the 
field of human genetics, where many inventions fall within the grey area between 
truly pioneer innovations and follow-on improvements. In this regard, the experience 
of the past three decades has led to a growing interest in establishing clearer and 
narrower limits to the patent scope of inventions in this field. 
6.2.3 Increasing Desire To Narrow The Scope Of Biotechnological Patents 
With the rapid advances in genetic sciences, a growing number of very broad claims 
started to be filed and sometimes granted by patent offices worldwide. For example 
the EPO has allowed generic claims to genetic inventions in several occasions,
639
 
which grant protection over a vast range of unknown advances.
640
 In these cases many 
of the applicants’ claims have been directed to research results based on a relatively 
modest and incomplete understanding of the functions, but patents have been granted, 
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for example, over DNA sequences per se.
641
 Furthermore, claims are often construed 
very broadly without clearly specifying the limits of the invention, for instance by 
using descriptions loaded with general and irrelevant information.
642
  In this sense, 
applications often contain open transition terms (e.g. comprising) instead of closed 
transition terms (e.g. consisting of).
643
 On the other hand, many claims also include 
functional terminology to define the invention by what it does (e.g. DNA sequence X 
that when used in a host, is capable of expressing protein Y),
644
 or are accompanied 
by limited exemplification like in the Harvard Oncomouse patent case. It seems 
therefore that patents within the field of genetics are often designed to cover future 
unknown applications rather than to disclose the actual content of the invention. 
Furthermore, patent offices and courts, which are the two bodies responsible of 
making patent scope decisions at pre-grant and post-grant stage respectively, 
generally have considerable room for discretion.
645
 Moreover, it is virtually 
impossible for any institution to make sensible predictions about the applications that 
will emerge for the patentee’s invention, the variations of the invention that might 
develop, the competing or substitute technologies that will arise, or the dependence or 
independence of complementary technologies to the given invention.
646
 In this regard, 
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the flexibility of courts and patent offices and the high level of unpredictability in 
genetics can also result in the grant of overly broad patents in this field.  
Genetics is a relatively new science where a lot remains to be discovered, and 
although some authors have found that broadening the scope of patent protection is 
associated with higher valuations (e.g. Kitch and Lerner),
647
 overly broad gene patents 
upset the balance that the patent system aims to strike between the inventor and the 
public,
648
 while having a negative impact on innovation and development.
649
 
Moreover, initial pioneer gene technology techniques are increasingly considered to 
be more predictable and are more likely to fall into the category of routine 
experimentation. One example of a type of technology where this has occurred is the 
production of monoclonal antibodies, where the nature of the technology involves a 
screening process.
650
  In this sense, in order to control the scope of gene patents and 
their impact on subsequent innovation, Article 9 of the Biotech Directive restricts the 
scope of protection of these patents to the invention’s ability of performing its 
function (practical contribution), which in the case of human gene patents is revealed 
through the requirement of industrial application set out in Article 5(3) of the Biotech 
Directive. This provision adds to Article 69 of the EPC, which deals with the scope of 
patent protection in general. 
6.2.4. Economic Theories On Patent Scope  
Very different theories regarding the optimal scope of patent rights coexist in the 
existing economic literature on patent theory. Studying the contrasting perspectives 
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that these theories offer and their limitations helps to understand the importance of 
patent scope and the effect that different scope sizes might have on the innovation 
process in different technical fields. Besides, exploring these theories is also 
important for comprehending the rationale behind the current European provisions on 
the determination of scope of protection in general and with regard to genetic 
inventions.  
In this regard, since an extensive review of these theories can be found somewhere 
else,
651
 this chapter will focus on those issues that are especially relevant to the 
interpretation of patent scope with regard to genetic material. In essense, this part of 
the chapter aims to show the differences between the reasonings behind each of these 
theories; how these theories would apply within the context of gene patents; and how 
those theories advocating for establishing a narrow patent scope, that would not deter 
subsequent innovation, rather than an overly broad scope of protection are supported 
by the Biotech Directive’s provisions limiting the scope of protection of patents 
concerning genetic material to the functionality of the claimed invention. 
6.2.4.1. Length And Breadth Theories 
The models developed by Klemperer and Gilbert and Shapiro studied the issue of 
optimal patent size as a trade-off between patent length and breadth. These authors 
consider patent life and scope similar in terms of their incentive effect on inventors. 
Klemperer focuses on designing patents with a specific combination of length and 
breadth that reward innovators with a minimum social cost. His theory argues that 
infinitely lived but narrow patents are typically desirable when substitution costs 
between varieties of the product are similar across consumers; while very short-lived 
but wide patents are desirable when valuations of the preferred variety relative to not 
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buying the product at all are similar across consumers.
652
 According to Klemperer, a 
narrow patent is desirable when it causes relatively few consumers to substitute, that 
is, when demand is relatively inelastic in substitution cost.
653
 These results suggest 
that optimal patent policies should vary across different classes of products
654
 
depending on the elasticity of demand of a certain good and the level of substitution 
costs.   
Klemperer’s analysis focuses on the link between broad scope, competing varieties of 
the patented product, and the cost associated to substitution of the patented product. In 
contrast, Gilbert and Shapiro emphasize the extent to which a patentee may exploit 
the patent right for a given coverage of the patent grant. In their model patent breadth 
has no effect on the set of substitute products that are offered to consumers but can 
only affect the price that the patentee can charge.
655
 Gilbert and Shapiro find that the 
optimal length may be infinite in all cases and that the appropriate margin on which 
patent policy should operate would be patent breadth.
656
 They interpret patent scope 
as the ability of the patentee to raise the price of the product covered by the patent.
 
Within this context, and given the overall level of rewards to innovators, the authors 
suggest longer patent lives combined with more careful antitrust treatment of patent 
practices, such as the provisions of licensing contracts, so long as patent breadth is 
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 Gilbert and Shapiro (n 611). In contrast, Gallini proposes an optimal policy consisting of broad 
patents (no imitation allowed) with patent lives adjusted to achieve the desired reward. The key in this 
model is the increasing cost of imitation as patent life increases, see Nancy T Gallini, ‘Patent Policy 
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increasingly costly in terms of deadweight loss.
657
  Under this model, awarding 
infinite patents and controlling the costs generated by broad scope patents through 
external intervention could achieve optimal patent design.   
Although these theories contain valuable proposals regarding optimal patent design, 
they also present important limitations within the context of genetic inventions. The 
main shortcoming of both models is that they do not take into account the effect of 
scope size on subsequent research, an aspect that is especially important in the field of 
genetics where innovations build upon each other and access to patented technologies 
is essential. As Klemperer himself recognizes, a wider patent may prevent duplicative 
or imitative efforts but a narrower patent may provide greater incentives to refine and 
improve the original innovation.
658
 On the other hand, neither does Gilbert and 
Shapiro’s theory consider the dangers of infinitively long patents on future research. 
Moreover, both papers ignore the role of subsequent inventions that substitute for the 
original invention but also improve on it, and may result in something significantly 
better than the patented technology.
659
 Consequently, since both models disregard the 
impact of patent design on follow-on innovation efforts, these theories as they stand 
do not provide an appropriate model for patent scope that promotes subsequent 
innovation in genetic research. 
6.2.4.2. Patent Breadth Theories  
In parallel to length and breadth theories, several models focused exclusively on 
patent scope have also been developed. In this regard, the theories proposed by Kitch 
and Merges and Nelson are especially relevant given their opposite rationales and the 
different effects that their ideas would have on gene patenting. 
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Kitch’s prospect theory supports broad patent scope to incite pioneer investors in 
undeveloped fields of technology to invest in and develop such fields. Kitch’s theory 
centers on the notion that a patent gives its owner the exclusive right to further 
develop the ‘prospect’ that the invention represents to induce ‘prospecting’, so that 
the pioneer inventor will organize the market to develop improvements and 
refinements of the invention efficiently.
660
According to Kitch, monopoly rights 
present more advantages for technical advance than a rivalrous setting.
661
 First, this 
exclusive right allows breathing room for the inventor to invest in development 
without fear that another firm will preempt or steal his work;
662
 and second, it permits 
the inventor to coordinate activities with those of potential imitators, for example, 
through licensing contracts,
663
 to reduce inefficient duplication of inventive efforts 
and thus avoid the inefficiencies associated with rival uncoordinated innovation.
664 
In 
sum, Kitch’s model views invention as the consequence of the efforts of a pioneer 
firm that should give the patentee the right to control subsequent research in that area 
during the whole life of the patent.  
Kitch’s prospect theory has found support in the writings of other authors. For 
example, Kitch agrees with Schumpeter to the extent that the monopoly holder should 
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be allowed to exercise the subject of his rights completely and without interference.
665
 
Likewise, Chang proposes broad patents for both discoveries with extremely high 
social value and those with low social value but in improving technical areas.
666
 
Denicolo recognizes that reducing patent scope leads to more competition in the 
product market after the innovation. According to Denicolo competition is usually 
socially desirable but may also involve social costs derived from duplication of efforts 
like duplication of entry costs and inefficient production.
667
  In their analysis of the 
optimal model of patent scope, O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, distinguish 
between lagging breadth, which protects against competition from products inferior to 
the patented products such as imitation products, and leading breadth, which protects 
against competition from products with higher quality;
668
 to conclude that lagging 
breadth may not alone provide sufficient incentives for investment whereas leading 
breadth can extend effective patent life and stimulate research and development. 
Finally, in view of the shortcomings of both letting innovators collect all the social 
value of their invention, as well as of awarding narrow protection so that second 
innovators will less easily infringe the first innovator patent, Scotchmer proposes 
cooperative prior agreements between first (original) innovators and second 
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innovators, who improve existing inventions but create new products as well, which 
permit firms to share the costs and proceeds of research.
669
  
On the other hand, the main criticism to Kitch’s model is that his ideas are not in 
conformity with a fundamental principle in patent law, that is, that a patent applicant 
can only obtain patent protection for what he has invented, and not for future 
inventions.
670
 Besides, holders of broad patents might be operating more as 
gatekeepers rather than coordinators since the ability to charge a royalty does not 
ensure more efficient development even if licenses are granted.
671
 Moreover, 
competition and rivalry are essential elements of the proper functioning of the patent 
system and thus patents with over-broad scope under the control of few entities might 
have a negative effect on technological progress.
672
 In this sense, granting broad 
prospects to first inventors might also give rise to wasteful races between 
competitors.
673
 Finally, strengthening patent rights does not always increase 
incentives to invent but greatly increases an improver’s chances of being involved in 
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 Therefore, in light of the increasing concern about the potential negative 
effects of overly broad patents on genetic information such as limited access to 
genetic discoveries, the limitations of Kitch’s model make it difficult its application to 
patent scope decisions with regard to these types of inventions.  
Like Kitch, Merges and Nelson’s incentive to competition theory, or race to invent 
theory, studies the question of how patent scope design influences the subsequent 
development of a technology, however, they conclude that the grant of broad scope 
patents will probably hamper the development of the technology rather than promote 
it. Through the use of historical studies, the authors argue that awarding broad scope 
patents to important inventions has slowed progress in several industries. Moreover, 
they find that patent scope influences progress in each industry differently depending 
upon the nature of the technology involved;
675
 the topography of technical advance in 
a field, particularly on how inventions are linked to each other;
676
 the extent to which 
rapid technical advance requires a diversity of actors and minds;
677
 and the extent to 
which firms license technologies to each other.
678
  Taking into account those factors, 
the authors propose at least four different generic industry models: discrete invention; 
cumulative technologies; chemical technologies; and finally, science-based 
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technologies like genetic engineering where technical advance is driven by 
developments in science outside the industry.
679
  
In each of these models patent scope issues take a special form.
680
  Moreover, these 
categories are dynamic, so that a particular field of invention may fall under a 
different classification as the field matures.
681
 Thus, the optimal patent scope in each 
category of industry changes as the industry advance.
 
In the case of science-based 
technologies research and development efforts attempt to exploit recent scientific 
developments, which tend to narrow the perceived range of technological 
opportunities and concentrate the attention of inventors on the same projects.
682
  This 
is a context that encourages inventive races to develop a major advance over prior 
art,
683
 particularly in the first-to-file system existing in Europe. In this regard, Merges 
and Nelson view that the efficiency gains from the pioneer’s ability to coordinate are 
likely to be outweighed by the loss of competition for improvements to the basic 
invention.
684
 Their model thus favors a competitive environment for improvements, 
rather than coordinated development by the pioneer firm.  
Merges and Nelson’s incentive to competition theory relies on theories like the theory 
of competitive innovation developed by Arrow,
685
 and on evidence such as that 
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 Arrow argues against Kitch’s prospect theory by asserting that competition, not monopoly, best 
spurs innovation. In his view, patent rights should be narrowly confined to specific embodiments of an 
invention and should not give the patentee monopoly control over product markets, see Kenneth J 





provided by Taylor and Silberston.
686
 Nonetheless, the main limitation of the theory 
proposed by Merges and Nelson is that, as they note, their analysis is only applicable 
to the broader claims of a small number of patents, primarily those on pioneering 
breakthroughs, and must always be interpreted in light of the nature of technical 
advance in each particular industry. Furthermore, Merges and Nelson acknowledge 
that competition may at times be inefficient, wasteful, and duplicative.
687
 Besides, a 
system that discriminates against pioneer inventions and promotes incremental 
advancement may promote secrecy, and thus more rent dissipation through 
duplicative efforts.
688
 Moreover, the narrowness of the grant, and consequent 
incremental nature of technological advance, might eventually promote the 
emergence of clusters of narrow patents that impose barriers to further research.
689
 
However, notwithstanding existing criticisms against this model, the incentive to 
invent theory responses better to concerns around the increasing number of overly 
broad patents in genetic industries. This theory acknowledges the importance of the 
specific characteristics of each technological field for designing patent scope and the 
role of competition in original and follow-on innovation; an approach that is 
consistent with the Biotech Directive’s aim of avoiding the grant of overly broad 
scopes of protection for human gene patents that extend beyond the invention’s 
technical contribution, and thus may undermine the progress of further research in this 
field. 
Nevertheless, the models described above reveal an important mismatch between 
patent scope theories and the real world. The lack of comprehensive data on the 
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economic effects of patents, which often leads authors to rely on anecdotal evidence 
to support their positions, makes it difficult to test the different patent theories.
690
 
Moreover, the parameters used often assume almost perfect conditions that do not 
occur.
691
 From a theoretical point of view, the models described above offer valuable 
guidance about the different possible designs of patent scope. However, the key to 
understand the wide range of theories for optimizing patent rules is the different 
industry contexts in which patents exist.
692
 In this regard, the particularities of each 
industrial field may require the adoption of specific measures for dealing with patent 
scope issues in certain technologies, which impedes the unconditional application of 
one of those theories. For example, as explained above, in Europe the Biotech 
Directive has introduced specific provisions dealing with the patent scope of genetic 
patents. Such provisions are additional to the EPC articles on patent scope.  
6.3. Patent Scope In The European Patent System 
6.3.1. Scope Of Protection Under The EPC: Article 69 Background And 
Interpretation 
A patent confers a temporary monopoly in exchange for the public disclosure of the 
invention to ensure widespread diffusion of its benefits to society. Following this 
logic the amount of protection granted should be proportional to the technical 
contribution of the invention disclosed by the applicant. As stated by the TBA at the 
EPO in Exxon, there is a ‘general legal principle that the extent of the patent 
monopoly, as defined by the claims, should correspond to the technical contribution 
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to the art in order for it to be supported or justified’.
693
 Therefore, determining the 
invention’s contribution to the art should be a preliminary question in all patent scope 
decisions. 
Such contribution to the art is delineated by the disclosure requirements, which 
require the applicant to describe the content and borders of his invention, namely, the 
invention’s breadth. Although scope of protection and breadth of invention are not 
identical, being breadth of invention determined at the pre-granting stage or in 
revocation proceedings after grant, while scope of protection can only be determined 
after grant once the breadth of invention is defined,
694
 there is a strong link between 
them since what the applicant reveals is what provides the foundations for designing 
the scope of the patent. 
The patent claims and their descriptions are what establish how wide the scope of 
protection should be. In this regard, the disclosure requirements are essential for 
preventing excessive claiming in terms of the range of products and processes that fall 
or can fall within the protection granted.
695
 That is, claims drawn broadly should 
entail the obligation to make a correspondingly wide disclosure,
696
 in order to ensure 
a correct deduction of the scope of the patent. Indeed, the combination of claim 
breadth, claim interpretation and patent scope is what determine the amount of 
protection awarded to European patents. 
Article 69 EPC lays down the extent of protection of European patents. The 
introduction of this provision was primarily concerned with reconciling the traditional 
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diametric opposition between the UK and Germany regarding claim interpretation. On 
the one hand, in countries like the UK the claims formed the periphery of the 
monopoly (fence posts)
697
 and patentees were required to mark out in advance the 
whole range of applications of the inventive concept to which those rights would 
extend.
698
 This model represented a narrow approach to interpreting claim language 
that only allows for literal or textural infringement.
699
 By the time Article 69 was 
being negotiated, the UK was consistently treating claims as the literal borders of the 
applicant’s invention, which was seen as a too narrow approach. In contrast, in 
Germany the claims only served as guides to define the core of the invention and the 
scope of protection was determined by generalization of the inventive concept, even if 
the teaching’s scope was wider than the literal reading of the patent claims.
700
 The 
German model influenced several smaller states, including the Netherlands, Austria 
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 In sum, the important part of the claim was the content (inhalt) 
and not the specific terms employed by the applicant. 
In view of the existing opposite approaches to claim interpretation, the delegates 
taking part in the elaboration of a European rule regarding scope of protection 
attempted to create a compromise and opted for an intermediate solution between the 
UK and German approaches, which culminated in the adoption of Article 69 and its 
Protocol of Interpretation.
702
 The first preparatory works for a European rule on the 
extent of protection were based on a study commissioned by the Expert Committee on 
the fundamental conditions for patent protection in the Member Countries of the 
Council of Europe.
703
 Based on that study, a final report dated 11 October 1960 
suggested that clarification of the scope of protection of the patent could be achieved 
if the patent claims were to be regarded as decisive for the extent of patent 
protection.
704
 This would extend protection to all embodiments that used the essential 
part of the inventive notion expressed in the patent claim, even if they did not 
correspond with the wording of the patent claim in every detail.
705
 However, the 
extent of protection was not to include solutions that were merely disclosed in the 
description or the drawings but not in the claim, although anything in the description 
or the drawings linked to any part of the patent claim could be used to interpret 
(clarify) the patent claim.
706
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This intermediate solution was taken at the text proposal
707
 for a first working draft of 
an agreement on a European patent law dated 14 March 1961 aimed at achieving a 
compromise solution for the determination of a substantive extent of protection.
708
 
The text provisionally adopted by the Patents Working Party in a document in May 
1961 provided that the extent of the protection conferred by the European patent shall 
be determined by the terms of the claims and notwithstanding, the description and 
drawings shall be used to define the extent of the claims.
709
 Following the hearing at 
the Fifth session of the Inter-Governmental Conference for the setting up of a 
European System for the Grant of Patents at the beginning of 1972 it was decided not 
to change the wording adopted in Article 8 of the 1963 Strasbourg Convention and 
incorporate the same formulation in Article 69 of the EPC in 1973.
710
 Moreover, to 
facilitate a uniform interpretation of Article 69 by national courts, a Protocol on the 
Interpretation of Article 69 (the Protocol)
711
 was also included in the Convention. 
In essence, the drafters of the Convention opted to follow the English approach of 
peripheral claim interpretation where the claims define the boundaries (and thus the 
scope) of the patent rather than the German central inventive concept approach. 
However, Article 69 of the EPC also provides that the drawings and the description 
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shall be used to interpret the claims, thus allowing for an interpretation of the claims 
that goes further than their literal meaning. In fact, this formulation seeks to lay down 
a principle for interpreting claims which is somewhere between the system in which 
the claims may be interpreted strictly according to the letter and that in which the 
claims wording do not play a decisive part in defining the limits of protection.
712
 
Article 69 was thus aimed at establishing a middle approach that took what the 
delegates thought were the best features of the UK and German approaches.  
As stated above, in order to avoid conflicting interpretations of Article 69 of the EPC, 
a Protocol for the interpretation of this article was also adopted. Like Article 69, the 
Protocol suggests a halfway position between the UK and German models. It 
stipulates the permissible readings of the patent claims.
713
 According to its text, the 
claims may be interpreted in a purposive manner based on their strict literal 
meaning,
714
 and then their scope of protection may be supplemented by consideration 
of equivalents that are obvious at the date of infringement of the patent.
715
 Basically, 
all the elements claimed by the applicant need to have sufficient bases in the terms of 
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the claims, although their interpretation is not strictly confined to the literal wording 
of the claims. Article 69 is to be interpreted as defining a position between a purely 
literal interpretation of claims and considering the wording of the claims as a mere 
guidance. This is in order to provide a fair protection for the patent proprietor with a 
reasonable degree of legal certainty for third parties. Nonetheless, the protection 
conferred by a patent can be extended to any element that is sufficiently equivalent to 
an element specified in the claims.  
In order to set the basis for achieving harmonization in the interpretation of the scope 
of patent protection among the national courts of EPC countries,
716
 provisions similar 
to Article 69 EPC and the Protocol have been included in the national patent laws of 
the EPC Member States. However, cases like Epilady,
717
 in which the UK and 
German courts arrived at opposite conclusions after a lengthily appeal process, and 
Pozzoli,
718
 where the UK and French courts revoked a patent that had been upheld in 
Germany and differed in their interpretation of the claims under dispute, suggest that 
complete uniformity between the decisions of national courts has not been reached. 
Discussing these cases in depth falls outside the scope of this thesis, but they 
nevertheless inform about the difficulties in achieving a uniform interpretation of 
patent scope across Europe.  
6.3.2. The Role And Interpretation Of The Disclosure Requirements In Gene 
Patenting 
As stated above, it is not possible to determine the scope of patent protection without 
first knowing the breadth of the invention, which is determined through the disclosure 
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requirements of sufficiency (enabling) of disclosure and written description contained 
in Articles 83 and 84 of the EPC. 
The disclosure requirements in patent law serve two purposes. First, they give public 
notice of the limits of the patent in order to allow society to enjoy the benefits of the 
invention, and permit third parties to foresee the content of the patent so that they are 
able to improve on and invent around without infringing.
719
 Second, they ensure that 
the inventor is truly in possession of the invention at the date of filing the 
application,
720
 that is, that the invention is reproducible and a specific industrial 
application is known.
721
 This second function relates to the practical utility of the 
invention, a factor that is essential in order to identify the invention’s actual technical 
contribution to the art. 
In the field of genetics, it is common to find cases where applicants try to get 
protection for products not disclosed in the application. However, notwithstanding 
courts’ discretion regarding how much information applicants ought to provide to the 
person skilled in the art,
722
 claims should be bounded to a significant degree by what 
the disclosure enables, over and beyond prior art.
723
 Applicants should provide more 
than a very general disclosure that does not correspond to the scope of the invention 
as claimed.
724
 This is because if the claims go further than the disclosure made by the 
applicant, the person skilled in the art will be unable to know with certainty whether 
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the inventor is entitled to get protection for everything claimed. Neither would the 
invention be sufficiently disclosed to the general public. 
Nonetheless, the inherent characteristics of genetic inventions usually pose difficulties 
for the application of disclosure rules. For example, the variability of DNA sequences 
or the range of functions of a single protein makes it more difficult to assess whether 
an invention within this field has been made sufficiently available.
725
 Furthermore, in 
the case of groundbreaking pioneer inventions based on little prior art, patentees find 
harder to explain claims in a manner that enables peers to fully practice the invention 
without engaging in undue experimentation.
726
 These issues often come into play 
when assessing the disclosure of patent claims concerning genetic inventions, which 
makes it difficult for patent authorities to make decisions without considering the 
particular circumstances of the claimed invention.  
With regard to the relationship between Articles 83 and 84 of the EPC, the EPO case 
law has shown that, at least in the field of genetics, although in principle both 
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 they are closely connected and basically concern the 
same matter.
728
 The purpose of both requirements is basically to ensure that the grant 
of a patent monopoly is justified by the applicant’s contribution to the art. 
Nonetheless, their assessments could lead to different outcomes and overly broad 
claims could better be attacked under one or the other.
729
  For example in the case of 
an isolated protein, it would be possible to satisfy the enablement requirement by 
depositing the claimed substance but not the written description requirement since it 
requires disclosing the invention in adequately specific terms.
730
 Moreover, only 
Article 83 can be raised as a ground of opposition after grant of a European patent 
except where amendment is sought by the patentee.
731
 However, in practice disputes 
concerning Articles 83 and 84 arise together
732
 and the distinction between them 
seems more semantic than real, as the EPO decision in Exxon illustrates:
733
 
‘In the present case (…) the reasons why the invention defined in the claims does not 
meet the requirement of Art. 83 EPC are in effect the same as those that lead to their 
infringing Art. 84 EPC as well, namely that the invention extends to technical subject 
                                                 
727
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matter not made available to the person skilled in the art by the application as filed 
(…)’.  
On the other hand, as in other fields, there are two key questions that require careful 
examination when interpreting the disclosure requirements within the context of 
genetic inventions: identification of the invention’s essential features and the 
requirement of practicability.  
6.3.2.1. The Invention’s Essential Features And The EPO’s ‘One Way Rule’ 
For disclosure purposes, an initial step is to identify the essential features of the 
claimed invention.
734
 The EPO has interpreted Article 84 as a requirement to ‘define 
clearly the object of the invention, that is to say, indicate all the essential features 
thereof’, which are all those features that are ‘necessary to obtain the desired effect or, 
differently expressed which are necessary to solve the technical problem with which 
the application is concerned’.
735
 Basically, essential features are those needed to 
enable the skilled man to carry out the invention, although variants of essential 
components can also receive protection.
736
 In other words, only those elements of the 
invention that form part of the invention’s central inventive content, that is, its 
technical contribution to the art, need to be disclosed. 
In a more recent case, the EPO has elaborated on the notion of essential features by 
acknowledging that ‘the essential technical features may also be expressed in general 
functional terms, if, from an objective point of view, such features cannot otherwise 
be defined more precisely without restricting the scope of the claim, and if these 
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features provide instructions which are sufficiently clear for the skilled person to 
reduce them to practice without undue burden’.
737
 Such interpretation offers 
applicants the possibility of formulating their claims in a more flexible manner 
without revealing all the information related to the essential elements of the invention. 
Related to the requirement of disclosing the essential features is the commonly cited 
as the ‘one way rule’ by which an invention is sufficiently disclosed if at least one 
example for carrying it out is described. This approach was first established by the 
EPO decision in Genentech I.
738
 In this case the patent related to a human growth 
hormone and the claim related to a recombinant plasmid into which artificially made 
DNA encoding a desired functional protein was inserted to later express the encoded 
protein in a recoverable form.
739
 Genentech’s main claim was drafted in broad terms 
covering the expression of the polypeptide using any modified plasmid,
740
 thus 
claiming other expression control sequences whose functions were still unknown.
741
 
However, reversing the EPO ED’s previous decision, the TBA held that an invention 
is sufficiently disclosed if at least one way enabling the skilled person to carry out the 
invention is clearly indicated.
742
 Thus, the disclosure does not need to include specific 
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instructions as to how all possible component variants within the functional definition 
should be obtained,
743
 but one way to perform the invention will suffice.  
The same flexible approach was adopted in Biogen. The principal claims of this case 
related to a recombinant DNA for use in cloning a DNA sequence in bacteria, yeasts 
or animals cells.
744
 Biogen claimed the DNA sequence in any host, however, at the 
effective date just E. coli strains were available and other hosts only became ready for 
use at a later stage.
745
 According to the respondents in this case, the claims were 
drafted broadly since the description of the invention in terms of how to carry it out 
was much more limited in scope.
746
 However, contrary to the EPO OD’s decision, the 
TBA followed the ‘at least’ one way rule stated in Genentech I.  
In the Board’s view, it is not necessary for the purpose of Articles 83 and 100(b) of 
the EPC that the disclosure of a patent is adequate to enable the skilled man to carry 
out all conceivable ways of operating the invention embraced by the claims, but only 
to the necessary extent.
747
 The decision relies on an open definition relating to an 
unknown but probably finite number of human and animal interferons of the alpha-
type that may differ in structure but still represent some structural similarity in view 
of the affinity in hybridisation tests.
748
 Moreover, since the members of the class 
provide end products with the same biological activity, as long as this is achieved by 
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the invention there is no necessity to provide instructions in advance on how each and 
every member of the class would have to be prepared.
749
  
Later cases have also followed the one way rule approach.
750
 However, the EPO case 
law on disclosure has progressively moved from the very flexible reasoning 
established in Genentech I, according to which in all cases a single working example 
established sufficiency for the entire scope, to an approach in which the description 
has to be sufficient over the whole claimed scope.
751
  For instance, in the more recent 
decision in Exxon the Board stated that ‘the disclosure of one way of performing the 
invention is only sufficient within the meaning of Article 83 EPC if it allows the 
person skilled in the art to perform the invention in the whole range that is 
claimed’.
752
 However, within the context of genetic inventions this decision may be 
seen as a very high standard since finding one way of performance that permits 
carrying out all claims of an invention is only possible in a few cases.
753
 Furthermore, 
the TBA did not clearly indicate what has to be understood as a ‘whole range’ but 
only provided that this was to be decided on a case-by-case-basis in view of the 
evidence available.
754
 However, although the Exxon decision recognized the 
importance of the circumstances of each case, it falls short in ensuring that patentees 
actually disclose a workable solution to a specific technical problem. In the case of 
gene inventions, given their intrinsic characteristics, one way of reproducibility might 
not necessarily achieve all the claimed products and more ways of performing the 
claimed invention might need to be indicated.  
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6.3.2.2. The Requirement Of Practicability 
This requirement implies that the disclosure made by the applicant has to be sufficient 
as to enable the person skilled in the art to carry out the invention without undue 
experimentation (burden).  At the date of the application the skilled person, having 
read the application as a whole and in light of the common general knowledge, must 
be able to put the invention into practice within the whole area that is claimed without 
undue effort.
755
 In this regard, the major problem resides in determining the line 
between what might be considered as an acceptable amount of trial and error, and 
undue experimentation.  
The question of undue burden is examined from the perspective of the man skilled in 
the art and, in general, the EPO Boards of Appeal have set the threshold rather high in 
the sense that a significant amount of experimentation is allowed without being 
considered to be undue. For instance, in Human immune interferon-Gamma (HIF-
Gamma) the invention related to an isolated DNA sequence coding for HIF-Gamma, 
cloning vectors, micro-organisms and cell-cultures, and processes for expressing 
DNA encoding human immune interferon in a recombinant host cell.
756
  The TBA 
admitted that although in the priority application the DNA sequence coding for HIF-
Gamma was disclosed, reproducibility of the whole process of expressing the gene to 
produce the desired interferon-gamma was still a difficult, complex and time-
consuming task in 1981. Nonetheless, it was finally held that the description of the 
DNA sequence in 1981 enabled those skilled in the art to reproduce the invention.  
A similar reasoning was applied in Human tissue plasminogen activator (Human t-
PA). In this case the issue was whether the disclosure of the first cloning and 
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expression of human t-PA in E.Coli was sufficient to ensure its workability in 
mammalian cells.
757
  Based on the evidence provided by the applicant, the EPO found 
that the invention was sufficiently enabled as the skilled person could be expected to 
prepare without inventive skill or undue burden derivatives of human t-PA by way of 
either amino acid deletion, substitution, insertion, addition, or replacement within the 
framework of routine trials. In the same line, in Kirin-Amgen
758
 the patent related to 
the manufacture of erythropoietin (Epo) by recombinant DNA techniques and even 
though no deposit of recombinant host cells was made, the TBA reasoned that Article 
83 EPC only requires a deposit if others were not able to repeat the invention at all. 
Thus, in the event that an invention can be somehow carried out without a deposit, as 
in the case at issue, no deposit is required.  
In view of the decisions above it seems that practicability or reproducibility can be a 
real problem for gene inventions since in many cases, a general principle is described 
but workability of such principle for the whole area claimed cannot be tested with the 
disclosure made by the patent applicant. The EPO has made allowances for variability 
in genetics and an invention will be enabled even if there is some variability in the 
starting material, as long as one can obtain members of the class claimed.
759
 
Moreover, the factor of undue experimentation is assessed in light of the facts of each 
particular case but a significant degree of trial and error will be allowed as long as this 
does not require undue inventiveness to the person skill in the art.  
In sum, the EPO’s interpretation of the EPC disclosure provisions within the context 
of genetic patents shows a high degree of flexibility in terms of the amount of 
information that applicants shall disclose in order to ascertain the invention’s breadth 
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and, based on this, its corresponding scope of protection. However, the difficulties in 
applying general rules on claim interpretation and patent scope to inventions over 
genetic material pose challenges to the implementation of fundamental patent policy 
goals concerned with access to genetic discoveries and the advance of research in this 
field. Given the significant impact of broad gene patents on subsequent innovation, 
there is the concern that the scope of protection for these patents should not extend 
beyond the invention’s real technical contribution. In this respect, in order to address 
the different difficulties for determining the appropriate scope of patent protection of 
biological inventions, Article 9 of the Biotech Directive introduces an additional 
limitation to the scope of protection of inventions concerning genetic information by 
restricting the scope of this type of patent to its capability of performing its intended 
function. 
6.4. Scope Of Protection For Gene Patents: Article 9 Of The Biotech 
Directive 
6.4.1. Background And Reasoning 
Chapter II of the Biotech Directive attempts to address the difficulties and 
uncertainties that arise in the application of general rules on patent scope within the 
context of biotechnological inventions. In response to concerns regarding the issue of 
exhaustion of patent rights after first sale of a product, Article 8 lays down a general 
principle stating that the protection conferred by a patent on a biological material shall 
extend to any derived biological material possessing the same characteristics as the 
initial biological material. This principle is further articulated in Article 9 with regard 
to gene inventions, which provides that the protection conferred by a patent on a 
product containing or consisting of genetic information shall extend to all material in 
which the product is incorporated and in which the genetic information is contained 





scope of protection but it provides additional clarification to the provisions of Article 
69 of the EPC on scope of protection within the context of genetic inventions. 
In view of the fact that living matter is self-replicable and may thus cause problems in 
respect of further generations, the 1988 First Directive Proposal aimed to address 
concerns regarding the issue of patent scope for living matter.
760
  In this sense, it 
explained with regard to Article 11 (later Article 8(1)) that:
761
 
‘Once a patented product has been placed on the market by a patentee or with his 
consent, no control over the further use of the product in intra-Community trade may 
be exerted by the patentee or a licensee (…) Article 11 will ensure that the use which 
is intended in a sale of patented self-reproducing material is not confused with a use 
which involves patent infringement. The provisions of Article 11 are needed because 
the issue of the extent of patent rights in respect of patented living or self-replicating 
material has not been dealt with in any national patent system and the provisions of 
the EPC do not address this question (…) For national patent laws, it needs to be 
legislatively established that use which involves propagation solely for the purpose of 
obtaining additional propagative or self-replicating material does not come within the 
scope of intended use which would be exhausted upon the sale of a patented product’. 
Because after sale purchasers would be able to reproduce the patented material 
without infringing, the Commission found first sale exhaustion as a threat to the 
capturing value of patents concerning easily propagating material such as seeds.
762
  If 
the scope of protection did not extend to the material in which the protected material 
is incorporated, patent protection would be practically useless in some cases.
763
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Therefore, in order to avoid evasion of patent infringement by simply propagating the 
original invention to obtain derived material with identical properties, Article 8 
extends patent protection to biological material derived from the patented product or 
process that possesses the same characteristics as the patentee’s invention. 
Within this context of extended protection to cover biological material derived from 
and similar to the patent, Article 9 clarifies how such extension of patent protection 
shall be applied to gene patents. Article 13 (now Article 9) of the First Directive 
Proposal stated that ‘the protection for a product consisting of or containing particular 
genetic information as an essential characteristic of the invention shall extend to any 
products in which said genetic information has been incorporated and is of essential 
importance for its industrial applicability or utility’.
764
 This approach was triggered by 
the broad scope of the first generation of DNA patents often covering, for example, 




Thus, with this provision the Biotech Directive sought to preempt patent holders from 
obtaining exclusive rights over products in which the genetic information is not able 
to perform its desired function. For example, applicants often claim several functions 
for the same genetic sequence but the gene either does not perform all of them, or 
after some time the gene function is lost and the invention is no longer capable of 
expressing its intended function.
766
 In this regard, Article 9 would impede applicants 
to obtain protection beyond the invention’s ability to be used for its intended purpose. 
Such an approach is consistent with the utilitarian view of patents as a means to 
provide society with useful innovative technologies, and with Locke’s theory of 
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property as a natural right, according to which the scope of the property should be 
limited to the purpose behind the labour, which is directed to a useful end.
767
  
The wording of Article 13 of the First Directive Proposal remained essentially 
unchanged during the ten-year period of negotiations prior to the final adoption of the 
Biotech Directive.
768
 In this regard, subsequent amendments to the initial proposal 
reaffirmed the Biotech Directive darfters’ intention to limit the protection conferred to 
a genetic patent to the extent that the genetic information is contained and expressed. 
This requirement was included in Article 9 of the text finally agreed, which provides 
that in the case of inventions concerning genetic information, protection must extend 
to all derived materials in which the genetic information is contained and performs its 
function. 
6.4.2. Interpretation Of Article 9: Purpose-Bound Protection V. Absolute 
Product Protection 
Together with Article 5(3) and related recitals, Article 9 gives to the criterion of 
industrial applicability a critical role in the patentability of gene sequences by limiting 
the extension of patent protection to only those derived materials where the genetic 
information carries out its function, that is, its industrial application. The link between 
the requirement of industrial application and Article 9 can be found in the wording of 
Article 13 (now Article 9) of the First Directive Proposal, which limited the 
protection for an invention consisting of or containing particular genetic information 
to those products in which said genetic information had been incorporated and is 
essential for its industrial applicability or utility. Although the final wording of Article 
9 refers to ‘function’ instead of ‘industrial applicability’ or ‘utility’, it seems clear that 
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in the legislators’ view, function, industrial application and utility are equivalent 
concepts.  
In this regard, since the function of human gene patents is the one disclosed according 
to Article 5(3) of the Biotech Directive, Article 9 can be seen, at least within the 
context of human gene inventions, as an extension to the general requirement that a 
patent application must describe the industrial application of human gene sequences 
and fragments thereof in order to receive patent protection. In this regard, it follows 
the question of whether the relationship between Articles 5(3) and 9 of the Biotech 
Directive results in the establishment of purpose-bound protection for human gene 
patents, and thus, whether for example using the same DNA sequence for expression 
of a different protein or a similar sequence for expression of the same or similar 
protein is still included in the scope of the patent.
769
 Moreover, in the case of 
artificially created human DNA, disclosure of the function is not required and thus 
absolute product protection should still be available.
770
 
Besides, through this function-related requirement, Article 9 could be interpreted as 
introducing purpose-bound patent protection for all types of genetic inventions; that 
is, limited to the extent that the patented invention performs the specific function 
initially claimed by the patentee. Nonetheless, for other types of biotechnological 
inventions absolute product protection is still available under Article 3(1).
771
 
Notwithstanding the arguable adequacy of adopting such approach for all sorts of 
genetic patents, the Biotech Directive’s text and preparatory works suggest that this 
delimitation was sought for human gene sequences. Otherwise, it would not make 
sense to refer to the function or industrial application of gene patents, which 
establishes a connection between Article 9 of the Biotech Directive and the 
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requirement in Article 5(3) that the function of a sequence or partial sequence of 
human DNA needs to be specifically disclosed in the patent application.  
Furthermore, with regard to the patentability of the human body, in order to avoid any 
extension of the patent protection for an element isolated from the human body to the 
human body itself,
772
 Article 9 of the Biotech Directive is applied save as provided in 
Article 5(1), which preempts the patentability of the human body and its elements.
773
 
This interpretation of Article 9 as a requirement of purpose-bound protection for 
human genetic information restricted to the prohibition of Article 5(1) is the one that 
has been followed by several national courts, the CJEU and the European Parliament. 
Moreover, several conditions have to be met in order to apply the limited extension of 
protection provided by Article 9. The first requirement, that the protected genetic 
information is contained in the derived material is not very difficult to fulfill since by 
simply incorporating the product containing or consisting of genetic information in 
other biological material, the latter will also contain the genetic information.
774
 The 
second condition requiring the expression of the genetic information in the derived 
material is however more difficult to comply with as it was seen in the Monsanto case 
before the CJEU and various national courts.
775
 
In this regard, together with the requirement of Article 5(3) of signaling the industrial 
applicability of human gene inventions, Article 9 moves closer to a more rigorous 
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approach towards the patentability of human genetic information. Through these 
provisions, the technicality (practicability) requirement as it is now interpreted within 
the context of human gene patents helps to strike the balance between theory and 
application since only that knowledge that is actually being applied to a practical end 
will be protected from infringement.
776
 It is precisely in its impact on the scope of 
patent monopolies that the real usefulness of the industrial applicability requirement 
resides.
777
 Abandoning it would broaden the permissible scope of patents, thus 
shifting the demarcation line between appropriable and public domain knowledge.
778
 
For some, however, such a limitation is neither appropriate nor necessary in order to 
avoid extensive patenting of genetic sequences, since the preconditions for the grant 
of a patent over genetic discoveries inherently restrict the scope granted.
779
 In this 
sense, absolute product protection should be granted if the finding and structure 
clarification of the DNA sequence as such are based on an inventive step,
780
 which 
consists in identifying and isolating a desired gene sequence before anyone else has 
done it. 
Nevertheless, if absolute product protection were given to an isolated gene, the scope 
of its protection would be far-reaching since it would include not only the discovered 
sequence but also all future uses of such sequence in its natural form; whereas 
purpose-bound protection would create the balance of rights and obligations referred 
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to in Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement.
781
 A strict requirement for purpose-bound 
protection ensures that access to human genetic material is still allowed for other 
purposes.
782
 Nonetheless, restricting the scope of gene patents to the disclosed 
purpose while maintaining the principle of absolute product protection for all other 
technical fields might be considered to be an unjustified differential treatment 
contrary to the non-discrimination requirement of Article 27(1) of the TRIPS 
Agreement.
783
 The compatibility between Article 9 of the Biotech Directive and the 
TRIPS Agreement was discussed by the CJEU’s decision in Monsanto, which will be 
reviewed later in this chapter. 
Despite existing arguments in favor of absolute product protection for all types of 
biotechnological inventions, purpose-bound protection is widely seen as a suitable 
alternative for patents concerning isolated human gene sequences as such. For 
example, in a 2003 survey carried out by the Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual 
Property, most biotech research institutions and private companies agreed that an 
absolute protection of DNA patents would hamper research and further development 
and that a concrete disclosure of the function of DNA patents would enable the 
restriction of patent claims.
784
 With scope of protection limited to the invention’s 
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function, investors may be more likely to contribute to the study of DNA sequences 
because they know that if another scientist identifies a function for a sequence, that 
scientist will only gain protection for that application, future identification of new 
functions will be allowed, and profits will still be available.
785
 Furthermore, licensing 
fees would only be paid if researchers focus on the same function of the sequence.
786
 
It therefore seems that, given the magnitude of the potential impact of granting 
absolute product protection on the development of genetic sciences, purpose-bound 
protection for human gene inventions presents a viable solution to address existing 
concerns about overly broad gene patents and ensure continuous research. 
6.4.3. Interpretation Of Article 9 By The Commission And The Parliament 
In addition to commentators and industry stakeholders, the Commission and 
Parliament have also given their views on the interpretation of Article 9 of the 
Biotech Directive as a requirement for purpose-bound protection. 
The interest of the Commission regarding the need to clarify the interpretation of 
Article 9 was first stated in the 2002 Commission report submitted under Article 16(c) 
of the Biotech Directive.
787
 Given the rapid advances in the fields of biotechnology 
and genetics, the Commission urged the review of two particular questions that 
required careful consideration, the patentability of human embryonic (pluripotent) 
stem cells and cells lines, and the scope to be conferred on patents relating to 
sequences or partial sequences of genes isolated from the human body.
788
 With regard 
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to the second question, the Commission concluded that certain provisions of the 
Biotech Directive, such as those relating to the scope of protection to be granted to 
gene sequences, appear to give Member States some flexibility in its transposal into 
national law, which may give rise to differing interpretations.
789
 In particular, 
consideration should be given to the scope to be conferred on patents involving DNA 
sequences and proteins deriving from those sequences, as well as those based on 
ESTs and SNPs.
790
 Essentially, the question to be reviewed was whether patents on 
gene sequences should be allowed according to the classical model of patent claim 
(absolute product protection covering possible future uses of the claimed sequence), 
or whether the patent should be restricted so that only the specific use disclosed in the 
patent application can be claimed (purpose-bound protection).
791  
In order to address the questions laid out by the 2002 report, the Commission 
submitted a second report in 2005. With regard to the scope of protection of human 
gene patents, the Commission acknowledged that after examining the Biotech 
Directive’s provisions on patent scope, no indication was found that these articles 
address the concept of a restricted scope of protection relating to the specific use 
identified for the gene sequence concerned.
792
 However, the report noted the intent of 
Articles 8 and 9 to extend the protection conferred by a patent to any biological 
material obtained from the claimed product or in which the claimed product is 
incorporated and the same genetic information also expresses its function. In this 
regard, Article 9 would limit the scope of protection of genetic patents not to the 
function of the invention but to the functionality of it, that is, to the extent that the 
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patented genetic information is able to work, to gene expression.
793
 Nonetheless, in 
the case of human genes, the specific function of the claimed sequence must be 
disclosed in the patent application and therefore, the scope of protection of these 
patents would be in any case limited to the extent that the genetic material can 
perform the function claimed by the applicant. 
Following this, the report then recognized the possibility of interpreting Article 9 as a 
requirement for purpose-bound protection since a reading of Article 5(3) and Recitals 
23 and 25 together might suggest that the Community legislator had intended to at 
least raise the possibility of a limited scope of protection covering only the specific 
industrial application identified in the patent, as far as this particular type of invention 
is concerned.
794
 Otherwise, Article 5(3) requiring the industrial application of a 
human gene sequence to be disclosed in the patent application would merely repeat a 
standard requirement of general patent law.
795
 It seems therefore that the Commission 
does not completely rule out the possibility of purpose-bound protection, at least 
within the context of human gene patents; and that, furthermore, it recognizes a 
logical link between Articles 9 and 5(3) of the Biotech Directive. 
Although the meeting of the informal Group of Experts in March 2003 concluded that 
there were no objective reasons to create a specific regime of purpose-bound 
protection for gene patents, it left two questions to be answered. First, there is the 
question of whether gene sequences isolated from the human body should be given 
different treatment to chemical substances on ethical grounds.
796
 A second question 
refers to whether it is more valuable to society to allow broad scope of protection to 
the first inventor or whether a patent on a gene sequence should be limited in scope to 
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allow future uses of such sequences to be patented freely.
797
 In view of the different 
existing approaches between Member States in their interpretations of Article 9 and 
the dangers of over generous patents for subsequent innovation, the Commission 
opted for not taking a clear standpoint on the interpretation of Article 9 as purpose-
bound protection as opposed to classical absolute protection, but decided to continue 
monitoring the potential economic consequences of possible divergences between 
Member States’ legislations. 
Following the second Commission report, the Parliament published a resolution in 
2005 attempting to answer the question of whether a patent on DNA should cover 
only the specific use disclosed in the patent application, or whether other functions 
and possible future uses should also be covered by the patent.
798
 In response to this 
question, the Parliament has called for a further limitation of DNA patents to the 
concrete application provided for them, and for the scope of the patent to be limited to 
that application allowing others to use or patent the same sequence for other 
applications, that is, purpose-bound protection.
799
 This interpretation of Article 9 is 
also shared by the CJEU, as it made clear in the Monsanto decision, and various 
national laws. 
6.4.4. The CJEU Decision In Monsanto V. Cefetra 
In 2005, a patent case arose in several European countries concerning a genetically 
modified soybean plant, which resulted in the first CJEU decision interpreting Article 
9 of the Biotech Directive. With this decision, the CJEU began to exercise its role in 
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shaping EU patent policy.
800
 The referral to the CJEU related to a dispute between a 
European patent (EP0546090 (hereinafter EP 090)) granted to Monsanto - on a plant 
gene isolated sequence with the capacity of rendering the Roundup Ready (RR) 
soybean plant herbicide resistant - and two European companies, Cefetra B.V. 
(Cefetra) and Alfred C. Toepfer International GmbH (Toepfer). This RR soybean was 
cultivated in a large scale in Argentina, where there was no protection for the plant 
gene, and then imported to the Netherlands as soy meal by Cefetra and Toepfer.
801
 In 
the Netherlands and other EU countries (including Denmark, Spain and the UK) the 
DNA sequence utilized in the RR soybeans was however covered by the Monsanto 
European patent EP 090.  
The Monsanto patent was granted on 19 June 1996 and related to ‘Glyphosate tolerant 
5-enolpyruvylshikimate-3-phosphate synthases’. Glyphosate is a non-selective 
herbicide that blocks an enzyme responsible for the synthesis of aromatic amino acids 
(Class I enzyme 5- enol-pyruvylshikimate-3-phosphate synthase (EPSPS enzyme)). 
Such enzyme plays an important role in the growth of plants and thus can cause their 
death when inhibited. Monsanto however found a class of EPSPS enzymes that are 
not sensitive to glyphosate, and thus, allow plants containing such enzymes to survive 
the effects of glyphosate. Monsanto inserted those genes into the DNA of a soy plant 
(RR soybean plant), thus making it glyphosate-herbicide resistant.
802
 As a result, the 
Monsanto RR soybean invention allows farmers to spray their fields with herbicide 
that kills the weeds but without damaging the crops.
803
  This patent did not have any 
claims to soy meal but it only claimed the DNA sequence used in the genetic 
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modification process. In principle, Monsanto could thus only claim infringement 
against the derived soy meal if the conditions of Article 9 of the Biotech Directive 
were met. 
For procedural reasons, Monsanto could not obtain a patent for this invention in 
Argentina, which encouraged other companies to grow large amounts of transgenic 
soybean containing the EPSPS gene in this country
804
 without the permission from 
Monsanto. After being grown in Argentina, the soybeans were pressed and processed 
to obtain the soy oil and the residual material (soy meal) was crushed, dried, heated 
and pressed into an end product that is used as animal feed.
805
  This soymeal was then 
imported into the Netherlands where Monsanto’s invention was covered by the EP 
090. To avoid infringement, Monsanto sought to prevent imports containing the 
genetically modified soybean into a number of European territories,
806
 including the 
Netherlands where in 2005 and 2006 three consignments were detained custom 
authorities under Regulation 1383/2003
807
 for suspected infringement of the 
Monsanto patent and confirmed that the meal contained the RR soybean.
808
  
                                                 
804
 Philip Webber, ‘Limitation of Gene Patents to Functioning DNA’ (2011) 17 Journal of Commercial 
Biotechnology 201. 
805
 Charles Gielen, ‘Netherlands: Patents - Biotech Directive - Scope of Protection’ (2010) 32 EIPR 93. 
806
 Gareth Morgan and Lisa A Haile, ‘A Shadow Falls over Gene Patents in the United States and 
Europe’ (2010) 28 Nat Biotech 1172. Monsanto filed suits in Denmark, the UK (Monsanto v Cargill 
[2007] EWHC 2257 (Pat)), and Spain (Monsanto Technology LLC v Sesostris SAE, ‘Roundup Ready 
Spain’ (Juzgado de lo Mercantil (Commercial Court of Madrid)) Decision No 488/07 [2007]). 
807
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003 of 22 July 2003 concerning customs action against goods 
suspected of infringing certain intellectual property rights and the measures to be taken against goods 
found to have infringed such rights. 
808





In order to stop or avoid infringement of its patent, Monsanto sued Cefetra and 
Toepfer for importing the soy meal into the Netherlands. The two cases were joined
809
 
and the District Court of The Hague, pronounced a first interlocutory judgment on 19 
March 2008 finding that the subsequent crushing, separation, and treatment stages 
were too drastic to still assume a direct relationship between the methods and the 
soymeal and thus the soya meal did not constitute a product directly obtained from the 
patented method.
810
 Then a second judgment on 24 September 2008 submitted four 
preliminary questions to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU. 
6.4.4.1. Referral Questions And Answers By The CJEU 
The main question referred to the CJEU related to the interpretation of Article 9 of the 
Biotech Directive. In this regard, the court asked whether a patent on a DNA 
sequence can protect any product containing the patented genetic information even 
though the protected sequence is not performing its function of being herbicide 
resistant but performed its function in the past (in the soy plant) and could also 
perform it in the future if isolated and inserted into a plant cell.
811
  In other words, the 
question was whether the Biotech Directive provides protection for products deriving 
from the patented genetic material regardless of whether the protected gene sequence 
actually performs its function. 
The other three questions related to the exhaustive character of Article 9 over national 
patent law; the retroactive effect of the Biotech Directive, that is, whether Article 9 is 
applicable to patents granted prior to its adoption; and whether Articles 27 and 30 of 
the TRIPS Agreement should influence the interpretation of Article 9. 
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6.4.4.1.1. The First Question: Does Article 9 Confer Purpose-Bound Protection? 
With regard to the first question, it was crucial that not RR soybeans as such, but dead 
soy meal, in which the genetic information can only be found in a residual state, was 
imported.
812
 The Biotech Directive does not contain any provisions regarding dead 
matter since such material cannot replicate itself and thus does not need special 
legislation.
813
 However, since the DNA sequence had performed its function in the 
soy plants, and could be isolated to perform its function again in an adequate host, the 
parties disagreed on whether the DNA was actually performing its function in the 
imported meal.  
Following the Advocate General Mengozzi opinion,
814
 the CJEU held in paragraphs 
38 and 39 of the decision that: 
‘the protection provided for in Article 9 of the Biotech Directive is not available when 
the genetic information has ceased to perform the function it performed in the initial 
material from which the material in question is derived. 
It also follows that that protection cannot be relied on in relation to the material in 
question on the sole ground that the DNA sequence containing the genetic 
information could be extracted from it and perform its function in a cell of a living 
organism into which it has been transferred’. 
In interpreting the requirement of performing the claimed function of the genetic 
material set out in Article 9, the CJEU referred to Article 5(3) and related recitals of 
the Biotech Directive regarding the industrial application of human gene sequences. 
Especially relevant is paragraph 45 of the decision stating that: 
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‘Since the Directive thus makes the patentability of a DNA sequence subject to 
indication of the function it performs, it must be regarded as not according any 
protection to a patented DNA sequence which is not able to perform the specific 
function for which it was patented’.
815
 
By referring to the Biotech Directive’s provisions on industrial applicability, the 
CJEU made clear that the function referred to in Article 9 corresponds with the 
invention’s utility disclosed in the patent application as required in Article 5(3). 
Basically, the CJEU admitted that the Biotech Directive’s express requirement of 
disclosing a real and present function in the patent application should be read as 
incorporating the function of the gene into the concept of the DNA sequences as 
patentable inventions and, therefore, the scope of protection of such patents should be 
equally restricted to that function.
816
 Thus, if the genetic sequence cannot perform the 
function as claimed, the patent claim should be unenforceable.
817
 With this decision, 
the CJEU discarded the possibility of interpreting Article 9 as a requirement of 
absolute product protection and gave his reasons for ruling purpose-bound protection 
for gene patents in which the scope of protection corresponds with their actual 
industrial application.  
However, even though such interpretation of Article 9 seems logical with regard to 
claims over isolated human gene sequences as such, which are subject to the 
requirement of Article 5(3), abolishing absolute product protection for all types of 
genetic inventions is not consistent with the text of the Biotech Directive. In this 
sense, some authors have seen the CJEU’s reference to Article 5(3) and related 
Recitals as an erroneous mix of concepts. According to this view, the requirement of 
disclosing the function of a gene is to satisfy the patentability requirement of 
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industrial application, not to restrict the scope of properly granted patent claims 
directed at genes the function of which had been identified and disclosed in the patent 
application.
818
 Article 5(3) requires disclosure of the function in the patent 
application, which suggests disclosure in the specification and no limitation in the 
claim.
819
 It has been argued that with this decision the CJEU equates a DNA that no 
longer performs its function in a specific embodiment, to a DNA sequence that has no 
function.
820
 And even if one reads a requirement of purpose-bound protection from 
Article 5(3), that is still not the same as saying that the claimed DNA sequence must 
perform its function at all times.
821
 Furthermore, Article 5(3) relates to human DNA, 
while the Monsanto invention concerns plant genetic material. In this regard, this 
importation by the CJEU might be read as an unjustified imposition of additional 
requirements to gene inventions that does not find support in the Biotech Directive. 
Nevertheless, within the context of human gene patents, both Recital 23 relating to the 
requirement of industrial application and Article 9 regarding scope of protection, refer 
to the ‘function’ of the gene, a word that is used in the Biotech Directive as equivalent 
to ‘industrial application’. Furthermore, if mentioning the function is a constitutive 
element of a human DNA invention and without disclosure of function in the patent 
application there is no technical teaching; then the scope of the patent should be 
limited to the function disclosed.
822
 A reading of Article 5(3), Recital 23 and Article 9 
all together suggests that it was the legislator’s intention to establish purpose-bound 
protection for at least patents on human genetic material. The CJEU and the 
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Parliament have also taken this approach, although they have arguably correctly 
extended this interpretation to all types of genetic patents. In this regard, the CJEU’s 
reference to Article 5(3) in a case concerning plant genetic material suggests that 
Article 5(3) could be applicable to non-human gene patents, thus extending the impact 
of this provision to all types of inventions concerning genetic information.  
6.4.4.1.2. Second And Third Questions: Does Article 9 Preclude National Law From 
Awarding Absolute Product Protection To Gene Patents? And If So, Does It Apply 
Retroactively?  
The second question to the CJEU sought clarification with regard to the relationship 
between the Biotech Directive and national patent law. The question was essentially 
whether Article 9 provides a minimum standard for protection in addition to the 
general provisions of national patent law, or whether it is exhaustive and overrules 
national patent law so that a DNA sequence is further required to perform its function 
to establish infringement.
823
 This question arises from the fact that national patent 
authorities disagree on what are the obligations imposed,
824
 and thus differ in their 
interpretations of the Biotech Directive. In response, the CJEU referred to Recitals 3, 
5, 7, 8 and 13 to finally find that Article 9 reflects the Community legislature’s 
intention to ensure the same protection for patents in all Member States, so that the 
effect of this provision must be regarded as exhausted,
825
 no matter whether the patent 
in question was filed before or after the implementation of the Biotech Directive.
826
  
As the Advocate General noted, the fact that the rules are incomplete does not mean 
that they are not exhaustive but the system established by that measure is exhaustive 
with regard to the particular matters dealt with, giving freedom to national legislature 
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only in those areas where the EU legislature has not intervened.
827
 This is because 
extended protection would compromise the balance sought between the interests of 
patent holders and other operators and, on the other hand, it would give rise to 
differences between the Member States, which would ultimately foster trade 
barriers.
828
 Nonetheless, the practical effects of Article 9 are limited since a 
corresponding provision has not been included in the EPC although European 
countries are progressively introducing legislation expressly limiting the scope of 
protection of gene patents, especially those of human origin, to the disclosed function.  
For example, Articles L611-18(2) of the French Intellectual Property Code limit the 
protection of any invention relating to an element of the human body to the extent 
necessary for the realization and the exploitation of its particular use; while Article 
L6113-2-1 restricts the scope of any gene sequence claim to the disclosed 
application.
829
 Likewise, the interplay of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the new section 1a of 
the German Patent Act effectively restricts the scope of patents for human gene 
sequences to their disclosed purpose by requiring patent applicants to disclose and to 
claim the specific application of the gene sequence.
830
 This provision means the 
abolition of absolute substance protection and the introduction of functional substance 
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protection for sequences or partial sequences of human genes or of the genes that 
correspond to the structure of a natural substance or partial sequence of a human 
gene.
831
 Similar provisions can be found in Article 3.1d of the Italian Law Decree
832
 
and in the Spanish Patent Act.
833
 The UK on the other hand has not expressly barred 
gene patents from absolute protection but had already offered purpose-bound 
protection for DNA sequences prior to the approval of the Biotech Directive.
834
 
However, in case of European patents granted with effect in a national country that 
has not adopted provisions implementing Articles 5(3) and 9 of the Biotech Directive, 
there is no need to disclose the function of the invention in the application and 
absolute substance protection should therefore be possible for human genes as well.
835
 
6.4.4.1.3. Fourth Question: Do Articles 27 And 30 Of The TRIPS Agreement Affect 
The Interpretation Of Article 9 Of The Biotech Directive As Purpose-Bound 
Protection?  
The fourth question only becomes relevant if the Biotech Directive is interpreted as 
having an exhaustive effect on national patent law that preempts the national 
legislature from adopting absolute product protection for genetic inventions. This 
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question basically asks whether Articles 27 and 30 of the TRIPS Agreement affect the 
interpretation of Article 9 of the Biotech Directive as purpose-bound protection. 
While the TRIPS Agreement was ratified by the European Community, it has no 
direct effect on EU legislation.
836
 The case law of the CJEU expressly precludes the 
possibility of testing the lawfulness of a provision of EU law against WTO 
agreements, even though the preparatory works of the Biotech Directive indicate that 
the Community legislature took the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement into account 
in preparing the Biotech Directive’s text.
837
 However, to avoid possible conflicts, the 
Community, when possible, applies an interpretation in keeping with the TRIPS 
Agreement although its provisions are not directly binding to EU courts. 
After clarifying this, the CJEU noted that Articles 27 and 30 of the TRIPS Agreement 
related to patentability and the exceptions to the rights conferred by a patent rather 
than to the patent extent of protection as Article 9 of the Biotech Directive does. 
Notwithstanding this difference, the court explained that an interpretation of Article 9 
limiting the protection it confers to situations in which the patented product performs 
its function does not appear to conflict unreasonably with a normal exploitation of the 
patent and does not ‘unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent 
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties’, within the meaning 
of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement.
838
 It thus concludes that the interpretation 
given of Article 9 of the Biotech Directive is not to be influenced by Articles 27 and 
30 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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6.4.4.2. Impact Of The Decision 
The Monsanto decision forms part of an ongoing trend to restrict the expansion of 
patent rights for DNA material. In this regard, the CJEU’s interpretation of Article 9 
of the Biotech Directive is one of the very first manifestations of the European 
judiciary in this approach towards imposing heightened patentability standards for 
genetic inventions.
839
 Nevertheless, the specific characteristics of this case, which 
involves death material resulting from genetically modified soy plants, raise questions 
regarding the implications of the CJEU’s judgment for cases where the resulting 
material possesses different properties. The decision of the CJEU takes very much 
into account the particular circumstances of the case, and thus it should be expected 
that future decisions do not apply the same standards if the characteristics of the case 
differ substantially. This interpretation would leave room for fair gene patent 
protection in each specific case, which should nonetheless correspond with the actual 
technical contribution made by the patentee.
840
 In the case of gene patents, such 
technical contribution is, according to the text of the Biotech Directive, the 
invention’s ability to carry out its function. Thus, although the CJEU’s decision 
rejects absolute product protection for genes, it restricts the scope of protection no 
further than to the actual technical value of the invention, thus seeking to establish a 
balanced interpretation that serves both the interests of patentees and the general 
public. 
For innovators within the agricultural biotech sector, purpose-bound protection would 
mean that patents on plant genes are no longer able to claim protection over derivative 
or processed products incorporating the invention unless the invention’s function is 
also being performed. In this sense, a new form of claim drafting would need to be 
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adopted to obtain protection on such products.
841
 Furthermore, companies may also 
start paying more attention to alternative forms of protection such as plant breeder’s 
rights protection pursuant to the International Convention for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (UPOV),
842
 which provides protection for final products 
containing the protected plant variety. Nonetheless this decision represents an 
important opportunity for farmers in their battle against patents over genetically 
modified plants and seeds. With purpose-bound protection, farmers are no longer 
liable for manufacturing final products containing the patented invention unless the 
latter is performing its industrial application as indicated by the patent applicant. 
For patentees in general, the decision removes a broad layer of protection that may 
erode the value of key patents within a company’s portfolio.
843
 Article 9 of the 
Biotech Directive breaks with the principle of absolute product protection prevailing 
in other technical fields and approximates gene patents protection to the protection 
conferred by use or method patents.
844
 It has been claimed that this ruling undermines 
the efforts for global intellectual harmonization by creating a lucrative loophole for 
patent infringement because growers could potentially circumvent gene patents over 
genetically modified crops by growing the crops in a country where the gene is not 
patented, and then importing the product into a country wherein the patent is in force 
with impunity.
845
 Nevertheless, as long as the imported product does not infringe the 
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patent under Article 9 of the Biotech Directive, the fact that an invention is not 
protected in a certain country cannot be interpreted as an opportunity to easily 
infringe the patentee’s rights.  
Furthermore, the Monsanto decision may also have an impact on the viability of 
patents claiming isolated DNA or RNA sequences used as reagents, including 
reagents used in diagnostic methods such as gene tests and DNA chips.
846
 These 
nucleotides do not perform their function in a reagent vial or kit, thus patent claims 
directed to this subject matter may not be enforceable in view of the CJEU’s 
judgment.
847
 On the other hand, the need to prove that the infringing product is 
performing the patent’s intended utility will increase litigation costs on the plaintiff’s 
side,
848
 which may discourage patentees such as medium-size companies from 
asserting their patent rights. Furthermore, this fact would also help to deter firms from 
starting litigation proceedings for strategic purposes only. In this regard, although 
discouraging patent owners from enforcing their exclusive rights is potentially 
prejudicial for patentees in this area, it represents a significant step towards public 
access to genetic diagnostic and test tools. 
Finally, with regard to the role of Article 5(3) of the Biotech Directive in interpreting 
purpose-bound protection, the CJEU clarified that the function referred to in Article 9 
is the industrial applicability disclosed by the applicant and not the biological 
function.
849
 Thus, the interplay between both articles and related recitals gives the 
requirement of industrial application a fundamental role in the patentability of gene 
patents. Furthermore, although Article 5 of the Biotech Directive only seems to 
concern the human body and its parts, the Monsanto decision subtly extends the scope 
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of the requirement in Article 5(3) concerning human genes and sequences thereof to 
cover genetic inventions in general. The CJEU decision reaffirms that the requirement 
of Article 9 of the Biotech Directive applies to human, animal and plant genetic 
sequences and therefore, by referring to the industrial application disclosed according 
to Article 5(3), this decision implies that the statement on function in the patent 
application required in Article 5(3) would also apply to non-human genes and gene 
sequences,
850
 thus extending the impact of the disclosure of industrial application 
requirement to all genetic inventions. 
6.5. Concluding Remarks 
As was discussed in the second part of this chapter, a clear delimitation of the scope 
of the patent is determinant for effectively defining the extent of the rights of the 
patentee and the limitations that such rights impose to competitors.  However, the 
special characteristics of fast developing industries like genetics, where many 
inventions claim pioneer status, pose problems to the application of general patent 
provisions on patent scope. In particular, inventors’ races for obtaining priority and 
the broadest possible scope of patent protection gave rise to patent claims that did not 
correspond with the invention’s technical contribution to the art. In order to ensure 
that the scope of genetic patents is limited to their actual practical value, Article 9 of 
the Biotech Directive restricted the scope of protection of all patents concerning 
genetic material to their ability to perform their intended function. This approach 
preempts the grant of absolute product protection, at least within the context of human 
DNA sequences as such, and thus is compatible with those economic theories on the 
size of patent scope that support narrowing the scope of protection granted to 
inventions in groundbreaking scientific fields. 
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Article 9 of the Biotech Directive simply introduces specific requirements for genetic 
inventions and thus is applied in addition to the general European patent law rules on 
the determination of patent scope. In fact, the interpretation of Article 9 as purpose-
bound protection has recently been discussed by the CJEU in Monsanto v. Cefetra. In 
line with the Parliament’s view, the CJEU has made clear with this decision that 
Article 9 is to be interpreted as limiting the scope of protection of gene patents to their 
ability to perform their desired function. Furthermore, the CJEU held that the function 
referred to in Article 9 is the industrial applicability disclosed by the applicant 
according to Article 5(3) of the Biotech Directive, which concerns patents over 
human genes and fragments thereof. Therefore, although the suitability of applying 
such approach to non-human gene patents is questionable, by referring to Article 5(3) 
of the Biotech Directive, the Monsanto decision implicitly extends the scope of the 
requirement in Article 5(3) concerning human genes to cover genetic inventions in 
general. Thus, together with Article 5(3) and related recitals, Article 9 forms part of 
an ongoing trend towards restricting the patentability of genetic material to the extent 
that they are usable in practice. 
The purpose of this chapter was to offer a complete analysis of the role of the 
requirement of industrial application in determining the extent of patent protection 
awarded to inventions over human genetic material. To do so, the chapter showed the 
importance of preventing the grant of overly broad patent scopes in the case of gene 
inventions and examined how the Biotech Directive’s delimitation of the scope of 
gene patents relates to the principal economic theories on patent scope. The chapter 
then analysed the Biotech Directive’s introduction of purpose-bound protection for 
human gene patents and how this provision has been applied in practice as an 








7. HUMAN GENE PATENTS, PATENT CLUSTERS AND 
INNOVATIVE PROGRESS   
7.1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades there has been an ongoing increase in the number of 
patents concerning biotechnological inventions. Moreover, today more and more 
products incorporate not a single new invention but a combination of many different 
components, each of which may be the subject of one or more patents. In industries 
like biotechnology where research is cumulative, this situation poses difficulties to the 
operation of the patent system. In particular, there is the concern that extensive 
patenting and over fragmentation of rights may give rise to clusters of overlapping 
patents that could pose barriers to the development of subsequent innovations. It has 
been argued that if such patent floods emerge, a restrictive exercise of the patentees’ 
exclusive rights would impede access to essential technologies, discourage further 
research and restrain future innovation. In this regard, different mechanisms to 
address the negative consequences of this situation have been proposed, and in some 
cases successfully implemented. However, none of the existing alternatives offers an 
over reaching solution to restrict the negative impact of extensive patenting on 
subsequent innovation in gene technologies. 
Therefore, this chapter of the thesis argues that, besides ex post models to improve 
access to important genetic innovations, the Biotech Directive’s strict interpretation of 
the requirement of industrial application for genetic inventions - in the sense that it 
poses a higher barrier to patentability and a limitation to the scope of protection 
granted to these types of inventions - can assist patent authorities in avoiding 
extensive patenting of gene sequences that do not provide a useful contribution to the 






This chapter of the thesis first analyses the background and effects of extensive 
patenting in the progress of innovation in gene technologies. Second, it explores the 
related ‘theory of the anticommons’, its main arguments, potential implications and 
practical limitations, to then discuss the possibility of an anticommons situation in the 
field of gene-based research tools. Finally, the chapter analyses some possible 
solutions to the problems associated with patent thicketing, their characteristics and 
limitations, and how the European strict approach towards the implementation of the 
industrial application requirement (that is applied prior to other promising ex post 
access mechanism) can help to impede the formation of unduly restricting patent 
conglomerates by limiting the number of broad patents without practical utility. 
7.2. Patent Clusters In Biotechnology 
7.2.1. Strengthening Patent Systems In Europe 
Over the last three decades, governments worldwide have adopted policies aimed at 
strengthening patent systems. In particular, reforms have been mainly focused on two 
objectives: encouraging innovators to use the patent system and reinforcing the rights 
of patent holders.
851
 Following the US example, Europe has gradually developed 
innovation policies that reflect a notably strong pro-patenting approach; especially in 
emerging industries like biotechnology. Relying on the assumption that patents are 
essential for boosting innovation, European governments have adopted measures to 
promote the utilization of the patent system. With regard to biotechnology, 
governments have implemented policies directed at making patents available for new 
subject matter, such as genetically engineered life forms or isolated human genes, and 
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new types of applicants like universities and other publicly-funded research 
institutions; extending the term of patent protection; and establishing lower patenting 
standards. 
7.2.1.1. New Patentable Subject Matter 
Partly in response to the perceived demands from emerging fields of research and 
technology such as human genetics, since the 1980s there has been a tendency 
towards broadening the definition of patentable subject matter. In this regard, 
European countries have developed policies and rules to consolidate the inclusion of 
living material as patentable subject matter.852 In consequence, as Chapter 5 of this 
thesis showed, today the EPO and national patent offices routinely issue patents on 
inventions concerning newly discovered genetic material like isolated human gene 
fragments.  
Nonetheless, policies extending patentability in these areas have received strong 
criticism, especially in the case of gene-based technologies.
853
 As discussed in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis, patents are widely seen as an effective mechanism for 
promoting innovation in the particular field of biotechnology. However, the question 
of whether biotech inventions should be susceptible of patent protection is still the 
focus of debate. In particular, disputes continue to arise regarding the types of biotech 
inventions that merit patent protection.
854
 In this sense, while patents concerning the 
use of enzymes in the paper industry hardly attract much attention, patents over 
isolated human gene fragments for the development of diagnostic kits are often the 
focus of controversy.  
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7.2.1.2. Universities And Public Research Institutions As Patent Owners 
Until the 1980s, the biotechnology field resembled a commons model in which 
governments encouraged the free flow of information about new scientific advances 
such as genetic discoveries and the results from publicly funded research used to be 
immediately published.
855
 Public institutions owned few patents and the technologies 
covered by those patents were not commercialized.
856
 An example would the 
discovery of the monoclonal antibody by Cesar Milstein and George Kohler in 1975, 
which was not patented and freely accessible by the public.
857
 However, this is no 
longer the case. Claims about the existence of a supposed ‘European paradox’ in 
academic research - according to which many European countries could hold 
prominent worldwide positions in terms of scientific achievements, but would not be 
able to transform them into technological advantages - have triggered policy measures 
aimed at facilitating the transformation of academic scientific research into 
marketable technical products.
858
 In this regard, patents have started to be considered 
as a good means for exploiting the commercial and social benefits of discoveries 
resulting from publicly-funded academic research; and thus, for bringing scientific 
knowledge into practice.  
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Traditionally, the prestige and value of academic researchers were mainly based upon 
peers’ recognition of their contributions to advancing scientific knowledge.
859
 
Publicly supported research was presumptively placed in the public domain, while 
privately supported research was typically appropriated as intellectual property. 
However, during the past decades, the remarkable value of upstream research projects 
carried out by universities (especially in biomedical sciences) has helped to attract 
private investment.
860
 As a result, commercial biotechnology firms have emerged 
between the upstream research of academic laboratories and the targeted downstream 
product development of private firms, which has made it difficult to mantain the 
previous boundaries between public and private research in biotech sciences.
861
  
Today, upstream research in biotechnology is now increasingly likely to be private in 
one or more senses of the term, supported by private funds, carried out in a private 
institution, or privately appropriated through patents, trade secrecy, or agreements that 
restrict the use of materials and data.
862
 Researchers in the public and private sectors 
are often working on the same problems, whether competitively or collaboratively,
863
 
and the incentives that govern private property rights have been progressively 
incorporated into academic and other types of public research institutions. Today the 
value of an investigation often depends in great part on the degree to which a 
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researcher can generate an invention.
864
 The prevailing wisdom is that institutions 
performing publicly sponsored research should patent their discoveries to promote 
commercial development,
865
 which makes universities increasingly eager to obtain 
patent protection for their research results. In consequence, researchers now 
increasingly seek to be co-inventors of patents and receive royalties from licensing 
their inventions. 
University patents came to the attention of the European academic community, 
policy-makers, and the general public as a consequence of the impressive growth 
registered in the number of patent applications by US universities after the 
introduction of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.
866
  However, the history and organization 
of the US system differs in many ways from the European one.
867
 In several European 
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jurisdictions the existence of the so-called ‘professor’s privilege’, which exempts 
academic personnel from attributing the rights over the inventions they generate to 
their employers, gives academic individuals the power to decide whether to patent, 
commercialize, or license their own inventions. Based on the argument that the 
professor’s privilege discourages academic scientists to commercialize their 
intellectual property rights, this exemption was abolished in some European countries 
including Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany and Norway.
868
 In other countries, 
like France, Ireland and UK, governments have adopted institutional ownership rights 
over academic inventions and (or) guidelines for incentivizing university patenting 
and foster more consistent practices in IP management.
869
 Jointly, these reforms have 
led to a notable increase in university patenting in most European countries. 
7.2.1.3. Extended Term Of Patent Protection 
With the introduction of the TRIPS Agreement in 1995 the term of patent protection 
was extended to a minimum term of 20 years in all WTO Member States.
870
 Thus, all 
European countries members of the WTO were required to adopt the new term of 
patent protection if they had not done so yet.  Furthermore, since 1993 supplementary 
protection certificates (SPCs) are available for medicinal products, which allow to 
further extend this period for a maximum of 5 years from the end of the lawful term 
of the basic patent for a period equal to the period which elapsed between the date on 
which the application for a basic patent was lodged and the date of the first 
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authorization to place the product on the market in the Community.
871
 SPCs were 
established to guarantee sufficient protection for the development of medicinal 
products in the EU and help to compensate owners for the long time needed to obtain 
regulatory marketing approval. In the case of biotechnology, diagnostic tests, 
biopharmaceuticals, and other biomedical products are entitled to apply for such 
supplementary protection. 
7.2.1.4. Lower Standards For Patentability  
Moreover, in new industries like biotechnology where there are a large number of 
inventions, the distinction between what constitutes an invention and what is a mere 
enhancement of an acknowledged technology is becoming increasingly difficult to 
discern.
872
 Thus, the evaluation of patent law requirements is often made in 
accordance with flexible criteria that sometimes lead to the grant of patents over pure 
discoveries or minor or trivial developments.
873
 Furthermore, as it was discussed in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis, applicants are in many cases successful in their attempts to 
broaden patent claims as much as possible in order to secure stronger scopes of 
protection that do not always correspond with the actual utility of the invention. 
In order to address some of the problems created by low patentability standards, the 
EPO adopted a ‘Raising the Bar’ policy directed to ensure that ‘the EPO grant patents 
only for innovations having sufficient inventive merit and meeting the needs of 
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 This same issue has also become a common concern among national 
patent authorities. However, not all the measures proposed have been successfully 
implemented and concerns still remain. 
7.2.2. The Result: Patent Clusters, Royalty Stacking, Patent Holdup And 
Defensive Patenting 
The patent law policies and reforms discussed above have resulted in a notable 
growth in the total number of biological patents, and patents covering a single 
technology. Moreover, the new pro-patenting scenario has also helped to encourage 
strategic patenting and increase the amount of upstream patents owned by universities 
and other public research institutions.  
In the last few years, the numbers of European patent filings and granted patents have 
risen in the biotech sector in general. Part of this growth can be explained by 
increased investment in research and development. However, a large part of this 
increase in patent activity is due to existing policies and strategic patenting 
behaviours aiming at reinforcing the bargaining position of patent holders and 
avoiding competition.
875
 Between 2002 and 2011 there has been a steady rise in the 
number of European biotech patents.
876
   In 2011 the EPO received around 5,900 
applications compared to the 5,700 that were filed in 2002. However, the number of 
granted patents has shown a more pronounced increase. In 2011 approximately 2,100 
patents were granted while in 2002 the EPO decided to grant patents over around 
1,000 inventions.  
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The amounts of so-called ‘submarine patents’, which are patents the issuance of 
which is intentionally delayed by the applicant, and ‘reach-through patent claims’, 
which give the owners of patents over upstream technologies rights in subsequent 
downstream discoveries, have also grown.
877
 Moreover, along with the general rise in 
the number of patents, there have also been numerous cases where an individual 
patent does not cover the entire set of inventions that form a specific product, but 
represents only a piece in a puzzle of patents covering a technical product or 
process.
878
 In contrast with the one-to-one correspondence between products and 
patents that might be expected, today there are many cases where hundreds of patents, 
which frequently overlap with each other, cover a same product. Moreover, those 
conglomerates of patents over a single technology rarely belong to a single owner, but 
ownership over those patent rights is usually divided among multiple owners.    
European universities are also increasingly active in terms of IP commercialization. 
Today, intellectual property rights over upstream inventions resulting from publicly 
funded research belong to universities in many countries including Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and UK.
879
 However, even 
though the number of patents owned by European universities and other public 
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institutions has increased in the last decade,
880
 the level of academic patenting in 
Europe still lags behind its US counterpart.
881
 Nevertheless, the situation has raised 
concerns among academics and other stakeholders. In particular, fears have been 
expressed about the impact of university patenting in future research. 
In discrete technologies patent holders can independently produce their goods and are 
not forced to enter collaborations with other technology holders whereas in 
cumulative technologies the opposite is true.
882
 In fields like biotechnology, where 
research is cumulative and builds upon previous discoveries, the increasing number of 
overlapping patents has contributed to the development of so-called patent clusters.  
The fact that those patents do not always fully comply with the traditional patent law 
requirements has also facilitated the formation of such conglomerates, creating 
difficulties for innovators. In this regard, the blooming of patents with broad claims 
and patents in the hands of public institutions exacerbate the problem. 
Patent clusters or floods are also usually referred to as ‘patent thickets’, a term that 
originated in litigation in the 1970s regarding Xerox’s dominance of a portion of the 
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 In 2000, economist Carl Shapiro re-introduced the term in 
academic discourse by defining patent thickets as ‘a dense web of overlapping 
intellectual property rights that a company must navigate its way through in order to 
actually commercialize new technology’.
884
 In essence, patent thicket is a descriptive 
term that refers to the problems that individuals may face when attempting to enter (or 
innovate in) a technology market that is flooded with upstream patent rights. In this 
scenario, patents cause regulatory blockage in the form of conglomerates of pre-
existing patents (and pending patents), which impose constraints to new innovators 
wishing to enter the market. Due to the negative connotation that this term carries, 
this thesis refers to the phenomenon of extensive patenting and fragmentation of 
rights as patent clusters, since such scenario do not always result in insurmountable 
obstacles to the progress of innovation.  
There are four main types of relationships between patents: blocking, complementary, 
independent and substitute. The evaluation of the positive and negative effects of a 
certain combination of patents would be much easier if all of the potential 
relationships between patents fell entirely into one these four categories. However, 
this is rarely the case. When two patents (A and B) block each other, the owner of 
patent B cannot practice the invention without a license from the owner of patent 
A.
885
 On the other hand, two patents that provide an additional benefit when used in 
combination are said to be complementary. Unlike blocking patents, complementary 
patents can each be practiced independently without requiring a license for the other 
patent. In contrast, independent patents are those that do different things and do not 
need to use other patents to perform their functions. Finally, two patents that perform 
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substantially identical functions or fulfill the same role but can be practiced 
independently are considered to be substitutes.
886
 While substitute and independent 
patents do not usually impose barriers to new innovators, blocking and 
complementary patents are likely to do so. 
According to Shapiro’s metaphor, the process of research and development is 
comparable to the continuous extension of a pyramid through the addition of new 
building blocks at the top.
887
 In the case of biotechnology, firms increasingly protect 
their contributions to this pyramid with overlapping patents.
888
 When these patents are 
complementary or block each other, newcomers to the pyramid need to obtain 
licenses for many or all the patents covering a particular technology that are essential 
to their research, which entails negotiating with all the patent holders concerned.  
The principal problems associated with patent thickets can be classified into four 
main issues: royalty stacking, patent holdup, strategic patenting and the related 
anticommons problem in sequential innovation. In practice, these problems often 
occur simultaneously or as a consequence of other’s effect. 
7.2.2.1. Royalty Stacking 
Royalty stacking arises when the combination of royalty fees that the developer of a 
new product needs to pay in order to cut through a patent cluster finally makes the 
product itself unprofitable. Despite the new wording, the economic logic behind 
royalty stacking is based on the ‘complements problem’ first studied by Augustin 
Cournot in 1838. Cournot showed that consumers benefit when all products that are 
complementary from a demand viewpoint are produced and marketed by a single 
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 However, in the case of patent rights, the complements problem is far more 
complex.  
Obtaining licenses from multiple patent owners may entail long and expensive 
negotiations, high economic risks and sometimes litigation costs. Moreover, since all 
the patents in a research area rarely belong to a single owner, businesses may find it 
difficult or even impossible to know with whom they are in conflict with, or whom 
they should approach for a license. While the precise extent of these problems 
remains unclear, empirical evidence has demonstrated that royalty stacking is far 
more than a theoretical possibility.
890
 In the field of genetics, current trends towards 
disintegration in the ownership of patent rights have revived discussions about the 
complements problem in innovative research and product development.  
For example, although a database of gene patents such as the PINTO database (Patent 
Information and Transparency On-line), which is aimed at improving transparency 
regarding the patent status of plant varieties,
891
 is a useful resource for improving 
transparency, granting too many property rights around isolated gene fragments could 
result in costly transactions to bundle licenses together before a firm can have an 
effective right to develop new gene-based technologies.
892
 When companies engage in 
a new project, an initial study of the patent landscape can sometimes reveal that there 
are dozens, sometimes more than 100 patents to consider.
893
 This was the case of the 
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Malaria Vaccine Initiative or the Golden Rice case where a freedom-to-operate survey 
initially uncovered 70 patents, belonging to 32 different companies and 
universities.
894
 In the long run, the sum of payable royalty fees may stop innovators 
from developing certain products, or divert resources to less promising projects,
895
 if 
that cost sufficiently reduces the profits from designing and manufacturing new 
technologies. 
7.2.2.2. Patent Holdup 
Holdup problems are common to all industries where patents exist. However, this 
problem is more frequent and complex in sectors that host heavy patent 
conglomerates. Holdup problems may appear, for instance, in cases where a drug 
manufacturer that has designed and started to produce a given product suddenly 
realizes that he may be infringing one or more patents. When this happens, the 
negotiating positions of the manufacturer and the patentees are unlikely to be 
balanced. Moreover, in the field of genetics the lack of substitutes for certain 
biomedical discoveries like patented gene sequences or receptors may increase the 
imbalance between patent holders.
896
 If the manufacturer decides not to obtain those 
licenses, his product may be found to be infringing others’ rights, even if the 
manufacturer was not aware of the existence of patents. Thus, in order to avoid risks 
the manufacturer will probably opt to acquire the necessary licenses, and in this case 
the patentee could and would probably seek greater royalties and impose stricter 
conditions since a refusal to grant a license could be highly damaging to the new 
manufacturer. 
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7.2.2.3. Defensive Patenting 
In contrast, strategic or defensive patenting refers to situations in which firms file 
patent applications only in order to strengthen their bargaining positions and extract 
benefits from competitors.  In this regard, even though strong patents may facilitate 
the transfer of technology, they may also facilitate anticompetitive behavior. As it has 
been previously discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, survey evidence suggests that 
firms in many industries have not increased their reliance on patents for appropriating 
the returns from research and development investment over the decade of the 
1980s.
897
 However, the number of patents has not ceased to rise.  
Today many companies aggressively seek to build large patent portfolios and use 
them as ‘bargaining chips’ to negotiate with competitors.
898
 For many firms, the only 
practical response to unintentional and sometimes unavoidable patent infringement is 
to file hundreds of patents each year in order to have something to trade with during 
cross-licensing negotiations.
899
 Clear examples of strategic patenting are the so-called 
‘patent trolls’, which are organizations that amass patent rights for the purpose of 
conducting opportunistic patent litigation against alleged infringers. As Turner 
describes them, ‘trolls do not reduce technology to practice yet close it off to use by 
complementary technologies’.
900
 Thus, the existence of thickets of overlapping 
patents encourage not only defensive patenting but also the formation of patent trolls 
seeking to obtain benefits from those firms that perform research cumulatively. 
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7.3. The Anticommons Of Biotechnology Research 
7.3.1. Background 
As explained earlier in this chapter, in industries like biotechnology where research is 
cumulative and innovations build upon existing knowledge, patent clusters can act as 
barriers that hinder innovation rather than encouraging it. However, although the 
existence of such patent conglomerates can impede an optimal functioning of the 
patent system, to what extent they are able to stifle innovation and research is not yet 
entirely clear. Within the context of patent property rights, the so-called ‘theory of the 
anticommons’ refers to the idea that a massive increase in the number of patents (or 
patent floods) will hamper the development of new inventions and thus innovation. In 
contrast, the counterarguments to the anticommons proposition object that the theory 
contains important shortcomings in addition to the relative lack of empirical evidence. 
In order to assess whether patent thickets in the biotech industry will create a situation 
of tragedy in the levels of innovation and research, this part of the thesis analyses the 
reasoning, implications and limitations of the anticommons theory.  
In 1998, by reversing the definition of a commons, Heller described what he called an 
‘anticommons situation’. In an anticommons, multiple owners are each endowed with 
the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and nobody has an effective 
privilege of use.
901
 On the contrary, in a ‘commons situation’ multiple owners have 
the right to use a given resource but no one has the right to exclude others.
902
 Thus, 
although in a commons nobody has the right or duty to exclude others from using the 
shared resource (open access), neither can anyone sell or administer such resource.  
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Subsequently, the idea of a ‘tragedy of the anticommons’ was developed by mirroring 
the so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’, which was first proposed by Hardin in the 
1960s. The tragedy of the commons is based around the ‘rational choice theory’, 
which stands the notion that man seeks to maximize utility in all areas of life. From a 
socio-economic perspective, the rational choice theory explains that people maximize 
the utility of a given good because maximization is rational.
903
 Building upon this 
assumption, Hardin describes how freedom in the commons would result in the 
destruction of a given resource, that is, how individuals with access to the commons 
would fail to consider the social cost of their actions. The example given by Hardin to 
illustrate his theory is a pasture open to all, in which each rational utility maximizer 
herdsman would try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. This is 
because each of the individual herdsmen with privilege to use the pasture would 
obtain more advantages than disadvantages by adding cows to graze on the common 
resource.
904
 The fundamental ideas of this theory have been used to explain other 
environmental problems like pollution, over exploitation of fisheries or destruction of 




On the other side of the spectrum, Heller proposes a different tragedy. By using the 
example of empty Moscow storefronts, Heller illustrates how multiple rights of 
exclusion over a scarce resource could lead to a tragedy of underuse.
906
 In a commons 
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situation misalignments may appear due to externalities not captured in the calculus 
of interests of the individual users.
907
 However, the tragedy of the anticommons may 
occur because multiple holders of exclusion rights do not fully internalize the costs 
created by the enforcement of their rights to exclude others. In sum, Heller’s theory 
suggests that although over exploitation of available resources is far from complying 
with the conditions of optimal use; neither is a situation of under exploitation. 
Therefore, like two sides of the same coin, both commons and anticommons systems 
of property, if taken to the limit, could provoke a sub-optimal utilization of a given 
resource.  
7.3.2. The Tragedy Of The Anticommons In Gene Patenting: Implications And 
Shortcomings 
Although the anticommons theory had been to some extent discussed in the property 
literature, Heller’s article had a major impact on intellectual property discussions, 
especially in relation to the problem of patent clusters in software and gene 
technologies. Since a patent grants its owner the right to exclude others from using the 
patented invention, the theory of the anticommons helps to explain some of the 
problems encountered by the patent system due to the creation of clusters of 
overlapping patents. In essence, this theory challenges the premise that stronger patent 
protection will always foster innovation. It builds on the idea that excessive patenting 
can inhibit the free flow and diffusion of scientific knowledge and the ability of 
researchers to build cumulatively on each other’s discoveries; and thus the expansion 
of patent rights privatizing the scientific commons would ultimately limit scientific 
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progress. For example, in technological fields where dense patent floods have 
emerged and patentees refuse to license their rights, royalty stacking problems may 
discourage the development of promising and innovative ideas.  
Over-fragmentation of patent rights usually generates additional costs to the practical 
functioning of the patent system.  This is because the reunification of fragmented 
rights generally involves transaction and strategic costs of a great magnitude, 
including transaction costs of rearranging entitlements, heterogeneous interests of 
owners, and cognitive biases among researchers that lead to over estimating their 
intellectual property assets.
908
  In this respect, the tragedy of the anticommons 
describes a hypothetical situation in which the negative externalities created by 
multiple rights of exclusion over blocking or complementary technologies provoke 
the waste of resources that may otherwise help to promote innovation and 
development. 
The anticommons idea originated from Heller’s broader theory derived from studying 
Russia’s transition from communism to a market economy and received support from 
several economists.
909
 However, despite the widespread diffusion of the anticommons 
theory, several shortcomings can be identified when it is applied to the patent system 
with regard to gene technologies. First, an implicit part of the anticommons argument 
is that there is a scarcity in the biological commons akin to a geographical scarcity.
910
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However, the intangible commons in patent property rights differ from traditional 
tangible property like land, water, air, etc.
911
 Furthermore, the ‘geography’ in genetic 
sciences is much more complex than physical land. For example in genetic research 
there can be many starting points and many routes that will lead to the desired final 
innovative product.
912
 Moreover, unlike tangible properties, the intangible commons 
cannot be easily defined. It could be pictured as a cloud of information or ideas that, 
unlike tangible property, do not depreciate in the same way that tangible resources do 
when they are shared by multiple individuals. 
Second, patent rights are limited in time. The anticommons tragedy in patent property 
rights would therefore be a temporary problem that could only have limited impact on 
future research. Due to the temporary nature of patents, patent holders will be able to 
enforce their rights of exclusion for a maximum time of twenty years, and thus the 
negative externalities that result from an anticommons situation in the patent system 
would be deemed to disappear.  
Third, the grant of exclusive patent rights does not necessarily imply that resources 
will be under exploited. Patent owners are given exclusion rights but they can also use 
their patents. Thus, they may exclude others from usage but at the same time, may 
directly use the facility or allow others’ access upon permission.
913
 Moreover, even 
during the period of patent protection, patent holders also face the possibility that new 
patented inventions, old patents that have expired and thus become freely available, or 
new techniques that come into the public domain will erode their dominance.
914
  
Applicants usually file patent applications because they intend to make profits by 
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utilizing the patent system. Thus, if patent holders do not practice their inventions, 
neither do they license them, they would probably miss important income 
opportunities.  
Fourth, patents help to facilitate investment and innovation in sectors the activities of 
which are costly and risky.  Therefore, the rights to restrict use that are granted to 
patent owners also serve to foster the development of certain industries.
915
 For 
example, as Chapter 2 of this thesis demonstrated, since patent protection is available, 
innovation in the biotech industry has progresses at high speed. 
Finally, there is a lack of exhaustive empirical evidence regarding the possible 
negative effects associated with patent clusters. Furthermore, in the case of gene 
patents the existence of contradictory studies concerning the implications of thickets 
in biotech innovation
916
 poses difficulties for identifying a potential anticommons 
situation in this industry.  
Therefore, although the anticommons theory anticipates a possible consequence of 
excessive patenting in gene technologies, there is no substantial evidence to sustain 
such proposition. Nevertheless, even though the number of cases where patent 
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monopolies have in reality hindered innovation is reduced, there is no guarantee that 
more cases will not arise in the future. For example, as the next section of this chapter 
shows, in the area of genetic research tools, the increase in the number of patents over 
upstream innovations pose barriers to the development of important medical products 
such as diagnostic tests for personalized medicine.  
7.3.3. The Case Of Biotech Research Tools 
The problems associated with extensive patenting are especially serious with regard to 
certain types of gene technologies where the proliferation of patent rights could stop 
or slow down the development of potentially life-saving products. This is the case of 
research tools, which are materials used in the laboratory to aid investigators in 
discovering and developing new products. They are sometimes referred to as 
‘upstream products’ because they comprise early stage inventions that are used to 
develop final products. On the other hand, end products developed through the use of 
upstream research tools are known as ‘downstream inventions’.
917
 Examples of 
research tools include partial sequences of genes (ESTs), genes, cell lines, 
monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth factors, combinatorial 
chemistry and DNA libraries, clones and cloning tools, methods, laboratory 
equipment and machines.
918
 A frequently cited example of research tools are ESTs, 
which are very often used to find certain parts of DNA – they can be used to identify 
an expressed gene and also as a sequence-tagged site marker to locate a particular 
gene on a physical map of a genome.
919
 In contrast, commercial applications of 
upstream research tools are for example gene therapies, diagnostic products, and 
biologic drugs.  
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The distinction between research tools and downstream technologies is not clearly 
defined. Research tools may be developed by public entities, private companies, or by 
entities that develop both upstream products and downstream commercial application. 
They may also be included in the commercial application sold to the end-user, like 
diagnostic tests. Moreover, companies can develop research tools themselves, or 
acquire them through purchasing the assets of another company, or obtaining a 
license. In this regard, the cost involved in developing research tools in-house or 
acquiring the assets of a company can be very high, and thus, licensing is usually the 
most cost-effective method of obtaining the rights to use a research tool.
920
 However, 
as explained above, licensing negotiations often involve structural problems (such as 
imbalanced bargaining positions) that could lead to an inefficient utilization of these 
technologies.  
In human genetics, patent applications over research tools are frequently based on 
new discoveries the utility of which can only be defined by reference to their value in 
performing further research.  This situation may foster the growth of markets based 
on licenses of patented upstream products and research discoveries that would have 
otherwise been in the public domain.
921
 Since today most research tools are 
patentable, problems may arise in the development of new commercial technologies if 
it is necessary to use multiple research tools each of which might require a separate 
license.  The royalties assigned to various licensors may severely erode profit 
potential, creating a disincentive for companies that require numerous research tools 
to develop specific commercial products or services.
922
 Subsequently, the need to 
collect multiple rights upstream could have the effect of preventing the development 
of publicly beneficial products further downstream, which could in turn hinder future 
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innovation in important areas such as biomedical research. This is for instance the 
case of biomarkers used in personalized medicine, which are usually subject to many 
different patents owned by different companies that unless all of them are acquired, 
pose important barriers to the development of diagnostic test kits.  
Therefore, the case of extensive patenting in the area of research tools and its impact 
on subsequent innovation suggests that the possibility of an anticommons situation in 
gene technologies should not be completely disregarded. Moreover, it might be 
advisable to adopt measures to prevent the development of such blocking webs of 
patents from which inventors are compelled to obtain licencees in order to be able to 
carry out further research. 
7.4. Raising The Industrial Application Bar For Gene Patents 
As noted above, although empirical evidence regarding the existence of patent 
thickets in genetic research is not completely conclusive, past and present events 
suggest that extensive patenting in this and other fields might hinder access to 
important technological developments.
923
 In this regard, adopting adequate measures 
would help to prevent, or at least minimize, the potential negative effects of extensive 
patenting on research and innovation. However, the special characteristics of genetic 
inventions and the particular structural features of the sector (e.g. public-private 
nature, unclear distinction between upstream/basic and downstream/applied research, 
relatively new and fast growing industry, and view of patents as essential means to 
foster innovation) make it hard to find a viable solution to the problem of patent 
conglomerates. 
Some studies suggest that in several sectors patent protection is not the main 
mechanism through which firms appropriate the returns to their product and process 
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 In those sectors, forbidding patents in order to impede the formation of 
patent clusters might be an option. However, innovation in life sciences industries is 
heavily dependent on patents, and thus, excluding biotech inventions from patent 
protection would not probably be the most effective policy mechanism.  
The solutions most discussed in patent law literature to address the issue of patent 
clusters include the so-called experimental use exception, cross-licensing, compulsory 
licensing and patent pools. In addition, there are also other measures that do not 
establish particular ex post mechanisms for facilitating access to patented 
technologies, but they rely on ex ante policy measures that help control the formation 
of thickets. In this regard, policies to raise the bar in the application of patent law 
standards, particularly those provisions that relate to the rules on industrial application 
and scope of protection, have garnered increasing attention. 
7.4.1. Experimental Use Exception 
The experimental use exception is an exception to the rights of the patent proprietor, 
which allows third parties to use a patented invention for the purposes of research. 
This exception, which is especially relevant for the development of drugs, is part of 
European patent law. Although the EPC and the recently adopted regulation on the 
unitary patent make no explicit mention to it,
925
 national patent laws generally include 
a provision stating that the rights conferred by a patent shall not extent to acts done 
for experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of the patented invention. 
However, interpretations of the scope and application of this exception vary across 
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countries because there may be considerable differences between the wording of the 
national legislations and interpretations of the exception by national courts.
926
  
For example, in science-based industries like genetics, the line between commercial 
and non-commercial research is often difficult to draw, thus, in order to avoid 
disparities, any research exception would need to be carefully worded and 
implemented.
927
 Today, most research in biotechnology has commercial implications 
and patents are increasingly important for firms in this sector,
928
 therefore the 
experimental use exception is unlikely to provide an optimal model for addressing 
access problems. 
7.4.2. Licensing Agreements 
The most employed mechanisms for gaining access to patented technologies are 
licensing agreements. A license is a right granted by the patent holder to a third party 
to use the patented invention. Today there are a wide variety of licensing agreements, 
which offer flexible models that allow adjusting access and use conditions to specific 
needs and circumstances. For example, when two companies own complementary or 
blocking patents, cross-licensing helps to reduce transaction costs to a minimum.
929
 
However, success in licensing negotiations usually depends on the perceived value of 
the patentee’s patent portfolio. The stronger the patent, the stronger the bargaining 
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position. Moreover, since licensing agreements are entirely voluntary, access to 
essential technologies is not guaranteed in all cases.
930
 Therefore, although licensing 
agreements provide a simple and effective model for spreading the benefits of 
patented technologies, they entail important shortcomings such as the possible 
imbalances between the positions of the negotiating parties, and the voluntary 
character of these types of contracts. 
7.4.3. Compulsory Licenses 
Under the compulsory license mechanism a government or court can compel a patent 
holder to license his patent rights in order to meet different public purposes that go 
beyond the private interests of the patentee.
931
 Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
which relates to non-voluntary licences granted to third parties, affirms the right of 
Member States to grant compulsory licenses and gives them autonomy to determine 
the grounds on which such licenses can be granted.
932
 Today, virtually all countries 
around the world allow compulsory licenses in their national legislation, which can be 
granted either by a judge or the government.
933
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It has been suggested that the compulsory licensing mechanism could be invoked to 
address the potential negative effects of patent clusters in biotechnology.
934
 However, 
this solution is of exceptional character and thus it can only be used under 
extraordinary circumstances like when a demand for the patented product is not being 
met; there is a public interest in the patented invention; the proprietor of the patent 
refuses to grant a licence or licences on reasonable terms; or the patentee has imposed 
conditions on the grant of licences that unfairly prejudice the manufacture of the 
invention, the use of materials not protected by the patent, or the establishment of 
industrial activities. Nonetheless, following the controversy surrounding diagnostic 
gene patents, specially tailored compulsory license mechanisms with the aim of 
serving public health have been established in France, Belgium and Switzerland.
935
  
7.4.4. Patent Pools 
Even though existing evidence does not entirely support claims that patent pools 
encourage innovation,
936
 so far, the most promising solution to patent thickets is the 
establishment of patent pools. Patent pools are agreements between two or more 
patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another, or to license them 
as a package (one-stop shop) to third parties that are willing to pay the royalty fee 
associated with the license. Those licenses are provided to the licensee either directly 
by the patent holders or indirectly through a new entity that is specifically created for 
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 In technical fields other than genetics, patent pools have 
emerged to deal with the problems associated with patent thickets. For example, in 
1917 an aircraft pool was formed that encompassed almost all aircraft manufacturers 
at the time the US entered World War I.
938
 In the late 1990s, several patent pools were 
also formed in the electronics and telecommunications industries, for instance, the 
moving picture experts group (MPEG)-2 pool in 1997 for inventions relating to the 
MPEG-2 standard.
939
 Patent pools can contribute to limit royalty stacking and 
transaction costs, reduce patent litigation, institutionalize information exchange, allow 
and encourage access to the pooled technologies, and spread the risks and benefits of 
technology implementation among the participants of the pool.
940
 Furthermore, patent 
pools have often been a successful solution to conflicts over standards, particularly 
when each firm’s patents only cover a small component of a product.
941
  
In the electronics and telecommunications sector, the generation of internationally 
accepted technical standards is seen as a strong incentive for setting up patent 
pools.
942
 However, such a standard is missing in genetics.
943
 Therefore, in the absence 
of this type of standard-driven incentive, dominant players in the biotech industry 
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might be reluctant to join a pool because there is no apparent gain.
944
 Moreover, since 
biotech firms use to rely on their patent portfolio for securing funding and negotiating 
licensing agreements, they might refuse to share their intellectual property assets. 
With regard to antitrust issues, patent pools may be found to be pro-competitive if 
they integrate complementary technologies that are ‘essential’ to a standard, clear 
blocking positions, reduce transaction costs, avoid costly infringement litigation and 
promote the dissemination of technology.
945
 However, pools may be found to be anti-
competitive if they constitute methods of fixing prices or allocating customers and 
markets, exclude competitors, or discourage participants and third parties from 
engaging in research and development.
946
 The biotech industry, particularly the area 
of genetics, is dispersed, does not have common goals and advances too quickly, 
making it difficult to identify the essential patents for a pool especially in early stage 
biotechnology areas.
947
 In this sense, difficulties in defining technical standards and 
thus identifying which complementary patents are essential to the pool may 
complicate and delay proceedings with antitrust authorities.  
Nonetheless, there are some cases of successful patent pools in gene technologies. 
The Golden Rice pool is an example of how private and public organizations, in a 
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combined effort, dealt with surrounding patents to create a non-profit humanitarian 
patent pool in the form of a single licensing authority.
948
 In this case, Potrykus 
succeeded in genetically enriching rice grains with β-carotene24 (Golden Rice) and 
wanted to transfer the materials to developing countries for further breeding in order 
to introduce the trait into local varieties that are consumed in these countries.
949
 Six 
key patent holders were approached and an agreement was reached that allowed 
Potrykus to grant licences free of charge to developing countries, with the right to 
sub-license.
950
 Subsequently, a humanitarian board was established as a voluntary 
association to assist in the associated governance and decision-making.
951
 A similar 
example is the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) corona virus pool, which 
is supported by the World Health Organization (WHO).
952
 However, these examples 
are very atypical and are based on altruistic purposes that most biotechnology 
companies do not share.  
With features similar to patent pools, ‘open source’ models where participation is 
open for all in exchange of a fair price and certain conditions have recently been 
implemented successfully, such as Syngenta’s TraitAbility or the International 
Licensing Platform (ILP).
953
 Nonetheless, both patent pools and open innovation 
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models rely on the voluntary engagement of the patentees, and thus, they do not offer 
a valid solution in cases where patent holders refuse to license their technologies. 
Furthermore, the examples above relate to the agricultural field, where companies 
have different characteristics and objectives than those in the pharmaceutical sector. 
Institutions like the OECD consider the concept of a patent pool to be an interesting 
one for biotechnology but have some doubts as to whether the technologies and 
markets for genetic inventions are amenable to patent pools.
954
 In December 2000, the 
USPTO also distributed a white paper that developed the idea of a patent pool for 
biotechnology. The paper outlined some of the benefits and risks associated with 
patent pooling, as well as some legal restrictions. It concluded that pooling is a ‘win-
win’ situation for the interests of both public and private industries.
955
 However, a 
biotechnology patent pool would only be effective if a right balance between the cost 
of creating a pool and the prospect of adequate revenue generated by royalties on the 
end product is achieved.
956
 Thus, an important obstacle to starting, developing, and 
sustaining a patent pool is convincing the various parties that there is substantial 
economic benefit.
957
 Therefore, although in theory patent pools might seem to be a 
                                                                                                                                           
access to and use of plant breeding traits for vegetables that are protected by patents or plant breeders’ 





 OECD, ‘Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices, Report of a 
workshop organized by the OECD Working Party on Biotechnology’ (n 854) 67. 
955
 USPTO, ‘Patent Pools: A Solution to the Problem of access in biotechnology patents?’ (USPTO 
2000); Resnik (n 927). 
956
 USPTO, ‘Patent Pools: A Solution to the Problem of access in biotechnology patents?’ (n 955); 
Resnik (n 927); Verbeure and others (n 893). 
957
 Even then, there would probably be some holdouts. For example, a company with patents related to 





good solution to the potential problems related to the proliferation of patent clusters, 
when applied to biotech industries several difficulties arise such as lack of technical 
standards, antitrust issues, and limited and specific examples in gene-related 
technologies. Moreover, the important role of patents in biotech industries makes it 
difficult to build a patent pool based on the volunteer motivation of participants.  
7.4.5. Raising the Industrial Application Bar 
The models explained above could in some cases offer suitable solutions to the 
problematic effects of extensive patenting by improving access to the patented 
technologies forming the patent cluster. However, these mechanisms are insufficient 
in the sense that they do not prevent the formation of such conglomerates, but can 
only reduce the impact of their negative effects by providing access to the patented 
innovations in limited occasions. In this regard, adopting adequate policy and legal 
measures would help to preempt the excessive growth and fragmentation of patent 
rights in gene technologies.  
For instance, it has been proposed that patent standards should be strengthened so as 
to make sure that no patents are granted on pure scientific discoveries without 
industrial application or utility, and that patents are only granted to new and 
nonobvious inventions.
958
 Doing so would also allow drawing a line between science 
and technology and would probably avoid some of the most potentially threatening 
patents, such as patents on mere discoveries of human DNA sequences, to be granted 
or enforced.
959
 In this regard, the Biotech Directive’s approach towards the 
interpretation of the industrial application of gene patents would help to prevent 
massive patenting in an emerging and fast evolving industry like human genetics, 
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where dependency on upstream patents without a known practical function may pose 
serious barriers to the progress of future research. 
The most immediate consequence of the boom in patent applications over DNA 
inventions is a general increase in the workload of the EPO and all national patent 
offices. In this sense, low patenting standards, especially for new technologies, 
together with an increase in the workload of patent offices may have serious 
consequences for the quality of issued patents. Besides, in gene technologies, the 
speed at which new subject matter and scientific inventions are introduced in the 
patent system makes it harder to assess the state of the art and thus, to determine 
whether the claimed invention is novel, involves an inventive step and is industrially 
applicable.
960
  In this sense, although it is difficult to document, the quality of patents 
is reported to be declining.
961
  
As explained in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis, with regard to human genetic 
inventions, Article 5(3) of the Biotech Directive significantly facilitates a rigorous 
assessment of the industrial application requirement by imposing on applicants the 
obligation of disclosing the invention’s utility already in their patent applications. 
Moreover, after the introduction of the Biotech Directive, the extent of the scope of 
protection of this type of invention is defined according to the practical utility that the 
patentee claims. Therefore, raising the industrial application bar in order to prevent 
the negative effects of patent clusters in gene technologies is an approach fully 
supported by current European patent law and policy with regard to inventions over 
human genetic material. Furthermore, as explained in the previous chapter of the 
thesis, the effects of the Biotech Directive’s approach towards the industrial 
application of human DNA inventions may extend to inventions in other fields, thus 
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leaving the possibility of using this requirement for addressing the issue of patent 
conglomerates in other technology areas.  
Patent law should not be seen as a goal itself but as a means for achieving objectives 
of innovation and technological development.
962
 Therefore, interpreting existing 
legislation in light of the realities of biotechnology and modern patent practice would 
certainly enhance the role of patent laws in life sciences innovation. In this sense, 
without amending European patent law, the Biotech Directive standard of industrial 
application could restrict the emergence of patent floods and subsequent barriers to 
innovators. Precautionary measures, such as raising the bar of industrial application, 
would help to maximize the scientific, technological, and social benefits of patenting 
while minimizing the risk of excessive patent conglomerates, thus maintaining the qui 
pro quo of patent systems.
963
 Moreover, in light of Article 9 of the Biotech Directive, 
this solution would also serve to limit the scope of such patents to the actual function 
of the protected inventions, thus allowing inventors to access the patented 
technologies for any other uses falling outside the patent’s precise scope of protection. 
This approach does not aim to change patent laws or encourage the adoption of new 
legislation. On the contrary, it offers and ad hoc solution to prevent the possible 
formation of dangerous patent clusters that can be incorporated into the current 
system without modifying existing rules. In this regard, a 2005 report of the European 
Parliament encouraged the adjustment of the system as it now stands with proposals 
that further the objectives to stimulate innovation and the diffusion of knowledge.
964
 
Thus, developing a strict approach towards the interpretation of the requirement of 
industrial application as an ex ante measure to restrict the emergence of patent 
clusters in gene technologies would also fit such suggestion. 
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7.5. Concluding Remarks 
Due to the increasing levels of patenting activity in genetic industries, the idea of a 
possible cluster of fragmented patent rights that may restrict access to essential 
technologies, and thus, create an anticommons situation that could hinder future 
innovation, has garnered special attention. This issue has been occasionally discussed 
in patent law literature regarding biotechnology. However, there is a lack of 
substantial empirical evidence on the existence and potential negative effects of patent 
floods in this field. Nevertheless, recent cases, along with the importance of life 
sciences innovation for societies worldwide, invite to consider this issue as more than 
a simple theoretical possibility.  
In recent years, several measures to reduce the negative effects associated with patent 
clusters have been proposed. In particular, cross-licensing, patent pools, and open 
innovation models are considered to be the most promising solutions to patent 
thicketing. However, they present important limitations when applied to human gene 
technologies. For example, the lack of technology standards and the voluntary 
character of these agreements make it difficult for biotechnology companies, which 
depend so much on patent monetization, to engage in such negotiations. In this 
regard, this thesis argues that the current European approach towards the industrial 
application of genetic inventions in its different dimensions - by reducing the 
patentability of discoveries, raising the industrial application standard and restricting 
the scope of gene patents - can help to preempt the emergence of unduly restricting 
patent conglomerates. A strict interpretation of this requirement can reduce the 
number of patents over discoveries with no practical utility but also the amount of 
patents the scopes of which do not correspond with the technical utility claimed by 
the applicant. Furthermore, this policy option does not require modifying existing 
patent laws since the Biotech Directive and the EPC already provide a valuable 





Thus, in addition to encourage patentees to engage in licensing mechanisms to 
improve access to patented technologies, patent authorities can interpret the 
requirement of industrial application with a view towards avoiding excessive 
patenting and fragmentation of rights in specially problematic areas like genetic 
diagnosis where extensive patenting can pose serious barriers to the progress of 




















8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Concerns about the patentability of human DNA sequences before a specific function 
of the claimed genetic sequence has been identified has been part of the international 
debate over patenting biotechnological inventions since the 1980s. Patent rights are 
very important for innovation in biotechnology industries; however, allowing patents 
over human gene parts without a known application in industry would lead to an 
imbalance in the patent bargain that grants exclusive rights to inventors in exchange 
for the disclosure of innovative technologies that are useful for society. 
This thesis has argued that the 1998 Biotech Directive’s policy approach of requiring 
applicants to disclose the industrial application of the claimed human gene sequence 
has been able to address such concerns efficiently. There are important arguments 
against the adoption of a strict interpretation of the requirement of industrial 
application. In particular, with regard to human DNA patents it has been claimed that 
the commercial value of isolated human genetic material arises prior to and goes 
beyond the identification of a specific utility in industry, and that preventing 
companies from patenting gene fragments at an early stage would affect the capacity 
of firms of recovering the invested resources and thus interfere in the progress of 
further research. Besides, arguments have been raised regarding the discriminatory 
conditions that adopting stricter patentability standards for particular technologies 
may impose on inventors in such sectors.  
However, as was established in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, a system that applies a 
very loose industrial application criteria would arguably serve the objectives of fair 
reward and dissemination of knowledge that justify the grant of patent rights. In this 
regard, this thesis has argued that the Biotech Directive’s strict approach towards the 
industrial applicability of human gene inventions achieves an optimal balance 
between the private rights of the patentee and the public interest.  It has been shown 
that this interpretation serves to impede the grant of patents over vague and 





Furthermore, the EPO has pragmatically implemented this approach on a case-by-case 
basis that takes into consideration the particular characteristics that genetic inventions 
may present, for example with regard to the type of function that should be disclosed, 
the admissibility of results obtained through computer-assisted methods, or the need 
to disclose a specific industrial application when the claimed invention is essential for 
human health purposes.  
Following this, the thesis observed that the Biotech Directive’s industrial application 
disclosure requirement for human DNA sequences also plays a key role in the 
distinction between discoveries and inventions in this field. As has been analysed in 
Chapter 5, the exclusion from patentability of discoveries in European patent law is 
especially relevant in the case of inventions concerning naturally occurring genes, in 
the sense that discoveries of natural substances must acquire a technical character that 
goes beyond the abstract characteristics of living matter in its natural state. The EPO 
has traditionally solved this issue through the ‘isolation doctrine’, which allows the 
patentability of natural substances as long as they are isolated from their original 
surrounding. However, with the adoption of the Biotech Directive, in addition to 
isolating the human genetic material, applicants must specify the utility of the newly 
discovered sequence in the patent application in order for the claimed human DNA 
substance to acquire an invention’s technical character. This thesis noted that this 
interpretation of the exclusion of discoveries is consistent with traditional views of the 
European patent law requirement for an invention that require reducing discoveries to 
useful creations. Moreover, this double requirement further defines the distinction 
between discoveries and inventions in this context in view of the fact that all genes 
that are discovered have to be isolated first by technical means, which makes them 
accessible for further study but not for practical exploitation if the function of the 
isolated sequence is not determined. 
Furthermore, the thesis also noted that the criterion of industrial application has 
become the reference point for determining the scope of protection of all types of 





genetic patents to the ability of the claimed invention of performing its function. This 
provision has been interpreted by the majority as an open gate for establishing 
purpose-bound protection for this type of invention; while the Parliament, the CJEU 
and several national authorities have acknowledged that this article indeed abolishes 
absolute product protection in favour of purpose-bound protection limited to the 
industrial application disclosed by the applicant for all inventions concerning genetic 
information. In this sense, this thesis argued that this interpretation is in line with 
those economic theories in support of narrow scopes of protection in very innovative 
scientific fields like biotechnology where unduly broad scopes of protection may 
seriously undermine the progress of further research. In particular, this thesis 
considers that restricting the scope of protection of human genetic inventions to their 
capability of carrying our their intended utility helps to strike the balance between 
patent holders and third parties and promote subsequent innovation by ensuring that 
patented genes are freely available for exploitation and further research as long as the 
protected material does not perform the specific function claimed by the patentee. 
Finally, within this context the thesis highlighted that interpreting this function-related 
scope of protection of gene patents in general, human and non-human, by making 
reference to the Biotech Directive’s requirement of disclosing the industrial 
application of human gene sequences would mean that the latter provision becomes 
applicable to all types of genetic inventions and not limited to human DNA. Thus, the 
implications of adopting a strict approach towards the standard of industrial 
applicability would extend to all sorts of genetic inventions. 
Finally, the thesis acknowledged the serious consequences that extensive patenting 
and fragmentation of patent rights may have in research and innovation in gene 
technologies. Within this context, the thesis argued that the Biotech Directive’s policy 
initiative of raising the industrial applicability bar can act as an ex ante mechanism for 
reducing the patenting of overly broad patents on genetic discoveries that would 
unduly contribute to the formation of clusters of overlapping patents that pose barriers 
to future innovators. This thesis noted that despite this policy option does not provide 





efficient prior and complementary means to other promising ex post models for 
facilitating access to important gene patents such as biomedical technologies. In this 
sense, the requirement of industrial application would be part of a set of available 
measures that will play an important role in preventing the negative effects of 
extensive patenting of human DNA sequences.  
In view of the above, this thesis holds that the European strict approach towards the 
industrial application of human gene patents results in a system that offers a balanced 
and compromised policy option that is able to address key questions and objectives 
with regard to gene patents. In this regard, the thesis demonstrates that this approach 
towards the patentability of human genes is consistent with the origin and rationale 
behind the European requirement of industrial application as well as with the 
economic justification for the grant of patent rights as a means to promote innovation 
and dissemination of useful technologies. 
Furthermore, this thesis shows that adopting a strict interpretation of existing patent 
law standards in order to address the particular concerns that new technologies raise is 
feasible. The chapters of this thesis have shown that the Biotech Directive’s policy on 
raising the industrial application bar within the context of human gene patents has 
been effectively implemented by the EPO and is progressively being introduced in 
national patent systems. Moreover, this has been achieved notwithstanding the 
complex characteristics of human gene technologies. Thus, the analysis of this thesis 
can serve as an example for dealing with future cases where challenging new 
technologies pose difficulties to the patent system and the introduction of specific 
criteria may be required. In sum, the case of the requirement of industrial application 
in human gene inventions suggests that modifying the interpretation of patent law 
standards to deal with the particular challenges that new technologies may pose is 
possible and can be done efficiently across European countries, no matter the 
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